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ABSTRACT
In the 1930's, Americans struggled with a problem that 
still haunts the United States todays the problem of chronic 
poverty. Thirty years ago, the nation focused its attention 
on rural poverty, not the poverty of urban ghettos. The 
people of rural America had known hard times in the 1920's, 
but the worst came after 1929. No economic group sufferedi
more in the Depression than the nation's farmers, and no 
farmers were more poverty-stricken than Southern farm ten­
ants, sharecroppers, and migrant farm workers. In reality, 
too many people were trying to earn a living from the land., 
Over a half million farm families— or two million to five 
million individuals— were no longer needed as cotton tenants. 
In the lower Mississippi River Valley, over two out of every 
three farmers did not own land of their own. When Franklin 
D. Roosevelt took the oath of office in 1933, the Southern 
farm tenancy system had virtually reached the point of col­
lapse .
Initially, the Agricultural Adjustment Administra­
tion's crop reduction and acreage restriction programs hurt 
rather than helped tenants and croppers in the Southern 
cotton belt, but President Roosevelt soon embarked on a bold 
approach for alleviating the plight of low-income farmers.
The New Deal resettlement program took submarginal land out 
of cultivation, resettled farm families on land that would 
support a decent living, and gave them the best technical 
assistance available. Beginning in 1933, the Subsistence 
Homesteads Division of the Department of the Interior was 
the first New Deal agency to resettle low-income families on 
subsistence plots. Soon afterward, the Federal Emergency 
Relief Administration (FERA), under Harry L. Hopkins, 
launched a number of community projects as part of its rural 
rehabilitation program. More important, the Resettlement 
Administration (RA), created by executive order in April, 
1935, not only absorbed the subsistence homesteads and most 
FERA rural rehabilitation projects, but initiated a whole 
new series of communities located mostly in the South. 
Resettlement Administrator Rexford G. Tugwell set up a 
complex national organization with twelve regional offices 
and hundreds of state, district, and county offices. Two 
years later, operating under authority granted in the Bank- 
head-Jones Farm Tenant Act of 1937, the Farm Security 
Administration (FSA) replaced the RA, inherited its organi­
zation and most of its personnel, and completed the resettle­
ment program.
In Arkansas, Louisiana, and Mississippi (Region Six), 
the Division of Subsistence Homesteads, the Federal Emergency 
Relief Administration, and the Resettlement Administration 
together established a total of thirty resettlement projects. 
Some of the projects formed separate communities, others were
scattered farms, a few experimented with cooperative farming, 
but the vast majority operated on the familiar principle of 
every farmer owning his own plot and farmstead. The New 
Deal's ultimate solution of the problems of farm tenancy was 
to make independent farm owners out of tenant families. Thus 
the resettlement program evoked an old tenet of American 
agrarianism: the belief that the small independent land­
holder was the nation' s backbone. When the resettlement 
program was liquidated during World War II, most of the 
projects were operating far in the red. Yet the resettlement 
agencies did succeed in giving thousands of farm families in 
Region Six a new start, a sense of hope, and a higher 
standard of living. The New Deal provided other kinds of 
help for farm tenants and sharecroppers, but it never came 
to grips with the total problem of, rural poverty.
CHAPTER I
FARM TENANCY AND THE NEW DEAL
The Great Depression struck hard at tenant fanners 
and sharecroppers, the chronic victims of rural distress in 
the South. During the 1930's, the activities of the 
Southern Tenant Farmers' Union, the popularity of Tobacco 
Road and The Grapes of Wrath. studies made by such men as 
Charles S. Johnson and Arthur Raper— all helped to focus 
national attention on the southern tenant problem.-*- In 
1937, the President's Special Committee on Farm Tenancy 
reported that sixty-four per cent of All American farm 
tenants lived in the South.3 The Southern tenancy rate had 
increased from more than a third of all farmers in 1880 to 
more than half in 1930.3 In 1935, there were 1,831,475
-*-David Eugene Conrad, The Forgotten Farmers; The 
Story of Sharecroppers in the New Deal (Urbana, 111., 1965) , 
Chapters V, IX? Erskine Caldwell, Tobacco Road (New York, 
1932) ? John Steinbeck, The Grapes of Wrath (New York, 1939) ; 
Charles S. Johnson, The Shadow of the Plantation (Chicago,
1934); Arthur F. Raper, Preface to Peasantry (Chapel Hill,
1938). See also Charles S. Johnson, Edwin R. Embree, and 
Will Alexander, The Collapse of Cotton Tenancy (Chapel Hill,
1935).
^National Resources Board, Farm Tenancy: Report of
the President's Committee (Washington, 1937), 35, 96.
3Ibid., 39.
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tenant farmers in the South; this meant that tenancy had 
trapped more than eight and a half million people, or about 
one of every four Southerners.^ After 1900, the rate of 
tenancy among white farmers in the South increased rapidly 
while holding fairly steady among Negro farmers. By 1935, 
over forty-six per cent of all Southern white farmers were 
tenants compared to over seventy-nine per cent of Negro 
farmers, but white tenants outnumbered blacks by two to one.^ 
Tenancy rates were highest where cotton production was most 
intensive, notably in the Southern Black Belt. In 1930, 
Mississippi had the highest rate of farm tenancy in the 
nation; 72.2 per cent of all farmers in the state did not 
own the land they farmed. Georgia was second highest with 
55.5 per cent, followed closely by Alabama (64.5), Louisiana 
(63.7), South Carolina (62.2), and Arkansas (60.0).6 In all 
six states, nearly three out of every four cotton farms were 
operated with tenant labor.^ "The agricultural ladder, for
^U. S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of
the United States, 1939 (Washington, 1940), 621; U. S. Bureau 
of the Census, United States Census of Agriculture: 1935;
The Southern States, II (Washington, 1935), 108.
5Farm Tenancy: Report of the President1s Committee.
99; Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1939, p. 621.
6Farm Tenancy: Report of the President1s Committee.
96; U. S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the 
United States, 1934 (Washington, 1934), 553.
I ^W. A. Turner, A Graphic Summary of Farm Tenure.
U. S. Department of Agriculture, Misc. Pub. No. 261 
(Washington, 1936), 1-3.
these Americans," Franklin D. Roosevelt said in 1937, "has 
become a treadmill."8
The rural South had been sinking into the morass of 
tenancy since the Civil War. After 1865, military defeat 
and post-war adjustment presented Southern agriculture with 
a series of problems: the breakdown of the labor supply, a
scarcity of money, and lack of credit. Since former slaves 
had no property and no credit, they needed land without 
having to buy it or pay cash rent. Landlords had land but 
not enough cash to hire laborers. Together owners and 
tenants evolved a form of tenancy peculiar to the South in 
which they substituted produce and labor for money by sharing 
the crop, the only thing either had of value. A few tenants 
were able to pay cash rent for the use of land, but most 
were either sharecroppers or share tenants. The sharecropper 
was the most disadvantaged and least secure. He had 110 live­
stock or farm equipment or any semblance of capital; all he 
had was his own labor and that of his wife and children to 
produce and harvest the crop. The landlord furnished him 
with land, house, mule, tools, seed, and other supplies, and 
in return the cropper agreed to pay as rent half of the crop 
he produced. The share tenant was somewhat better off since 
he was able to furnish more of his own needs for his share of
^Franklin D. Roosevelt to the Congress of the Uhited 
States, February 16, 1937, in Farm Tenancy: Report of the
President's Committee. 25, 26.
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the crop. He supplied all of his own workstock and equipment 
as well as labor; consequently his rent was less, usually a 
fourth to a third of the crop. What further tightened the 
grip of poverty on the rural South was the crop-lien system. 
Because of the lack of agricultural credit, landlords 
depended on a local "furnish" merchant to advance supplies 
to the tenant and his family until the crop was harvested, 
and the storekeeper protected his investment by taking a 
mortgage or "lien" on the tenant's share of the future crop. 
Since merchants would risk supplies only on staples like 
cotton and tobacco, the one-crop system, overproduction, and 
/ soil exhaustion were more characteristic of the New South
f ' ■
than the slave South.0
The life of tenants and sharecroppers, both Negro and 
white, was a miserable existence in dirt, poverty, ignorance, 
and disease.10 They lived in the worst houses, usually two- 
or three-room unpainted shacks with cotton planted right up 
to the front door. The monotony of their basic diet— salt 
pork or fatback, corn bread, molasses, and sweet potatoes—  
explains the high rate of pellagra among tenants; malaria
^Rupert Vance. Human Factors in Cotton Culture (Chapel 
Hill, 1929), Chapter III.
10ln addition to the books cited in Footnote No.. .1, 
see Agee and Walker Evans, Let Us Now Praise Famous Men 
(Boston, 1960)? Howard Kester, Revolt Among the Sharecroppers 
(New York, 1936); Herman Clarence Nixon, Forty Acres and 
Steel Mules (Chapel Hill, 1941). For an Arkansas reaction, 
see Arkansas State Policy Committee, Agricultural Labor 
Problems in Arkansas. Published Paper No. 1 (n.p., October 
31, 1936).
and hookworm were also common. The children went to school, 
if at all, three to four months a year because they were 
needed in the fields. Tenant wives all aged prematurely, 
showing up in photographs as gaunt, frightened creatures. 
Tenant income was below subsistence levels, even by depres­
sion standards. The Agricultural Adjustment Administration 
and the University of Arkansas, in a 1934 survey, revealed 
that the cash income of tenants on three Arkansas plantations 
was about $300 for that year. ^  In a study in 1936, the Farm 
Security Administration found that 287 cotton tenants in the 
hill section of Arkansas had a total average cash income of 
$134.71 per year.'1’2 Despite lack of income, many croppers 
moved every two or three years? some were evicted, but 
others were looking for a better life that few ever found.
Everyone who traveled through the South in the 1930's 
to peer into tenant shacks and talk with croppers sitting on 
front porches was appalled by what he saw and heard.
Tenants lived in such extreme poverty that many observers 
sensed something un-American about it. Frazier Hunt, New 
York World-Telegram reporter, saw groups of cotton pickers 
working their way across cotton fields. "In some strange 
way, they reminded me," he said, "of Chinese coolies working
•^Conrad, The Forgotten Farmers, 12, 13.
■^Paul v. Maris, "Farm Tenancy," in U. S. Department 
of Agriculture, Farmers in a. Changing World? The Yearbook of 
Agriculture, 1940 (Washington, 1940), 889.
in the soya beans along the Southern Manchurian Railroad." 
"They seemed to belong to another land than the America I 
knew and loved. "it is in Arkansas that one finds the 
situation of the sharecroppers really tragic," wrote free­
lance author and traveler Fred Kelly. "I have never seen 
living conditions on lower standards, even in backward 
sections of E u r o p e . N a o m i  Mitchison, an English novelist, 
made a visit to Arkansas in 1935. "I have traveled over 
most of Europe and part of Africa," she said, "but I have 
never seen such terrible sights as I saw yesterday among the 
sharecroppers of A r k a n s a s . c o n d i t i o n s  among tenants on 
Arkansas plantations may have'been typical, but they were 
probably no worse than elsewhere in the cotton belt.
Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace decided to take a 
look for himself in 1936. "I have never seen among the 
peasantry of Europe, " he said, "poverty so abject as that 
which exists in this favorable cotton year in the great 
cotton states from Arkansas on to the East Coast. . .
Most tenants, sharecroppers, and submarginal farmers 
found it impossible to move out of this abject poverty and
13New York World-Telegram. July 30, 1935.
l^Quoted in "A Statement Concerning Farm Tenancy Sub­
mitted to the Governor's Commission on Farm Tenancy by the 
Executive Council, Southern Tenant Farmers1 Union," c. 1936, 
Socialist Party of America Papers, Duke university Library.
l5Quoted in Kester, Revolt Among the Sharecroppers. 51.
16flxthur M. Schlesinger, The Coming of the New Deal
(Boston, 1959), 375, 376.
up the agricultural ladder toward ownership. They were
caught in a squeeze between depression problems and certain
long-range trends in cotton farming. In 1935, Charles S.
Johnson, Edwin R. Embree, and Will W. Alexander published a
hard-hitting little book entitled The Collapse of Cotton
Tenancy predicting an early doom for the South1s plantation
type of farm organization, the one-crop pattern, and the
farm tenancy system. Indeed, if it had not been for federal
subsidies, they implied, cotton tenancy would have already
collapsed from a series of causes: soil depletion, an
abundant supply of ch&ap foreign cotton (and a consequent
loss of world markets), competition of synthetic fabrics
like rayon, and the mmBchanization of agriculture. What
will become, they were asking, of the millions of destitute
tenants and croppers and small farmers whose livelihood
1 7depend on cotton?x/
When Franklin D. Roosevelt took office on March 4, 
1933, he moved quickly to carry out the New Deal that he had 
proclaimed during the campaign. But early New Deal spending 
barely trickled down to the chief victims of rural distress. 
The Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA), a corner­
stone of the First New Deal, grew out of a conception of 
agricultural policy in which the central issues were prices 
and credit, not the relief of rural poverty. The purpose of
  . 17Johnson, Embree, and Alexander, The Collapse of
Cotton Tenancy. Chapter III.
the AAA was to raise prices by curtailing production. Farmers 
voluntarily agreed to take acreage out of production in 
return for "benefit payments" to replace lost income. Thus 
the AAA sought to restore farmers to "parity," a ratio of 
what fanners paid to what they received, based on farm pur­
chasing power and prices in the prosperous period of 1909- 
1914. But the Agricultural Adjustment Administration's 
cotton plow up and acreage reduction program worked directly 
against tenant farmers and sharecroppers. The AAA quite 
obviously reflected the interests of large farmers and land­
lords; tenants, for example, had no place on the AAA county 
committees which supervised the program locally, nor did AAA 
cotton contracts contain adequate safeguards for the protec­
tion of their interests. As a result, many landlords 
accepted benefit payments for taking acreage out of produc­
tion, while either cheating tenants and sharecroppers out of 
their rightful share of the subsidies or evicting those
]pwhose labor was no longer needed. °
In response to the landlords1 highland tactics and AAA
^®See Conrad, The Forgotten Farmers. Chapter IV? Fred
C. Frey and T. Lynn Smith, "The Influence of the AAA Cotton 
Program upon the Tenant, Cropper, and Laborer.” Rural Soci­
ology, I (May, 1936), 495-98? Harold Hoffsommer, "The AAA 
and the Sharecropper>1 Social Forces, XIII (May, 1935), 494- 
502?. Edwin G. Nourse, Joseph S. Davis, and John D. Black, 
Three Years of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration 
(Washington, 1937)? Henry I. Richards, Cotton and the Agri­
cultural Adjustment Administration (Washington, 1936) ?. and 
T. J.. Woof ter, Jr., et al.. Landlord and Tenant on the 
Cotton Plantation. WPA Research Monograph No. V (Washington,
1936).
policies, sharecroppers in Arkansas began to organize. What 
aroused Arkansas croppers was the action of one man, Hiram 
Norcross. In 1934, Norcross issued eviction notices to 
about forty families on his 4,500-acre plantation near 
Tyronza, Poinsett County, Arkansas. In July, a group of 
eighteen sharecroppers, white and Negro, meeting in a school 
building near Tyronza, organized the Southern Tenant Farmers' 
Union. They turned for leadership to H. L. Mitchell, former 
sharecropper and currently owner of a small dry cleaning 
shop; H. Clay East, service station operator; and J. R. 
Butler, saw mill hand and school teacher. The reason for 
forming a union was both to give sharecroppers and tenants 
some bargaining power with planters and to stop evictions 
and landlord chiseling under AAA contracts. Within a few 
months, the STFU had about 1,400 members in four or five 
northeastern Arkansas counties; by 1936, it had 50,000 mem­
bers in Arkansas and parts of Oklahoma, Texas, Missouri, 
Mississippi, and Tennessee. After watching union membership 
climb, landlords retaliated with a campaign of violence which 
dramatized the plight of Southern tenants. Planters and 
their allies arrested, jailed, flogged, and murdered union 
organizers and members; they broke up meetings by burning or 
shooting into homes, churches and other known union meeting 
places. STFU leaders adopted a policy of passive resistance, 
endured the attacks, and moved their headquarters across the
10
Mississippi River to Memphis, Tennessee.19
With the help of Socialist party leader Norman Thomas 
and a few quick-triggered landlords, the STFU put the tenant 
problem in the headlines and helped awaken the nation's con­
science. Even in Arkansas there was evidence of growing 
concern. Arkansas Governor J. Marion Futrell declared that 
farm tenancy was "eating at the vitals of the South's economic 
structure and, whether exaggerated or not, is of such serious 
character as to call for immediate and exhaustive study and 
examination with a view to its definite settlement."20 On 
August 15, 1936, Futrell announced that he would appoint a 
special commission composed of impartial and fair-minded 
citizens to investigate conditions among tenants and share­
croppers in the state and to recommend a solution to the 
problem.^1 On the commission's recommendations, the Arkansas 
legislature in 1939 passed legislation designed to reform 
some of the system's inequities.22
l^Conrad, The Forgotten Farmer. Chapters V, IX? M. S. 
Venkataramani, "Noman Thomas, Arkansas Sharecroppers, and 
the Roosevelt Agricultural Policies, 1933-1937," Mississippi 
Valley Historical Review. XLVII (September, 1960), 225-46?
John Gould Fletcher. Arkansas (Chapel Hill), 335-53.
20Arkansas Gazette (Little Rock), August 16, 1936.
21ibid., August 27, 1936.
22rphig-was the Arkansas Land Policy Act (Act 331)., 
approved March 16, 1939. See Acts . ... . oj£ the Fifty-Second 
General Assembly of the State of Arkansas . . . (Little Rock,
1939), 863-71.
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More important, Thomas and the STFU put pressure on 
the Roosevelt Administration to offer a positive program to 
relieve tenant suffering. At first, however, Secretary of 
Agriculture Henry A. Wallace defended AAA policies. He was 
not blind to the plight of tenants and sharecroppers; but 
farm tenancy had existed for a long time, Wallace maintained, 
and their low standard of living was not due to the new crop 
reduction program. The AAA's 1934-35 cotton contract, he 
argued, contained protection for sharecroppers in paragraph 
7, a provision that required landlords to keep the same
number of tenants they had the previous year. Wallace
v '•* 7believed that the AAA could not do any'more to protect the 
rights of tenants.
One group within the AAA, the urban liberals under 
Jerome Frank, did favor positive action to relieve the dis­
tress of tenants and sharecroppers. In February, 1934, with 
AAA director Chester Davis out of town, Frank circulated a 
directive which interpreted paragraph 7 to require that 
planters not only retain the same number of tenants but the 
same individuals as tenants. But Davis canceled the direc­
tive and, with the backing of Roosevelt and Wallace, fired 
Frank and most of his a l l i e s . ^4 President Roosevelt himself 
was sympathetic to the plight of sharecroppers, but he
23see Venkataramani, "Norman Thomas, Arkansas Share­
croppers, and the Roosevelt Agricultural Policies," 230-32, 
238.
24 ...  .....Conrad, The Forgotten Farmers, 141-49.
12
approached the problem with caution. "I know the South," he 
said to Norman Thomas, "and there is arising a new genera­
tion of leaders in the South and we've got to be patient."^5 
By 1935, the New Deal, while continuing acreage reduction 
schemes, had already started moving in the opposite direction, 
with programs that in effect boosted farm production by 
increasing the number of farmers and by making farm tenure 
more secure. Theinmost controversial New Deal experiment in 
helping farm tenants, sharecroppers, and submarginal farmers 
was the rural resettlement or community program.2®
Since the New Deal launched its resettlement program 
before the Southern tenant problem exploded in 1934, the 
earliest community projects showed little concern with dis­
advantaged and dispossessed farmers. Instead, these com­
munities drew inspiration from the back-to-the-land movement 
popular during the Great Depression.27 Following the 1929 
crash, many Americans despaired of the city and began to talk
2 5 Q u o t e d  in Schlesinger, The Coming of the New Deal,
378.
26'The best secondary account is Paul K. Conkin, To­
morrow a New World: The New Deal Community Program (Ithaca,
N. Y., 1959); Select Committee of the House Committee on 
Agriculture, Hearings on the Farm Security Administration,
78th Cong., 1st Sess., 1943-1944, part III, contains a 
factual summary f the resettlement projects.
27Conkin, Tomorrow a New World, 11, 12, 27-36, 79-89; 
see Pascal K. Whelpton, "The Extent, Character, and Future 
of the New Landward Movement,” Journal of Farm Economics. XV 
(January, 1933), 57-72.
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nostalgically of the land and of subsistence farming. A few 
sought escape into a pastoral utopia where men and women 
could get away from the materialism of industrial society 
and live a more fulfilling life close to the soil? but for 
most, subsistence faming was a means of temporary, relief.
Even Franklin D. Roosevelt possessed a mild form of back-to- 
the-landism. The President, wrote Rexford G. Tugwell,
"always did, and always would think people better off in the
Opcountry and would regard the cities as rather hopeless." ° 
While governor of New York, Roosevelt experimented with pro­
jects designed as a marriage of agriculture and industry in 
what he called "rural industrial groups"— a broad program 
for decentralizing industry and giving families a chance to 
combine the advantages of factory employment and rural 
living.3® "Suppose," asked Roosevelt in 1931, "one were to 
offer these [unemployed] men opportunity to go on the land, 
to provide a house and a few acres in the country and a little 
money and tools to put in a small food crop?"3® Thus after 
his inauguration he was more than receptive to plans for 
setting up subsistence homesteads and rural communities.
The Subsistence Homesteads Division of the Department
28.Rexford G. Tugwell, "The Sources of New Deal Reform' 
ism," Ethdcs, LXIV (July, 1954), 226.
3®Conkiri, Tomorrow a New World, 83.
...... 39F.ranklin D. Roosevelt, "Back to the Land, " Review
of Reviews. LXXXIV (October, 1931), 64.
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of the Interior was the first New Deal agency to work in the 
field of community building. During the Hundred Days,
Senator John H. Bankhead of Alabama attached a $25,000,000 
appropriation to the National Industrial Recovery Act pro­
viding a "blank check" for a program of subsistence home­
steads. Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes assumed 
responsibility for the appropriation, set up a Division of 
Subsistence Homesteads in August, 1933, and appointed M. L. 
Wilson as director. A farm economist from Montana State 
Agricultural College with both farming experience and aca­
demic credentials, Wilson envisioned subsistence farming as 
a means of realizing a "better life" away from the material­
ism and shallowness of what he called "the jazz-industrial 
age." Since he possessed broad authority, he experimented 
with communities for stranded mine workers and full-time farm 
colonies to take farm families off submarginal land, but 
most homestead projects were for part-time industrial 
workers. Generally, the industrial homesteads consisted of 
a cluster of twenty-five to one hundred homes located near 
the outskirts of a city or small town; each family raised 
much of their own food on a five- to ten-acre tract of land, 
while earning cash income in nearby factories or "in indus­
tries established within the communities.^
In 1934, the Federal Emergency Relief Administration
  .. 3l.conkin,.. Tomorrow a New WorId, 86-96; Schlesinger,
The Coming of the New Deal. 363, 364.
(FERA), under Harry L. Hopkins, began experimenting with 
community projects as part of its rural relief program. 
Hopkins combined all FERA rural relief programs as well as 
those of the Civil Works Administration into the Division of 
Rural Rehabilitation and Stranded Populations, turning it 
over to Lawrence Westbrook. As relief administrator in 
Texas, Westbrook had taken a hundred farm families off relief 
rolls and resettled them on the Woodlake cooperative com­
munity near Houston. In the case of destitute farmers, both 
Hopkins and Westbrook desired to shift emphasis from immedi­
ate relief to long-term rehabilitation. The Rural Rehabilita 
tion Division made loans and grants to needy farmers but also 
built a series of rural communities designed to take farmers 
off relief and put them back on farms full time. The FERA 
community program was slow to get off the ground; during the 
FERA's lifetime, Westbrook completed only two of the twenty- 
eight projects he initiated. Although the FERA communities 
were more relevant to the problems of the rural poor than 
those of the Subsistence Homesteads Division, the New Deal 
by 1935 had accomplished little toward relieving the distress 
of farm tenants, sharecroppers, and submarginal farmers.32
On April 30, 1935, soon after the end of the "reign 
of terror” against the STFU in eastern Arkansas, Roosevelt
32Conkin, Tomorrow a New World. 131-34; Lawrence 
Westbrook, "The Program of the Rural Rehabilitation Division 
of the FERA," Journal of Farm Economics. XVII (February,
1935), 89-100.
created the Resettlement Administration (RA) to take over 
both rural rehabilitation and the subsistence homesteads.33 
Rexford G. Tugwell, the new Resettlement Administrator, had 
long been a spokesman for the disadvantaged farmer in the AAA, 
and he had persuaded Roosevelt to bring together all rural 
poverty programs in a new, independent agency. 3^ The Re­
settlement Administration functioned through a balanced and 
coherent program aimed at stopping the waste of both human 
resources and natural resources.33 Rural rehabilitation was 
the emergency phase of the RA program and, though less 
spectacular, involved more money and more people than the 
better-known community projects. The Rural Rehabilitation 
Division made loans and grants to individual families to 
help them become self-supporting farm owners, sponsored rural 
cooperatives for purchasing farm machinery and equipment, 
and helped work out satisfactory debt adjustments between dis­
tressed farmers and their creditors. In the Land Utilization 
program, Tugwell sought to improve submarginal land through 
soil conservation, reforestation, and flood control and to 
convert it to nonagricultural uses. The Resettlement
...... 3.3.U. S.. Civil Service Commission,. Civil Service Acts
and Rules, Statutes. Executive Orders and Regulations, 
amended to June 30. 1935 (Washington. 1936), 80-89.
...... 3^See Rexford G. Tugwell, "The Resettlement Idea,"
Agricultural History. XXXIII (October, 1959), 159.
......35Will W. Alexander, "Rural Resettlement," The
Southern Review, I (Winter, 1936), 528-39.
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Division, Tugwell's special concern, completed most of the 
old subsistence homesteads and the FERA projects, and 
initiated a new series of communities located largely in the 
South. Tugwell favored the suburban or greenbelt towns near 
major cities, but he also approved infiltration or scattered 
farm projects and distinct farm communities for low-income 
farmers.3®
In 1936, a presidential election year, the landlord- 
tenant controversy continued to be a source of embarrassment 
to the Roosevelt Administration. During May and June, the 
Southern Tenant Farmers1 Union organized a general strike 
which idled 5>000 sharecroppers in northeast Arkansas, and 
violence again broke o u t . 3 ^ Strikers were harassed, beaten, 
arrested on vagrancy charges, and some were forced at gun 
point to return to work in the fields. When five or six 
unidentified men seized Little Rock, clergyman Claude 
Williams and Willie Sue Elagden, both STFU members, and 
flogged them, the incident appeared in national publications
O O(this was "true Arkansas hospitality" implied Time). A 
"March of Time” newsreel flashed the story of the strike
36conkin, Tomorrow a New World, 153-60.
...... 37see Stuart N. Jamieson, Labor Unionism in American
Agriculture, Bureau of Labor Statistics Bulletin No. 836 
(Washington, 1945), 309-13.
3®"Farmers: 'True Arkansas Hospitality,'"Time,
XXVII (June 29, 1936), 12-14? Oren Stephens, "Revolt in the
Deltas What Happened to the Sharecroppers' Union. ” Harper's
"Magazine. CLXXXIII (November, 194L), 658.
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across the nation's theatre screens. But President Roosevelt, 
even though in Little Rock on June 10 to celebrate the cen­
tennial of Arkansas' statehood, made no public mention of 
the strike.^9
Yet sharecropper unrest in Arkansas and STFU agitation 
apparently had some effect on the Roosevelt Administration1 s 
decision to take additional steps to attack the tenant prob­
lem, although the President himself made no public move until 
after his reelection. On November 16, 1936, he appointed a 
special presidential commission to study farm tenancy.^0 
Under Henry Wallace's chairmanship, it turned out a report 
in February, 1937, recommending that Congress set up a new 
agency to continue Resettlement Administration programs and 
to implement an expanded loan program to assist tenants 
toward landownership.^1 Senator Bankhead and Representative 
Marvin Jones of Texas, who had sponsored an unsuccessful 
farm tenancy bill in 1935, now introduced a new bill which 
followed the committee's recommendations. In July, 1937, 
Congress passed the Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act placing 
the entire New Deal rural poverty program for the first time
  % o r  his speech see Samuel I. Roseman (ed..) ,. The
Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt (12 
vols.; New York, 1939-1850), V, 195-202.




on a firm legislative foundation.^ On September 1, acting 
under authority granted by the Bankhead-Jones Act, Wallace 
abolished the Resettlement Administration (Tugwell had 
resigned in December, 1936), created the Farm Security 
Administration (FSA) , and assigned it the task of carrying 
out the new tenancy program.
"The FSA," writes William E. Leuchtenburg, "was the 
first agency to do anything substantial for the tenant, the 
sharecropper, and the migrant farmer. The Farm Security 
Administration embodied the final phase of the New Deal 
attack on rural poverty; in reality it was the Resettlement 
Administration under a new name with the same personnel 
(including Tugwell's successor, Will W. Alexander, as 
administrator). As a result Farm Security was the depository 
for a diversified collection of rural welfare programs. 
Alexander assumed responsibility for the RA's land utiliza­
tion, resettlement, and rural rehabilitation activities; but 
the latter, as in the RA, was his chief concern. He also 
administered the Bankhead-Jones tenant purchase program, a 
loan program enabling qualified tenant families to purchase 
family-size farms on forty-year notes at three per cent
^united States, Statutes at Large. L, pt. I, pp.
522-33.
^3Conkin, Tomorrow a New World, 185.
^^William E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and 
The New Deal (New York, 1963), 141.
interest. As evidence of its receptivity to new approaches, 
the FSA experimented with migratory labor camps, medical- 
care cooperatives, and prefabricated housing. Yet nothing 
the FSA or RA did stirred up more controversy and suspicion 
than the community program. The resettlement projects of­
fered a dynamic approach to rural poverty with their use of 
cooperative enterprises, long-term leases rather than fee 
simple ownership, and detailed social planning. In 1937, 
however, Congress directed the FSA to complete the projects 
already underway or for which the RA had purchased land but 
to make no effort to add new communities.^
In Tomorrow New World, Paul K. Conkin argues that 
the development of the New Deal community program was "one 
of the most open breaks with the individualistic tradition 
in American history." The term "community," he says, "became 
a synonym for a form of collectivism and an antonym of indi­
vidualism. These communities were to be examples of a new, 
organic society, with new values and institutions.^® What 
should also be emphasized about the overall community program 
is its debt to traditional agrarian values. The Farm Security 
Administration was eventually responsible for more than 150 
resettlement projects, but only a handful of these operated 
as actual collective farms or otherwise attempted to form a
45Qrant McConnell, The Decline of Agrarian Democracy ' 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1953), 88-96.
46conkin. Tomorrow a New World, 6.
new society with collectivist values and institutions. The 
majority drew their inspiration from the individualism of 
the family-size farm. Quite obviously, as Conkin points out, 
not all resettlement projects were organized asccommunities, 
but neither did every community make a "conscious break with 
individualism. 1,47
The most important question is how many resettlement 
projects were based on the family-farm type of agriculture.
In 1943, Joseph W. Eaton, head of the Rural Settlement 
Institute of Chicago, published a study of the PSA's "co­
operative group farms," which he defined as "an association 
of members of farm families who operate jointly a large 
scale farming enterprise and who equitably share the returns 
of their group effort." According to Eaton, there were 
twenty-seven such communities; for the remaining projects, 
"the traditional family farm pattern" was the predominant 
type of o r g a n i z a t i o n . T h e  same year, C. B. Baldwin, 
Alexander's successor as Earm Security Administrator, speak­
ing before the Senate Committee on Appropriations, stated 
that his agency had managed 195 projects, including only
47Ibid., 17.
48Joseph W. Eaton, Exploring Tomorrow's Agriculture 
(New York and London, 1943), 66, 67, 62. Eaton wrote, "All 
except about 750 full-time farm families resettled by the 
FSA are on family farm units. The 750, or 2 per cent, who 
do not conform to this traditional pattern are settled on 
co-operative corporation farms. . . ."Page 42.
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thirteen cooperative farm communities. “Over 97 per cent of 
the project units," he said, "are operated on an individual, 
family-farm b a s i s . A .  Whitney Griswold, in 1948, placed 
the number of "cooperative cooperation farms” at fifteen.
“The great majority of the projects," he said, “consisted of 
groups of small, individually leased and operated family 
farms on government-owned tracts of l a n d . "50
As generally defined, the family farm was a farm of 
forty to sixty acres on which one family, without hired help, 
could do all the work and earn an adequate income. The 
family farm began with the earliest settlements in North 
America; the sturdy yeoman, whose independence and individual­
ism had supposedly helped make America great, had his roots 
in a small homestead. In the nineteenth century, Jefferson*s 
dream of a republic of small independent freeholders became 
part of the Garden of the World myth. The Ordinance of 1785, 
the Premption Act of 1841, the Homestead Law of 1862, and 
the Federal Farm Loan Act of 1916 all favored individual 
ownership of small farms. In the 1930*s, unemployed urban 
workers, hoping for a better life in pastoral surroundings
^9U. s. Senate, Agricultural Subcommittee on .the..
Committee on Appropriations. Hearings on the Agricultural 
Appropriations Bill for 1944. 78th Cong., IstSess., 1943, 
pp. 624, 630.
5 ° A .  Whitney Griswold. Farming and Democracy (New 
York, .1948),, ,167;. see Richard S. Kirkendall,. Social 
Scientists and Farm Politics in the Age of Roosevelt 
(Columbia, Mo., 1966), 129.
than in dirty cities, drifted "back to the land" to look for 
subsistence plots. Most of all, farm tenants and share­
croppers were obsessed with the idea of owning their own 
land.51
Nothing was deeper rooted in the minds of American 
farmers than the mystique of private ownership of small 
family farms. With few exceptions, farm leaders in the 
Roosevelt Administration shared the enthusiasm, and they 
evoked it instinctively when discussing solutions for 
tenancy.5^ Perhaps the strongest voice for the family farm 
within the New Deal was that of Secretary of Agriculture 
Henry A. Wallace. "I know of no better means of reconstruc­
ting our agriculture on a thoroughly sound and permanently 
desirable basis," wrote Wallace in 1935, "than to make as 
its foundation the family-size, owner-operated farm."
51See.Charles S. Hoffman, "Do You Mean Family Type 
Farm?" Land Policy Review, V (June, 1942), 25.-27.;. Farm 
Security. Administration, Report of the Administrator of the 
Farm Security Administration. 1940 (Washington, 1940), 11; 
Griswold, Farmincr and Democracy, 163-72; Maris, "Farm 
Tenancy," Farmers in a Changing World, 887-88; Paul V.. Maris 
The Land is Mine; From Tenancy to Family Farm Ownership,
U. S. Department of Agriculture Monograph No. 8 (Washington, 
1950), 118-22.
52gee Raymond C. Smith, "New Conditions Demand New 
Opportunities," 810-26; W. W. Alexander, "Overcrowded Farms, 
870-86; Paul V. Maris, "Farm Tenancy, " 887-906; and M. L. 
Wilson,. "Beyond Economics," 922-37, all in Farmers in a. 
Changing World.
53Henry A.. .Wallace,, "Wallace Points to the Danger of 
Tenancy," New York Times Magazine. LXXXIV (March 31, 1935), 
21.
M. L. Wilson, who after service in Subsistence Homesteads 
replaced Tugwell as Assistant Secretary of Agriculture, was 
another "deep believer in farm ownership by the family who 
operates the farm." "The rapid increase of tenant farmers 
during the past half century," said President Roosevelt him­
self in 1936, "is significant evidence that we have fallen 
far short of achieving the traditional American ideal of 
owner-operated farms."55 The reports of the President's 
Special Committee on Farm Tenancy and the Arkansas Farm 
Tenancy Commission, while aware of the complexity of rural 
poverty and the limitations of any one solution, both assumed 
that ownership of family farms was the basic answer to the 
problem of tenancy.56 The Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act of 
1937 primarily sought to reestablish a Jeffersonian pattern 
of small farms tilled by their owners. Finally, the Farm 
Security Administration stressed cooperative enterprises 
and long-term leases, not because of any philosophical dis­
taste for competitive individualism or traditional land 
tenure policy, but to help groups of small farmers operate 
with the efficiency and security of large commercial farmers.
5,4m . L. Wilson, "The Problems of Poverty in Agricul­
ture," Journal of Farm Economics. XXII (February, 1940), 12.
55Franklin D. Roosevelt to Henry A. Wallace,. November 
16, 1936, in Farm Tenancy; Report of the President's Com- 
mittee, 25. >
56ibid., 12, 13; Arkansas Gazette, December 13, 1936.
57Aiexander, "Rural Resettlement," 536 r Conkin, 
Tomorrow a New World, 189.
On the other hand, the cooperative projects differed 
radically from the traditional family farm. The cooperative 
farming movement in the New Deal centered around Rexford G. 
Tugwell, Wallace's Under Secretary of Agriculture and Resettle- 
ment Administrator. A  critic of competition and individualism 
in American economic life, Tugwell questioned the agrarian 
devotion to the family farm. In an economy based on large- 
scale units, he argued, the independent family farm was an 
anachronism. The rise of commercial agriculture employing 
tractors and other farm technology on hundreds of acres had 
outdated the forty-acre, one-horse farm. Above all, Tugwell 
envisioned a future based on economic planning and coopera­
tion, and the depression gave him an opportunity to put his 
ideas to work. As RA chief, his job was primarily resettle­
ment— taking farmers off worn out land and resettling them 
on good land where with the proper help they could make a new 
start. But Tugwell believed that rural resettlement would 
work best on large community-type projects stressing 
mechanized farming and cooperative organization.58
While Resettlement Administrator, Tugwell approached 
the problem of rural poverty with the conviction that security 
was a better goal for tenants than ownership. Anxious to
58Conkin. Tomorrow a New World. 149, 159, 160;
S chles inger. The Coming of the New Deal, 309-71? Kirkendall, 
Social Scientists and Farm Politics,. .112, 113? Bernard 
Sternsher, Rexford Tugwell and the New Deal (New Brunswick, 
N. J., 1964), 265-68.
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attack poverty as its sources, he argued that ownership 
could be just as bad as tenancy. "One trouble with tenancy 
is landlordism,” wrote Tugwell in 1937, and "one trouble 
with ownership is the m o r t g a g e . s m a l l  owners were no 
better off than tenants, he contended, if they carry the 
weight of mortgage, high interest rates, and face foreclosure. 
What they needed more than immediate ownership was health 
care, better diets, clothes, livestock, seed, fertilizer, 
and competent supervision.
Like Tugwell, the Southern Tenant Farmers' Union dis­
agreed with the "farms for tenants” slogan. The union com­
plained that the Bankhead-Jones Act pointed backward and not 
forward, leading toward a subsidized peasantry in America. 
Representing the union's views, W. L. Blackstone, member of 
the President's Committee on Farm Tenancy, filed a minority 
report urging that the Federal Government stress cooperative
,i
famming communities as a realistic alternative to small home­
steads. Although the committee was sufficiently impressed 
to suggest their initiation "on an experimental scale,” this 
approach was well outside the framework of agricultural
59Rexford g . Tugwell, "Behind the Farm Problem: Rural 
Poverty,” New York Times Magazine. LXXXVI (January 10, 1937),
5.
6°"A Statement Concerning Farm Tenancy Submitted to 
the Governor's Commission on Farm Tenancy by the Executive 
Council, Southern Tenant Farmers' Union,” c. 1936, Socialist 
Party of America Papers, Duke university Library, Durham, 
North Carolina.
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orthodoxy.®-1' The New Deal community program would never 
fully satisfy STFU demands; instead, most resettlement pro­
jects were based on the family farm ideal.
22.
61Farm Tenancy: Report of the President’s Committee,
CHAPTER II
THE RESETTLEMENT ADMINISTRATION'S REGION SIX
I
Rexford G. Tugwell set up eleven regional offices to 
supervise the field activities of the Resettlement Adminis­
tration. He created Region Six out of Arkansas, Louisiana, 
and Mississippi, three states with similarities that made 
them a natural unit. Covering 144,296 square miles of land 
area, the region virtually dominated the lower Mississippi 
River valley. The alluvial delta soil and a favorable 
climate made Region Six potentially one of the most wealthy 
agricultural sections in the nation, but much of the rural 
population in 1935 was living at or below poverty levels.
The three states of the region suffered from the character­
istic agricultural problems of the South: the prevalency of
tenancy, an excessive reliance on cotton, a large number of 
Negroes at the bottom of the economic ladder, and extensive 
absentee ownership of farm land. Farm tenancy was perhaps 
the most serious social and economic problem directly 
affecting the region's farmers. Mississippi, Louisiana, and 
Arkansas ranked first, third, and sixth, respectively, in 
the national farm tenancy rate. By 1935, there were 477,700
28
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farm tenants in the region compared to 255,206 farm owners; 
almost two out of every three farms in the region were 
tenants.̂
Mississippi was the most agricultural state in Region 
Six. In 1930, almost sixty-eight per cent of the total 
population lived on farms, and more people were gainfully 
employed in agriculture than in all other occupations com- 
bined. Cotton production was the state's major agricultural 
enterprise, contributing from seventy-five to eighty per cent 
of the gross farm income. The Mississippi and Yazoo River 
deltas were the most intensive cotton farming areas. Where 
cotton was secondary, farmers relied on fruit, vegetable, and 
livestock production. Mississippi had the highest rate of 
farm tenancy not only in Region Six but in the nation.
About three out of every four Mississippi farmers did not 
own the land they farmed, and nearly half were sharecroppers 
who owned neither land nor equipment. Out of a total of 
311,683 farmers, Mississippi had only 93,224 farm owners in 
1935. Mississippi was the only state in the region with 
more Negro farmers than white; in 1935, there were 169,006 
Negro farmers in the state, and of these 147,693 were
•^Rupert B. Vance, Human Factors in Cotton Culture 
(Chapel Hill, 1929), 18-22, 53-79; U. S. Bureau of the Census, 
Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1939 (Washington, 
1940), 606, 616.
^u. s. Bureau of the Census. Statistical Abstract of 
the United States, 1934 (Washington, 1934), 8, 66, 67.
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tenants. By contrast, only 69,871 out of 142,677 white 
farmers were tenants.^
Economically, Louisiana was the most diversified of 
the three states, possessing the largest non-farm population 
and the only major metropolitan center (New Orleans) in 
Region Six. More Louisiana people worked at non-farm occupa­
tions than did citizens of the other states. In 1930, only 
about forty per cent of the total population lived on farms; 
about a third of the total land area of Louisiana was in 
farms compared to two-thirds in Mississippi and a half in 
Arkansas. Except for New Orleans, however, Louisiana was 
still largely rural in the 19301 s. Cotton was the principal 
cash crop of Louisiana farmers, especially in the fertile 
bottomlands along the Mississippi and Red rivers. Grown as 
a feed crop, corn was second in importance. The sugar cane 
industry centered in the south central part of the state and 
rice in the southwest. The fourteen parishes bordering the 
Gulf of Mexico produced the major portion of the United 
States sugar cane crop. Farm tenancy in Louisiana was only 
slightly less prevalent than in Mississippi? nearly two out 
of three Louisiana farms were tenant-operated. Negroes 
accounted for more than half of the tenants and over three- 
fifths of all sharecroppers in the state. In most delta
^Resettlement Administration, Information for Prospec­
tive New Farmers in the State of Mississippi. Resettlement 
Information Sefvice Bulletin No. 10 (Washington, 1937), 1-3? 
Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1939, p. 623.
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parishes, Negroes predominated in the farm population and, 
in certain northeastern sections, comprised nearly four- 
fifths of the total.^
Unlike Mississippi and Louisiana, Arkansas possessed 
large areas of mountainous country, the Ouachita and Ozark 
ranges, that were poorly suited for farming. Additionally, 
much of the land in Arkansas was in forest, with lumber and 
wood-products the major non-agricultural industries in the 
state. But like the other states, Arkansas agriculture was 
primarily based on cotton production; cotton was the major 
cash crop in sixty-two out of the seventy counties, although 
farmers also engaged in commercial production of certain 
grains, forage, and livestock. In the Mississippi and 
Arkansas river bottoms along the entire eastern side of the 
state, cotton was the primary source of income on more than 
ninety per cent of all farms. The prevalence of tenancy was 
characteristic of Arkansas cotton regions. Tenants operated 
about sixty per cent of all farms in Arkansas, and in some 
delta counties farm tenancy was as high as seventy to ninety 
per cent. In the Red River delta and the southern part of 
the Mississippi River delta, most of the croppers and tenants 
were Negroes; however, in the delta north of the southern 
boundary of Tennessee, there were many areas with a higher
^Resettlement Administration, Information for Prospec­
tive New Farmers in the State of Louisiana, Resettlement 
Information Service Bulletin No. 11 (Washington, 1937), 3-5; 
Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1939, p. 616, 619.
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proportion of white tenants.^
Although Region Six contained some of the richest farm 
land in the United States, the high rate of tenancy was due 
in part to a lack of opportunities for ownership. Large 
planters and absentee landlords held much of the more fertile 
land in large units, and they were rarely willing to break 
their large holdings into small farms to be sold to indi­
vidual farmers. The amount of land actually under cultiva­
tion was relatively small in all three states, but the 
presence of millions of acres of land not used for agricul­
ture did not suggest many opportunities for new farmers. In 
Region Six, most of the vast acreage of undeveloped land was 
not suitable for growing crops because of unproductive soil, 
rough topography, erosion, poor drainage, or floodings.
About 22.4 million acres in Mississippi and two-thirds of 
Louisiana were in cut-over land, forest, pasture, swamp; and 
in Arkansas much of the land area consisted of forest or 
mountainous terrain.®
In 1937, the Resettlement Administration published 
three bulletins for "prospective new farmers ” in Arkansas, 
Louisiana, and Mississippi, stressing that ownership was
^Resettlement Administration, Information for Prospec­
tive New Farmers in the State of Arkansas, Resettlement 
Information Service Bulletin No. 9 (Washington, 1937), 7.
^Resettlement Administration, Region Six Annual Report 
As of December 31, 1936, Record Group 96, Records of the 
Farmers' Home Administration, National Archives (to be cited 
hereafter as R.G. 96, National Archives).
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becoming more difficult for farmers of limited means.7 The 
initial investment needed to set up a farm in Region Six was 
prohibitive for most small farmers. According to Resettle­
ment Administration farm management studies, sixty acres was 
the minimum size which should have been considered for a 
family farm in the cotton areas of Region Six. During the 
mid-1930's, the current selling price for improved farm land 
was between forty-five and seventy dollars per acre in 
Mississippi and between thirty-five and fifty dollars in 
Arkansas and Louisiana. So for land alone, a sixty-acre farm 
meant an investment of $3,000 to $4,000 in Mississippi and 
$2,500 to $3,000 in Arkansas and Louisiana, dependent upon 
location, productivity, and number of cleared acres. In 
Louisiana, sugar cane land was selling for forty to seventy- 
five dollars per acre; and since about thirty-five acres of 
cane land was needed to support a family, there was no 
substantial difference in cost between farms in sugar cane 
and cotton areas.8 (A small farmer could buy undeveloped 
land for twelve to fifteen dollars per acre, but it was less 
productive, and the cost of clearing the land drove the price 
back up to around fifty dollars per acre.) To build a small 
cottage and the minimum of farm buildings and to buy the 
necessary livestock and equipment required an additional
7See Footnotes 3, 4, and 5.
^Information for Prospective New Farmers in the State 
of Louisiana, 18-21.
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investment of $1,500 to $2,000, probably more. Thus RA 
experts estimated that the total investment for a family 
farm would run between $4,000 and $5,000. This price was 
far beyond the means of croppers and share tenants or even
Qmost cash tenants.
II
The Division of Subsistence Homesteads and the Federal 
Emergency Relief Administration began resettling low-income 
farmers in Arkansas, Louisiana, and Mississippi two years 
before the three states became Region Six. To carry on their 
community building programs, both agencies set up relatively 
simple administrative structures, compared to that used by 
the Resettlement Administration. Under M. S. Wilson, a 
series of homestead corporations organized on each project 
became the action arms of the Division or Subsistence Home­
steads. The local corporations possessed full authority to 
own property, enter into contracts, borrow money, construct 
the homesteads, and manage the completed project.-1-® Shortly 
before Wilson left Subsistence Homesteads in 1934, however, 
a Federal Subsistence Homesteads Corporation assumed complete
 9Ibid., 8. 9? Information for Prospective New Farmers
in the State of Mississippi, 6, 7; Information for Prospec­
tive New Farmers in the State of Arkansas, 24-26.
lOpaui K. Conkin. Tomorrow a New Worlds The New Deal 
Community Program (Ithaca, N. Y., 1959), 106, 107.
35
control over the local corporations. The Rural Rehabilita­
tion Division of the Federal Emergency Relief Administration 
distributed its funds through state rural rehabilitation 
corporations. Operating under the state Emergency Relief 
Administration, each state corporation dealt directly with 
distressed farmers and enjoyed a wide latitude in handling 
its own rural relief work; some states, for example, chose 
not to undertake a community building program at all.11
The Division of Subsistence Homesteads made plans to 
establish industrial-type projects in all three Region Six 
states. The subsistence homesteads program in Louisiana 
never got off the ground. Although Bossier City was con­
sidered, Morehouse Homesteads near Bastrop was the only 
Louisiana project ever to receive approval.1^ By contrast, 
the Arkansas program was more ambitious and seemed to have a 
promising future. Glenn E. Riddell, secretary of the 
Arkansas State Housing Board, worked closely with Bruce 
Melvin of the Division of Subsistence Homesteads to locate 
homesteads in the state. "In general," Melvin wrote Riddell 
in 1933, "we are trying to establish projects near industrial
i:LIbid., 134-36.
^Resettlement Administration, First Annual Report 
(Washington, 1936), 144? Riley J. Wilson to C. B. Baldwin, 
October 14, 1935, R. G. 96, National Archives? Riley J. 
Wilson to Marvin H. McIntyre, August 13, 1935, Official File 
1568, Bpx 4, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New 
York (to be cited hereafter as FDRL).
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centers where people may receive part-time employment.
While touring Arkansas in February, 1934, Melvin showed 
interest in the homestead possibilities of Fort Smith, West 
Helena, Camden, Huttig, Warren, and Pine Bluff.^ In March, 
the Division approved plans for Fort Smith, West Helena, and 
Camden. The Division of Subsistence Homesteads allotted 
about $317,500 for the four Arkansas and Louisiana projects, 
but spent a total of only $108 before transferring them to 
the Resettlement Administration.-^
Mississippi was the only state in the region where 
the subsistence homestead program paid off. In December,
1933, the Division approved five industrial-type homestead 
projects near McComb, Laurel, Tupelo, Meridian, and a full­
time farming project near Richton, Mississippi; in January,
1934, it gave approval for another industrial-type project 
at H a t t i e s b u r g . T h e  industrial projects each contained
■^Bruce L. Melvin to Glenn E. Riddell, November 17, 
1933, R. G. 96, National Archives.
•̂ Arkansas Gazette (Little Rock), February 26, 1934; 
Arkansas Democrat (Little Rock), February 22, 1934.
15Glenn E. Riddell to Bruce L. Melvin, March 1, 1934 
(two letters), March 7, 1934, April 9, 1934, R. G. 96, 
National Archives; U. S. Department of the Interior, Divi­
sion of Subsistence Homesteads, Monthly Project Report, 
April 26, 1935, ibid.; Resettlement Administration, First 
Annual Report, 144. The abandonment of the Arkansas sub­
sistence Homesteads was reported in Arkansas Gazette, 
January 7, 1936.
l^Report of the Division of Subsistence Homesteads 
and Federal Subsistence Homesteads Corporation, June, 1934, 
R. G. 96, National Archives.
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twenty to twenty-five homesteads located on five-acre tracts; 
they were designed to give families an opportunity to farm 
and to work part time in factory jobs. By the end of 1934, 
construction had begun on all but Laurel and Richton. When 
the Resettlement Administration took over the subsistence 
homesteads program in 1935, Tugwell reconsidered the Divi­
sion's plans for Fort Smith, West Helena, Camden, Bossier 
City, Bastrop, and Laurel. The RA's Management Division took 
over the projects near or actually under constructions 
Tupelo, Meridian, McComb, Hattiesburg, and Richton. The RA 
completed the latter projects but dropped the others.^-7
The Federal Emergency Relief Administration did not 
undertake a comprehensive program of community building in 
any Region Six states. The Arkansas Rural Rehabilitation 
Corporation began construction work on only one project 
during the lifetime of the FERA. In 1934 W. R. DyesS, 
Emergency Relief Administrator of Arkansas, conceived the 
idea of building an agricultural community as a means of 
getting relief clients "back to the soil." Under his super­
vision, the Arkansas RR Corporation acquired 17,500 acres of 
wilderness and swamp land near Wilson in Mississippi County, 
divided it into 500 units of about twenty acres each, and
^7The Resettlement Administration and Its Work, 
September 10, 1935, Official File 1558, Box 1, FDRL; Thomas 
H. Hibben, Memorandum to R. G. Tugwell, June 29, 1935, R. G. 
96, National Archives; R. G. Tugwell, Memorandum to John S. 
Lansill, July 10, 1935, ibid.; Tugwell, Memorandum to Harry 
L. Hopkins, July 18, 1935 . ibid.; Conkin, Tomorrow a New 
World. 111.
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built a community center complete with post office, cafe, 
stores.',, school, hospital, and cotton gin. Dyess colony, as 
it was named after its founder's death in an air crash, was
I Qthe largest of all New Deal fatnming communities.
Under Resettlement Administration control after 1936, 
the Arkansas RR Corporation went on to develop other large 
tracts of land it held under lease or had purchased. with its 
trust fund. In 1935 and 1936, the corporation developed St.
_ Francis River Farms and Trumann Farms, both located in 
Poinsett County, the home of the Southern Tenant Farmers' 
Union. The two projects together consisted of 6,195 acres 
of land divided into 143 units to enable tenant farmers to 
become owners of family-type farms. The Arkansas corporation 
owned two projects in the southeastern part of the state, 
Chicot Farms in Chicot and Drew counties and Kelso Farms in 
Desha County, which it leased to the War Relocation Authority 
for use as a Japanese relocation center during World War II. 
Chicot, the second largest community project in the region, 
covered 13,781 acres broken up into 241 family farm, units 
and included the entire town of Jerome, Arkansas. Kelso was 
not developed as a farming project before being turned over 
to the WRA. Central Arkansas Valley Farms consisted of
  ^Arkansas Emergency Relief Administration, Traveling
Recovery Road: The Story of Relief. Work-Relief. and Rehaba-
bilitation in Arkansas. August 30, 1932 to November 15. 1936 
(Little Rock, 1936), 153-57? Conkin, Tomorrow a New World. 
137, 138.
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eighty-five individual farm units widely scattered through­
out nine counties in northern Arkansas. The Mississippi 
Rural Rehabilitation Corporation purchased 5,404 acres of 
land for Hinds Farms near Terry, Mississippi, but the RA and 
FSA developed the project. The Louisiana RR Corporation 
operated the Terrebonne project near Schriever for two years
(1937-1938) but never initiated any resettlement projects of
■ , 19 ^its own.
Ill
In 1935, the Resettlement Administration brought new 
enthusiasm and new direction to a New Deal resettlement pro­
gram that was beginning to stall in Arkansas, Louisiana, and 
Mississippi. Under Tugwell, the RA set up a decentralized 
administrative structure with major control of resettlement 
and rural rehabilitation in the hands of regional offices.20 
Tugwell originally planned to have two directors in each
19Resettlement Administration, Arkansas Rural Reha­
bilitation Division, Annual Report 1936, December 30, 1936,
R. G. 96, National Archives? Resettlement Administration, 
Nearly Report of the Custodian of Corporations Division 
[December, 1936], ibid.? Select Committee of the House Com­
mittee on Agriculture, Hearings on the Farm Security Adminis­
tration. 78 Cong., 1 Sess., 1943-1944, pp. 1038-49, 1071-75?
U. S. Department of Agriculture, Farm Security Administration, 
"Resettlement Projects, Land and Source of Acquisition, Also 
Status of Unit Development, Vendor, Acreage and Number of 
Units Developed or Undeveloped, Region Six," January 1, 1941, 
mimeographed, R. G. 96, National Archives? Philip B. Fleming, 
Memorandum for Edwin G. Arnold, January 19, 1937, ibid.
^Conkin, Tomorrow a New World. 155.
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region, each with complete authority over their respective 
divisions, but together constituting the regional leadership. 
For Region Six, he selected T. Roy Reid to direct rural 
rehabilitation and resettlement, and Buford M. Gile to handle 
the land utilization p r o g r a m . 21 Reid assumed responsibility 
for the rural relief work of the FERA, the state rural 
rehabilitation corporations, and the subsistence homesteads 
program in the three states. Gile, who was already working 
in the field of land use as head of the Land Policy Section 
of the AAA's Division of P l a n n i n g , 22 merely transferred his 
activities into the Resettlement Administration's regional 
office. But Tugwell dropped this dual arrangement in 
November, 1935, and designated Reid as regional director in 
charge of both land utilization and rural resettlement and 
rehabilitation; Gile stayed on as assistant regional director. 
From the beginning, Reid had had the primary task of setting 
up the entire administrative organization of Region Six from 
the regional office down through state, district, and
2^Rexford G. Tugwell to the President, July 10, 1935, 
R. G. 96, National Archives; Arkansas Gazette. June 29, 1935, 
July 2, 1935.
22l . C. Gray, Memorandum for Rexford G. Tugwell, May
22, 1935, R. G. 96, National Archives. The sixth region of 
the AAA's Land Policy Section covered Arkansas, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, Oklahoma, and Texas. Julien N. Friant,, Memo­
randum to Laurence I. Hewes, Jr., June 14, 1935, ibid.
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county offices.23
T. Roy Reid possessed a broad background of educa­
tional and agricultural experience. He was born on a farm 
in Greenville County, South Carolina. Deciding not tq become 
a farmer himself, he attended Clemson College for his under­
graduate education and went on to the University of Wisconsin 
for a Master of Science in agriculture. Reid started out as 
a teacher; he gained experience teaching in rural schools 
before and during his college years. From 1912 to 1913, he 
taught science and economics at Clinton College, Clinton, 
Kentucky/? and from 1913 to 1917, he taught agriculture at 
Arkansas A&M College at Monticello. At the time of his 
appointment as regional director of the Resettlement Adminis­
tration, he was serving as assistant director of the 
Arkansas Extension Service. His connection with extension
work dated back to 1917, when he served a year as county
agent in Drew County. In 1918, he joined the state extension 
in Little Rock as assistant agent in 4-H Club work and later 
became a specialist in livestock and marketing. Reid became 
assistant director in 1923. Prior to 1935, he had taken an
active part in New Deal programs by serving on the board of
directors of the Arkansas Rural Rehabilitation Corporation 
and as AAA director in Arkansas. In 1941, when he went to
23ĵ ex;£0ra G> Tugwell to B. M. Gile (telegram), November 
15,, .1935, ibid.; Carl C. Taylor to Harry Wise, July 26, 1935, 
ibid.
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Washington to serve as special assistant to the Secretary of 
Agriculture, A. D. Stewart took his place as regional direc­
tor.2^
Taking a year's leave of absence from the Arkansas 
Extension Service (he later resigned), Reid stepped into his 
new job on July 1, 1935. No announcement had been made, 
however, about the location of the regional office. The 
Arkansas Gazette expected Fayetteville to be chosen.26 
Fayetteville, after all, already claimed the regional office 
of the AAA's Land Policy Section, the Extension Service, and 
the College of Agriculture. But on July 17, Carl C. Taylor, 
head of the Resettlement Division in Washington, wired Reid 
to establish in Little Rock both his own headquarters and 
the offices of the three state directors for Louisiana, 
Mississippi, and Arkansas.26 Lessie S. Read, editor of the 
Fayetteville Daily Democrat (in his words, "an original 
Roosevelt and pro-administration [and] anti-Long newspaper"), 
warned Tugwell that this decision would lose support for the
2^Tugwell to the President, July 10, 1935, ibid.;
T... Roy Reid to W. W. Alexander, October 26, 1937, ibid. ; 
Arkansas Gazette, June 29, 1935, December 13, 1936; C. B. 
Baldwin to John E. Milles, February 13, 1941, R. G. 96, 
National Archives. See Inez Hale MacDuff, "27 Years in 
Rural Arkansas," Arkansas Gazette Sundayy Magazine Section, 
March 30, 1941, p. 3.
26Arkansas Sazette. July 2, July 3, 1935.
26Carl C. Taylor to T. Roy Reid (telegram), July 17, 
1935, R. G. 96, National Archives; Carl C. Taylor, to T.. Roy 
Reid (telegram), July 19, 1935, ibid.; Arkansas Gazette, 
July 20, 1935, July 22, 1935.
Roosevelt administration since it came at a time when W. H. 
"Coin” Harvey was opening a Huey Long Headquarters near 
Fayetteville.27 Dan T. Gray, dean of the College of Agricul­
ture at the University of Arkansas and Director of the Exten­
sion Service, also regretted the move to Little Rock? he 
wanted the regional office located at his own institution.28 
Probably the Resettlement Administration turned Fayetteville 
down because northwestern Arkansas was rather inaccessible 
from the rest of the state and from the entire region, and 
because Little Rock would be closer to most resettlement 
projects and other activities.28 Another reason may have 
been that Reid made his home in Little Rock.
The regional office was a kaleidoscope of shifting 
organization. Following the pattern of the Washington office, 
Reid divided his staff into a series of co-ordinate divi­
sions: rural resettlement, land utilization, management,
finance, personnel, information, business management, legal, 
and labor relations. The actions divisions, however, were 
land utilization, rural resettlement, and management. B. M. 
Gile's Land Utilization Division consisted of a project 
planning section, a land acquisition section, farm development,
27Lessie S. Read to Rexford Tugwell (telegram), July
16, 1935, R. G.,96, National Archives.
28Dan Gray to C. C. Taylor, July 22, 1935, ibid. i 
Horace Thompson, later project manager at Lake pick, inter­
view with the author, January 19, 1968.
29ibid.
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and project development sections.3° For regional chief of 
rural resettlement, Reid chose E. B. Whitaker, formerly head 
of the FERA's Rural Rehabilitation Division in Arkansas. 
Whitaker's division, the largest in the region, not only had
the biggest budget, it was also the one about which the __
general public knew most.3-*- Besides the resettlement program 
itself, the Rural Resettlement Division originally included 
all rural rehabilitation work, a community and cooperative 
staff, and a farm debt adjustment section. The Management 
Division chief was James B. Lawson, a transfer from the 
Mississippi subsistence homesteads program, where he had 
developed Tupelo.
In 1936, Reid created three assistant directorships 
to take charge of the growing resettlement, rehabilitation, 
and management programs. He gave rural rehabilitation full 
divisional status in recognition of its importance, naming 
T. P. Lee division chief. Rehabilitation embodied the RA's 
rural relief work with loans to individuals and cooperative 
groups, farm debt adjustment, home and farm management work, 
and later the FSA's new tenant purchase program. Whitaker's 
Resettlement Division now supervised all projects, both land
3^Warren Bruner to James H. Wells, October 30, 1935,
R. G. 96, National Archives.
^Resettlement Administration, Annual Report Region 
VI As of December 31, 1936, ibid.
32e . E. Agger, Memorandum to Will W. Alexander,
October 18, 1935, ibid.
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use and rural resettlement, and handled most of its own 
development work, including architecture and engineering, 
land analysis, surveys, and purchase, and project construc­
tion. In Management, Lawson was responsible to the regional 
director for managing the completed projects, collecting rent, 
maintaining the property, and for such social service func­
tions as family selection. This organization remained 
essentially the same under the Farm Security Administra­
tion.^
Next to Reid, E. B. Whitaker became the most important 
man in the regional office. He was a native of Mississippi 
and a graduate of Mississippi State College at Starkville.
He did graduate work in agriculture at the University of 
Wisconsin, but never earned a graduate degree. Like Reid,
He was with the Arkansas Extension Service when he went into 
federal employment. In 1934, W. R. Dyess made him director 
of rural relief. In the Resettlement Administration,
Whitaker started out as state director of rural resettlement 
for Arkansas and in rapid order became regional chief of the 
Rural Rehabilitation Division and then assistant regional 
director in charge of resettlement.*^ As the process of
33Resettlement Administration, Annual Report Region 
Six As of December 31, 1936, ibid.; Region Organization 
Chart, M.&., ibid.; George S. Mitchell to T. Roy Reid, May 9, 
1939, ibid.
3%I. b . Whitaker, interview with the author, January 
19, 1968; James H. Wells to Warren Bruner, October 9, 1935,
R. G. 96, National Archives.
expansion, consolidation, and musical chairs continued in 
the regional office, Reid tended to rely more and more on 
Whitaker's ability as an administrator. In 1937, he combined 
the Resettlement and Management divisions under Whitaker; in 
1938, Reid returned to Whitaker most of the responsibilities 
he had had in his original Rural Resettlement Division.33 
The purpose of these moves seems to have been for Whitaker to 
take control of all phases of the regional resettlement pro­
gram. In May, 1940, Whitaker became assistant regional 
director without special designation but in direct charge of 
resettlement, farm management, home management, cooperative 
services, and community and family services.3® More than any 
other one man, he was the resettlement program in Region Six.
In addition to regional headquarters at Little Rock, 
the Resettlement Administration maintained offices on state, 
district, county, and project levels. When Carl Taylor 
notified Reid of the Little Rock decision, he also issued 
instructions for "completely regionalizing the three states 
of region six."3  ̂ Reid was to arrange office space at Little
35e . b . Whitaker, interview with the author, January 
19, 1968; Reid to Will W. Alexander, February 17, 1937, R. G. 
96, National Archives; Reid to Alexander, March 31, 1938, 
ibid.; Lewis E. Long to E. R. Henson, August 7, 1937, ibid.
36t . Roy Reid to Will W. Alexander, May 25, 1940, ibid. 
Resettlement Administration, Region Six, Quarterly Report, 
July-September, 1940, ibid;.!.
37carl C. Taylor to T. Roy Reid (telegram), July 17, 
1935, July 19, 1935, ibid.
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Rock, Arkansas. ”RRA KEPT OUT OP LONG'S CLUTCHES,” declared
O Qthe Gazette headline. Throughout the summer of 1935, 
Senator Huey P. Long had been engaged in a running battle 
with the Roosevelt administration, including especially 
Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes. Long wanted to 
control all federal money spent in Louisiana and had rammed 
bills through the state legislature at Baton Rouge to accom­
plish this purpose. In response, Ickes threatened to stop 
all PWA work in Louisiana? and in July, about the time 
Taylor informed Reid of the location of Region Six head­
quarters, Ickes did so, ruling out any future projects unless
state laws regulating the expenditure of federal funds were 
39repealed. When asked, Reid declined to comment on the 
reason for establishing the state offices in Little Rock.^® 
The Resettlement Administration's thorough organiza­
tion at the grass roots existed mainly to conduct the reha­
bilitation program, which involved extensive supervision of 
loan clients and educational work in every rural county in 
the region. The state offices for Louisiana and Mississippi 
were eventually moved out of Little Rock and located at New 
Orleans (later Alexandria) and Jackson. Each state office 
contained a rural rehabilitation director and his staff and
•̂ Arkansas Gazette. July 22, 1935.
39Ibid., July 6, 1935, July 19, 1935, July 20, 1935.
40Ibid., July 22, 1935.
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later a state farm debt adjustment committee and an FSA 
advisory committee composed of important state leaders. The 
state directors and their offices were under close super­
vision from Little Rock and possessed no authority to take 
any initiative in policy matters. In all three states, there
were four district offices, each covering a number of
*
counties or parishes; the typical district office combined a 
district rehabilitation supervisor and a home management 
supervisor and their staffs. The county officers consisted 
of rehabilitation and home management supervisors, a county 
farm debt adjustment committee, a county rural rehabilitation 
committee, and later a county tehant purchase committee. 
Committee membership was made up of local citizens who helped 
make decisions about who should get loans or whose debts 
should be scaled down and by how much. The project officers 
handled the resettlement projects. The community or project 
manager reported directly to the regional office, skipping 
the county, district, and state offices.
"The men placed at the head of these Resettlement 
Programs," Wrote Mississippi State Senator James C. Rice in 
1939, "are broken down Ford dealers, junk men, or airplane 
builders— or just anybody but someone who has actually made
^Stanley W. Brown and Virgil E. Baugh (comp.)., 
Preliminary Inventory of the Records of the Farmers Home 
Administration, National Archives and Records Service Pub. 
No. 118 (Washington, 1959), 10, 11, 28-30.
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42a living out of faming." He was complaining because too 
many FSA employees, in his view, were book fanners with 
college degrees; this much, at least, was accurate. The most 
essential qualification for all supervisory positions was a 
degree in agriculture. Reid recruited most of the top 
personnel in both the regional and field offices from either 
the Extension Service or federal agencies. In 1935 and 1936, 
the highest officials of the regional office were on leave 
from the University of Arkansas' College of Agriculture.43 
Many others came to the Resettlement Administration with the 
AAA's Land Policy Section, the FERA's state rural rehabilita­
tion divisions, or the Division of Subsistence Homesteads.
Regional information chief George Wolf wrote in 1939, 
"We now have in the region 1,879 employees, making us by far 
the largest agricultural agency in the three states."44 
Located on the fourth floor of the Donaghey Trust Building, 
the Little Rock office was the largest in the region. At 
first, the .Gazette reported plans for it to employ between 
seventy-five and eighty persons.45 j\t the end of 1937, the 
regional office contained 216 employees; by 1941, it had
42james C. Rice to Theodore G. Bilbo, April 7, 1939,
R. G. 96, National Archives.
43Dan Gray to Raymond A. Pearson, April 20, 1936, 
ibid.; Arkansas Gazette, November 20, 1936.
44personnel Report, Region VI, December 31, 1939,
R. G. 96, National Archives.
45Qeorge Wolf to John Fischer, April 10, 1939, ibid.
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A Cexpanded to 559. ° Resettlement and Farm Security personnel 
went into every nook and cranny of the three states. In 
1937, the FSA had 185 employees stationed in Louisiana, 285 
in Mississippi, and 309 in Arkansas, based on the proportion 
of farms in each state compared to the entire region.^ In 
1939, there were twelve district offices and 201 county 
offices with a combined total of 1,102 employees,* 709 were 
rehabilitation and home management supervisors and 393 were 
clerks.^8
Reid ran a large and complex bureaucratic structure 
in Region Six, and he contended with the problems that 
plague any such organization. Some of his problems were 
mundane: acquiring more office space as his regional staff
grew, keeping new employees supplied with appropriate govern­
ment procedure manuals, or setting up a badly needed steno­
graphic pool to handle the flood of paper work.^8 A  more 
serious problem, however, was rivalry between the three 
states. In 1937, Congressman Overton Brooks of Louisiana 
inquired about current charges that his state was being
46Arkansas Gazette, July 20, 1935.
47c. B. Baldwin to Overton Brooks, December 2, 1937,
R. G. 96, National Archives? A. D. Stewart to C. B. Baldwin, 
August 20, 1941, ibid.
48gai3win to Brooks, December 2, 1937, ibid.
49j . Roy Reid to Division Heads and Section Chiefs, 
April 30, 1940, ibid. ? James H. Wells to Warren Bruner,
August 30, 1935, ibid.
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discriminated against in favor of Mississippi and Arkansas.50 
True, said assistant administrator C. B. Baldwin, Louisiana 
had only 23.7 per cent of all Region Six employees head­
quartered outside the Little Rock office; but the state, he 
reasoned, had only twenty-three per cent of the total farms 
in the region.5 In 1941, twenty per cent of the employees 
in the regional office itself were natives of Louisiana.5^ 
Yet, evidence did exist to indicate discrimination at least 
in the resettlement program. When all community building 
stopped in 1941, Louisiana had only four resettlement pro­
jects compared to ten for Mississippi (including five sub­
sistence homesteads) and sixteen for Arkansas. The amount 
of funds spent in Louisiana was similarly disproportioned.53 
Reid's more serious administrative problems included 
defining the authority of the regional office vis-a-vis 
state, district, and county office, and wielding all parts of 
the three-state organization into a smooth and efficient
50oVerton Brooks to Will W. Alexander, October 5,
1937, ibid.
51c. b . Baldwin to Overton Brooks, December 2, 1937, 
ibid. See Brooks to Alexander, October 5, 1937, ibid.; A. D. 
Stewart to C. B. Baldwin,.October 24, 1941, ibid.
5?a . D..Stewart■to C. B. Baldwin, August 20, 1941,
ibid.
53parm Security Administration, "Resettlement Pro­
jects, " ibid. Originally, there were a total of fifty-two 
resettlement projects proposed for Arkansas alone. E. B. 
Whitaker to T. Roy Reid, August 14, 1935, ibid.; see Rexford 
G. Tugwell to William J. Driver, June 15, 1936, ibid.
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operation. "There is a lack of coordination," wrote Missis­
sippi director George M. Reynolds in 1935, "both in the 
region and the state offices, which is due to the fact that 
there is no centralization of authority over the entire pro­
gram, either in the region or the state. His solution was
to abolish the dual regional directorship and to put the 
entire resettlement program in charge of one general regional 
director; however, he also favored giving state directors, 
like himself, the same power in their states as the regional 
director possessed in the region. Region Six's early diffi­
culties, wrote two Washington officials, were "attributable 
in no small degree to the strong attitudes of state directors 
who desired to operate programs with little control from the 
regional office.”^5
From 1936 to 1939, Reid considerably strengthened 
regional control; for example, he took the authority to 
approve loans and grants out of the state offices and placed 
it in the regional office. At the same time, he reduced 
state office functions to directing the work of district and 
county supervisors and managing the work of the state rural 
rehabilitation corporations (the office of regional Custodian 
of Corporations soon took away the latter function). In
^George m . Reynolds to Will W. Alexander, November 
15, 1935. ibid.
55c . B. Baldwin and Robert W. Hudgens to Will W. 
Alexander, November 18, 1939, ibid.
53
addition, he concentrated in his assistant regional director 
Whitaker almost every activity related to resettlement, again 
preempting the authority of the state directors.56 Now there 
were complaints of too much centralization. In 1939, George 
S. Mitchell, trouble shooter for the Administrator's office, 
wrote Reid that "the extreme concentration of functions in 
your Assistant Regional Director is thought unwise." More 
authority should be delegated to community managers.5^
Mercer G. Evans, another Washington representative, commented 
on "a tendency on the part of the regional office not to 
delegate authority and responsibility to subordinate field 
offices." This criticism applied especially "to the pro­
grams under Whitaker."58 John Fischer, Washington Informa­
tion director, complained about the resettlement program in 
Region Six. " . . .  [T]here is little written material avail­
able for reference in the regional office and . . .  Mr. 
Whitaker keeps most of the pertinent facts in his head."^9
5^Resettlement Administration, Region Six Annual 
Report TVs of December 31, 1936, ibid. See A. D. Stewart to 
C. B. Baldwin, August 18, 1941, ibid.
  s. Mitchell to T. Roy Reid, May 9, 1939,
ibid.
58Mercer G. Evans, Memorandum for George S. Mitchell, 
April 15, 1939, ibid.
59John Fischer, Memorandum to George S. Mitchell, 
April 6, 1939, ibid.
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IV
Reid quickly threw his organization into action 
against rural distress. During the eighteen months from 
July 1, 1935 to December 31, 1936, rural rehabilitation and 
land utilization activities had the largest impact on the 
region. By July, 1936, Region Six was leading all other 
eleven regions in rehabilitation loans with 45,497 low-income 
farm families borrowing $6,186,442. The Land Utilization 
Division had optioned 590,630 acres of land unfit for agricul­
ture at a total purchase cost of $3,248,268, and had employed 
about 4,300 men to develop the land for forestry, pasture, 
game refuges, and recreation. This effort also led the 
nation.60
During the same period, Reid launched the resettle­
ment program, but none of the projects initiated by the 
Resettlement Administration in Region Six were completed 
until 1937. By December, 1936, Whitaker had plans for 
eighteen resettlement projects, sixteen active projects and 
two on which activity had already been suspended. According 
to early estimates, these projects would ultimately resettle 
2,574 farm families and cost about $ 4 , 1 1 0 , 0 0 0 . The
6°Times-Picayune (New Orleans), June 23, 1937; Madison 
Journal (Tallulah, Louisiana), July 3, 1936; Rexford G.
Tugwell to T. Roy Reid, February 2, 1937, R. G. 96, National 
Archives.
^Resettlement Administration, Annual Report of 
Assistant Regional Director, in Charge of Rural Resettlement 
[E. B. Whitaker], ibid.
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resettlement program involved months and months of detailed 
planning on the part of most divisions and sections in the 
regional office. The Management Division, for example, took 
over the unfinished work of the Division of Subsistence Home­
steads and began preparations for transferring four Missis­
sippi projects to local homestead associations (Richton had 
to be developed from scratch). Management also began inves­
tigating and selecting families for occupancy on both 
inherited and new community projects.®2 (At this time, 
family selection was the only function the RA assumed at 
Dyess colony; the WPA managed the project until 1939 and 
then turned it over to the Farm Security Administration.)
At the end of 1936, the Land Acquisition Unit of the Land 
Utilization Division had appraised 419,225.76 acres in 
Region Six for resettlement p u r p o s e s T h e  Architectural 
and Engineering staff's field survey teams began marking out 
boundaries and subdivisions at project sites and locating 
future roads, bridges, and drainage ditches. Their job also 
included preparation of all blueprints and sketches, building 
specifications, and estimated costs for forwarding to 
Washington. As 1936 closed, the Construction Division was
®2Region Six Management Division, News Letter, July 1, 
1935 to January 1, 1937, Region Six, ibid. ■
®^Region VI Progress Report, Land Utilization Division, 
Period ending December 31, 1936, ibid.
®^Report of the Architectural and Engineering Staff, 
Region VI, July 1, 1935-December 31, 1936, ibid.
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just beginning work on the first resettlement projects in
Arkansas.65
Between November, 1935, and February, 1936, the
Resettlement Administration gave approval for all resettle-
66ment projects it initiated in Region Six. After 1937, the 
Farm Security Administration continued the resettlement pro­
gram but barely finished many projects before having to start 
their liquidation. No two projects were exactly alike, but 
they all had basic similarities. Some were agricultural 
communities formed by breaking up one or more large planta­
tions; others consisted of single, isolated farms or clusters 
of farms scattered throughout several counties. Some were 
Negro projects, others were for whites only, and still others 
were mixed, though always the races lived separately. Most 
projects centered around a cooperative association which sub­
leased land to its members in family-size units for indi­
visual operation. What gave unity to the overall resettle­
ment program in Region Six was this emphasis on the family 
farm. When project construction ended in the region, Whitaker
^Resettlement Administration, Construction Division, 
Progress Report for Projects in Development and Planning,
July 1, 193jS to August 1, 1936, ibid.; Resettlement Adminis­
tration, Region VI Annual Report, As of December 31, 1936, 
ibid.; Rexford G. Tugwell to T. Roy Reid, February 2, 1937, 
ibid.
66parm Security Administration, "Resettlement Pro­
jects," ibid*? Resettlement Administration, Annual Report of 
Assistant Regional Director in Charge of Rural Resettlement, 
July 1, 1935 to December 31, 1936, ibid.
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had charge of a total of thirty resettlement projects. Two 
communities and part of another broke with tradition and 
experimented with communal farming. But the remaining 
twenty-eight projects were all based on the family farm 
ideal. By 1940, there were about 175 families living on the 
cooperative projects, but about 2,500 families occupied pro­
jects where they had a chance to become owners of their own 
fi 7farms. Essentially, the rural resettlement program m  
Region Six sought to stabilize tenancy by taking low-income 
farmers off poor land and helping them get a new start as 
independent farmers with better land. The Region Six pro­
jects reflected the same overwhelming emphasis on the family 
farm that existed nationally in the community program.
Since projects were developed as funds became avail­
able from Washington, Whitaker had construction in progress 
constantly from 1936 to 1940. In 1935, Tugwell gave approval 
for work to start as early as possible on five projects:
Plum Bayou, Lakeview, and three farm tenant security projects. 
Plum Bayou, an agricultural community type project near 
Wright, Arkansas, was the first Resettlement Administration 
project to be completed in the united States. In 1935 and 
1936, the RA purchased 9,854 acres of river bottom land in 
Jefferson and Arkansas counties and divided it into 200 farm 
units averaging forty-two acres each. Plum Bayou's primary
67parm security Administration, "Resettlement Pro­
jects, " ibid.
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purpose, as a Gazette editorial noted, was "to demonstrate 
the feasibility of land ownership by young farmers and young 
farm wives following a 'live at home' program."®8 A coopera­
tive association provided such community services as a general 
merchandise store, repair shop, feed mill, cotton gin, live­
stock breeding, and heavy equipment. But every Plum Bayou 
farmer did his own farming and owned his own land. At Lake- 
view, an 8,163-acre project in Phillips and Lee counties in 
eastern Arkansas, the RA developed 142 units for Negro share­
croppers and farm laborers. The Camden and West Helena 
subsistence homesteads were to be for Negroes, but they never 
got beyond the planning stage.®8 The Resettlement Adminis­
tration was the first community-building agency to show 
effective concern for Negro farmers in Region Six.
In contrast to Plum Bayou and Lakeview, the RA under­
took three "farm tenant security" projects, one in each of 
the three states. These differed from the community projects 
since they resettled farm families on units scattered or 
infiltrated into existing farming districts, although some 
tracts were large enough in themselves to become separate 
communities. The Louisiana Farm Tenant Security project, 
for example, consisted of nineteen tracts of land totaling 
7,165 acres; fourteen tracts each contained eight units or
68Arkansas Gazette, November 20, 1936.
®9Glenn E. Riddell to Bruce L. Melvin, March 1, 1934, 
R. G. 96, National Archives.
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less, but one tract, the Millsaps plantation at Crew Lake in 
Richland Parish, contained 2,947 acres. Thus the farm 
tenant security projects shared features of both the community 
projects and the Bankhead-Jones tenant purchase program. The 
Crew Lake community closely resembled Transylvania or Mounds, 
but the development of most of the other units did not differ 
essentially from the tenant purchase units.70
Lake Dick, Terrebonne, and Marcella were the only 
projects in Region Six which ran counter to the traditional 
pattern of individually~owned family farms.7! The Lake Dick 
project near Altheimer, Jefferson County, Arkansas, con­
sisted of 4,529 acres of sandy lpam and buckshot soil lying 
in a basin between the Mississippi and Arkansas rivers. At 
Lake Dick, the Resettlement Administration experimented with 
a pattern common in European agriculture where farmers lived 
in villages and went out to work in surrounding fields. The 
Lake Dick homes and most of the community and cooperative 
buildings formed a village around the banks of a horseshoe­
shaped lake in the middle of the project. A  cooperative 
association, Lake Dick Farm, Inc., rented the land and 
facilities from the FSA and carried on the farming operations;
70Heaxinc[s on the Farm Security Administration. 1062? 
Farm Security Administration, "Resettlement Projects, " R. G. 
96, National Archives.
7!conkin, Tomorrow a New World, 168-70? Joseph W. 
Eaton, Exploring Tomorrow’s Agriculture (New York, 1943),
66, 67.
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through membership in the association, the project families 
collectively "owned*1 the land, their homes, the community 
center, school, cooperative store, dairy, cotton gin, and 
barns. As individuals, they owned only their "children and 
chickens."72 Members worked as day laborers for wages paid 
at the end of each week and shared annually in the associa­
tions * profits (if any) on a patronage basis. They received 
their homes and garden plots rent free. In 1939, the FSA 
developed four sugar cane plantations in Terrebonne Parish, 
Louisiana, into one large collective farm of seventy
7 0families. At Terrebonne, each farmer rented a six-acre 
homestead unit? his home occupied two acres, but he could 
use the other four to grow food for his family's own use or 
for sale as supplemental income. Despite plans for coopera­
tive ownership, the FSA divided Terrebonne into forty-acre 
units, perhaps an indication of growing doubt about the 
practicality of cooperative farming. Less important, the 
Marcella project was a 2,686-acre collective farm in Holmes 
County, Mississippi, but it never had an independent 
existence. Marcella was part of Mileston Farms, the only 
project in Region Six that the FSA was solely responsible 
for initiating, planning, and developing. Constructed in
720ren Stephens, "FSA Fights for Its Life." Harper *s 
Magazine, CLXXXVI (April, 1943), 482; Arkansas Gazette, 
January 11, 1938, Arkansas Democrat Sunday Magazine/ August
11, 1940.
73item-Tribune (New Orleans), June 25, 1939.
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1939 and 1940, Mileston was a community type project of 
9,350 acres and 106 units, only thirty-six of which were 
operated collectively.7^
Beginning about 1938, Whitaker launched a final round 
of project building. Most of the early projects had been 
located in Arkansas, but now Louisiana and Mississippi 
received more attention.75 Transylvania Farms, in East 
Carroll Parish, was a 10,725-acre community type project 
designed to provide 160 low-income farm families in the Louisi­
ana delta with family-type farms and a chance to obtain an 
adequate living. In 1938, Transylvania Association, Inc., 
taking a ninety-nine-year lease on the land, developed the 
project with funds borrowed from the government. Whitaker 
created the Mounds project nearby because the Transylvania 
purchase had displaced many Negro families. He purchased an 
additional 11,896 acres in East Carroll and Madison parishes 
and developed the land into 145 family-type farms. The 
Mounds project did not differ at all from Transylvania except 
in the color of the clients.
Except for Transylvania, Mounds, and Terrebonne, the 
Farm Security Administration's late projects were somewhat
7^Eaton, Exploring Tomorrow's Agriculture. 142, 1515; 
Hearings on the Farm Security Administration. 1072, 1073; 
Farm Security Administration, "Resettlement Projects," R. G. 
96, National Archives.
75T. Roy Reid to the Employees of the Farm Security 
Administration in Region Six, July 6, 1938, ibid.
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more improvised than those w611 underway by 1936 or 1937.
The FSA., for example, developed Northwest Arkansas Farms in 
Benton and Washington counties to provide farms for 
families being displaced from submarginal purchase areas in 
the Ozarks. Northeast Mississippi Farms— an infiltration 
type project covering Choctaw, Clay, Kemper, Lowndes,
Noxubee, Oktibbeha, and Winston counties— offered opportunity 
for similar families in the north Mississippi hills. The 
FSA inherited 5,744 acres of cut-over land in George and 
Green counties, Mississippi, built a community center and 
other facilities at Lucedale, and developed ninety-three 
family-type farms. Unlike most resettlement projects, Luce­
dale relied on income from truck crops, grain, and livestock. 
In 1939, the Farm Security Administration created five 
separate projects out of land originally purchased for an 
older project known as Arkansas Delta Farms.7® Biscoe,
Clover Bend, and Lonoke were for white families; Desha and 
Townes were for Negroes. These were essentially infiltration 
type projects, but they differed from the farm tenant 
security projects by utilizing larger tracts of land. They 
actually included many plantations of 1,000 or more acres 
scattered throughout the delta. The total project acreage 
usually ran from 3,000 to 5,000 acres and contained between 
fifty and 100 units. Since they were developed late, they
7®T. Roy Reid to Will W. Alexander, May 17, 1939,
ibid.
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did not always have the variety of community facilities 
characte]:istic of early projects.7?
Despite differences among the projects, the resettle­
ment program possessed a basic continuity, especially after 
1935. The RA and FSA were identical organizations, with the 
latter incorporating the RA's entire staff from the regional 
office down to the lowest level. With one exception, the FSA 
did not initiate any new resettlement projects in Region Six, 
but completed those it had inherited, using the RA's plans. 
How projects were planned and developed will be discussed in 
the next chapter.
77F.arm Security Administration, .."Resettlement. Pro­
jects, " ibid. ? Hearings on the Farm Security Administration. 
1038-49, 1074, 1075.
CHAPTER III
THE MISSISSIPPI SUBSISTENCE HOMESTEADS
"There are in one sense," wrote M. L. Wilson in 1940, 
"two polar extremes of thought in respect to the direction 
agricultural development should followiin the future." One 
school would stress greater technological efficiency, mechan­
ize farming on a huge scale as rapidly as possible, and put 
surplus farm workers into industry. But Wilson objected: 
as long as unemployment was high, industry could not provide 
employment for surplus rural people. The second school of 
thought favored breaking up agriculture into small units, 
turning away from modern technology and specialization, and 
returning to "subsistence practices that were common before 
the industrial revolution." Again Wilson objected: 
specialized, large-scale agriculture had become absolutely 
necessary to supply raw materials for industry and to feed 
the industrial population of the cities. Why go to either 
extreme? he asked. Why not combine both modern farming 
techniques and small subsistence farms? All agriculture 
need not be commercial, and subsistence farming did not 
necessarily mean going back to the Middle Ages; it could be
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as modern as any large-scale farm.1
As chief of the Division of Subsistence Homesteads in 
1933 and 1934, Wilson followed this middle course. He 
experimented with subsistence farming, but he did not seek 
to form enclaves where homesteaders could escape modern 
problems and retreat to a simpler life near the soil. Nor 
did he want to use subsistence homesteads as a defeatist 
attempt to reverse progress. In the South, Wilson estab­
lished a few colonies for stranded workers, as at Arthurdale, 
West Virginia, the first and best-known subsistence home­
stead project. He also built a few all-rural colonies for 
submarginal farmers, but for the most part he concentrated 
on homesteads for part-time farmers near industrial employ­
ment. In Mississippi alone, the Division of Subsistence 
Homesteads planned five industrial-type projects and one 
rural colony. Also taking a middle course, Mississippians 
saw them primarily as a means of promoting home ownership.2
The industrial projects became the best examples of 
what subsistence homesteads were supposed to be. A subsis­
tence homestead, according to an official definition, was "a 
house and out buildings located upon a plot of land on which 
can be grown a large portion of the foodstuffs required by
1M. L. Wilson, "Beyond Economics, " in Farmers in a 
Chancing- World: The Yearbook of Agriculture. 1940 (Washing­
ton, 1940) , 922-37. Quote from p. 930.
^See Daily Register (Clarksdale, Mississippi, May 1,
1934.
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the homestead family.” The homesteader produced only for
home consumption and not for commercial sale. "In that it
provides for subsistence alone, it carries with it the
corollary that cash income must be drawn from some outside
source. The central motive of the subsistence homestead
program, therefore, is to demonstrate the economic value of
a livelihood which combines part-time wage work and part-
3time gardening or farming." Except for their small size, 
the Mississippi projects were probably typical of most 
industrial-type subsistence homesteads. They all contained 
between 100 and 300 acres of land broken up into twenty to 
twenty-five units, with an average of four to seven acres 
per homestead. They were all located within about five 
miles of a small town with industrial jobs available. The 
Division of Subsistence designed them to take up the slack 
of seasonal employment in cotton gins, textile mills, and 
other industries common in small Southern towns. These pro­
jects offered opportunities both for industrial workers to 
practice subsistence farming and for farmers to earn cash 
income as part-time industrial workers.^
The Division of Subsistence Homesteads announced plans 
for industrial-type projects at McComb, Laurel, Tupelo,
^u. S. Department of the Interior, Division of Sub­
sistence Homesteads, Bulletin 1 (Washington, 1934), 4, 
quoted in Paul K. Conkin, Tomorrow a New World: The New
Deal Community Program (Ithaca, N. Y., 1959), 110,111.
4conkin. Tomorrow a New World. 105, 106, 110, 111.
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Meridian, and Hattiesburg, Mississippi.^ None of these towns 
were urban centers, but they all possessed economic poten­
tial. In 1935, Meridian had the largest population (31,954), 
with Hattiesburg (18,601) and Laurel (18,017) almost equal; 
McComb (10,057) and Tupelo (6,361) were considerably smaller. 
Meridian, Mississippi's second largest city, was located in 
the east-central part of the state, a region famous for 
yellow pine, hardwood, cotton, livestock, and dairying.
Timber was practically the only natural resource of this 
region; but lumber companies had already stripped the best 
virgin forests by 1930. The most important railroad center 
in eastern Mississippi, Meridian was the junction of the 
Mobile and Ohio, the New Orleans and North Eastern, the St. 
Louis and San Francisco, and several smaller lines.
Meridian's cotton mills produced more cotton oil for sale in 
Europe than did any other city in Mississippi, but a shirt 
and garment factory and three hosiery mills made the city an 
important textile town as well. In the northeastern part of 
the state, Tupelo was one of the first TVA cities and per­
haps Mississippi's best example of the "New South." Like 
many other Southern towns, Tupelo took its first step away
^Report of the Division of Subsistence Homesteads and 
Federal Subsistence Homesteads Corporation, June, 1934,
Record Group 96, Records of the Farmers' Home Administration, 
National Archives (to be cited hereafter as R. G; 96,
National Archives); U. S. Department of the Interior, Division 
of Subsistence Homesteads, Monthly Rroject Report, April 26, 
1935. ibid.
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from the land with the cotton mill? but three garment fac­
tories soon became the city's major industry.®
McComb, Hattiesburg, and Laurel all lay within the 
coastal plain. At one time, this region had consisted of 
thick forests of long-leaf yellow pine? but in the thirties, 
it too was mainly cutover land with little or no marketable 
timber left. In addition, southern Mississippi was a truck 
farming area specializing in corn, sweet potatoes, oats, 
tobacco, sugar cane, garden vegetables, pecans, and peanuts. 
For both truck farming and industry, McComb occupied a 
favorable geographical position as the largest town along 
the Illinois Central railroad between New Orleans and 
Jackson. McCombians found industrial opportunities in 
Illinois Central repair shops, an ice company, sawmills, 
(textile mills, and a woodworking plant. Once a mere sawmill 
camp, Hattiesburg had become an important manufacturer of 
naval stores, railroad center, and college town. Twenty- 
five miles north, Laurel was still primarily a lumber town 
on the extreme northeastern edge of the yellow pine forest.7
The Mississippi industrial-type homesteads all fol­
lowed the same basic stages of development? they were also 
virtually identical as completed projects. First, the
^Federal Writers' Project of the Works Progress 
Administration, Mississippi; A Guide to the Magnolia State 
(New York, 1938), 227-31, 261-65.
7Ibid., 396, 417, 222-27.
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Federal Subsistence Homestead Corporation organized the five 
projects into separate subsidiary corporations, assigned 
each a general or project manager, and released an allotment 
to cover development and management costs. Subsistence Home­
steads officials worked closely with chambers of commerce 
and other local "sponsors11 in selecting land for each pro­
ject. Next, the general manager began clearing and surveying 
the land and opened bidding on the homesteads and out build­
ings. As originally planned, each homestead would cost 
between $2,500 and $2,800, including land and all improve­
ments.® The general manager also supervised the work of 
selecting homesteaders, breaking the land up into individual 
subsistence plots, and building roads. Since the projects 
were all close to town, the Division of Subsistence Home­
steads planned no community facilities for project resi­
dents . ®
At first, McComb set the pace for the subsistence 
homesteads program in Mississippi. During a visit to McComb,
®Report of the Division of Subsistence Homesteads and 
Federal Subsistence Homestead Corporation, June, 1934, R. G. 
96, National Archives.
9Conkin, Tomorrow a New World. 106, 107. Besides the 
industrial projects, the Division of Subsistence Homesteads 
announced a full-time farm colony at Richton, Mississippi, 
purchased 7,753 acres of farm land for $36,753.24, and made 
plans to divide it up into about 310 farm units. But the 
Resettlement Administration inherited Richton in 1935 as a 
completely undeveloped project. U. S. Department of the 
Interior, Division of Subsistence Homesteads, Monthly Pro­
ject Report, April 26, 1935, R. G. 96, National Archives.
on December 26 and 27, 1933, I. R. Bradshaw, Mississippi 
field representative for the Division of Subsistence Home­
steads, and N. A. Keller, land clearing specialist of the 
Department of Agriculture, revealed unofficially that the 
city had won approval for a subsistence homestead project.-1-® 
The people of the city responded with enthusiasm. In fact, 
a special committee of the McComb Chamber of Commerce, had 
already been lobbying for a project. To business men, a 
homestead project meant more than merely homes for twenty or 
twenty-five families; it meant employment for laborers, 
carpenters, plumbers, electricians, and other workers who 
would develop the homesteads „ Within a week after Bradshaw 
and Keller left, a group of McComb people decided to ask 
Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt to dedicate the project; knowing 
her interest in the subsistence community idea, they also 
wanted to name the project the Eleanor Roosevelt Homesteads. 
Edgar G. Williams, chairman of the Mississippi State Demo­
cratic Committee, agreed to present their invitation to the 
first lady at the White House; and Senator Pat Harrison set 
up the appointment with Mrs. Roosevelt. Did she know Edgar
G. Williams? he asked. "Oh, I remember him," she replied. 
"He's the gentleman from way down in South Mississippi who 
wore a silk suit and a red necktie to the inauguration."
When Williams called at the White House, he found her "well
•̂®McComb Enterprise, December 29, 1933.
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posted on the plan of a subsistence homestead project at 
McComb." She was pleased with the invitation, he reported, 
but she could not give a definite answer since the Division 
had not officially approved McComb for a project.
On December 29, 1933, the Federal Subsistence Home­
steads Corporation, the action arm of the Division of 
Subsistence Homesteads, formed McComb Homesteads of Missis­
sippi, Inc.12 Organized under Delaware law, McComb 
Homesteads was a subsidiary corporation with responsibility 
for developing and operating the McComb project. Rather 
than set up a regional or state-by-state organization, the 
Division of Subsistence Homesteads virtually operated its 
entire program through such local corporations, setting up 
one for every homestead project. A  legal device, McComb 
Homesteads of Mississippi would borrow money from the 
parent corporation, hold title to the land, buildings, and 
other property, enter into contracts with architects, 
contractors, and building supply companies, make all expen­
ditures, and issue purchase contracts to individual home­
stead families. Once construction work was over, McComb 
Homesteads would manage the project. As on all subsistence
^ I b i d ., January 5, 1934? January 19, 1934.
12McComb Homestead Project SH-MS-4, Report of Examina 
tion, dated June 22, 1937, Records of the Housing and Home 
Finance Agency, National Archives (to be cited hereafter as 
R. G. 207, National Archives) ; Conkin, Tomorrow a, New 
World. 106, 107.
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homesteads, the corporation officers were prominent citizens 
of the local community. In early 1934, Edgar Williams, state 
Democratic committeeman, became president of the corporation. 
J. 0. Emmerich, editor of the McComb Enterprise, took over 
as general or project manager, while Xavier A. Kramer, mayor 
of McComb, W. M. Webb, and J. c. Flowers, both businessmen, 
rounded out the board of directors.13
On January 18, Senator Pat Harrison and Congressman
H. D. Stephens and Russell Ellzey wired Emmerich: "MCCOMB HAS
BEEN SELECTED A SUBSISTENCE HOMESTEAD SITE [ , ] ANNOUNCEMENT BY 
DIRECTOR OF SUBSISTENCE HOMESTEADS TO BE MADE TODAY."14 A 
few days later, M. L. Wilson officially gave the board of 
directors of McComb Homesteads of Mississippi full authority 
to go ahead with plans for developing a project. Then on 
February 1, the board announced the purchase of a 
364.04-acre tradt of land three miles southeast of the city. 
McComb Homesteads of Mississippi paid John 0. Lanier, a local 
landowner, $2,200.00 for the undeveloped land. 3 Almost 
as soon as the purchase was made, engineer Jimmie Barnes had
13McComb Enterprise. January 5, 1934; February 2,
1934. In May, 1934, however, Secretary of the Interior 
Harold L. Ickes federalized all subsistence homestead pro­
jects, abolished the control of the subsidiary corporations, 
and placed the entire program directly under the Federal 
Subsistence Homesteads Corporation. See Conkin, Tomorrow a 
New World. 120-23.
14McComb Enterprise. January 19, 1934.
15Ibid., February 2, 1934? A. T. McCurdie, Memorandum 
to J. Lloyd Taylor, January 15, 1946, R. G. 207, National 
Archives.
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two crews of men on the project drawing contour maps of 
elevations, streams, and other land marks, while a third 
crew under Walter Fitzgerald was locating the legal bound­
aries. In the meantime, the board of directors began working 
on plans for the project with agricultural engineers, horti- 
culturalists, and the state extension service.
Within a few weeks, homestead officials had drawn up 
building plans for an initial group of twenty-five homes, 
with a total of thirty-seven homes planned for future develop­
ment. On March 5, a capacity crowd of prospective home­
steaders and other interested people jammed the McComb City 
Hall auditorium where Emmerich outlined the corporation1s 
plans for "Eleanor Roosevelt Homesteads." Since the 
engineering Work had been completed, he explained, actual 
construction awaited Washington's approval of final building 
plans. Emmerich had already submitted these plans to Brad­
shaw; he in turn had approved them, Emmerich said, and sent 
them on to Washington. "The program," he wrote later, "will 
carry out a dream of President and Mrs. Roosevelt to provide
modern homes in ideal surroundings near a city for part-time
17industrial workers." '
On April 24, McComb Homesteads held a ground-breaking 
ceremony, an event that put it ahead of all other subsistence
■^McComb Enterprise, February 9, 1934. 
•*-?Ibid.. March 9, 1934.
homesteads projects in Mississippi. A. B. McKay, state 
horticulturalist, and J. T. Copeland, state agricultural 
engineer, had both participated in planning the project; now 
they turned over the first spade of earth on the site of the 
first h o m e s t e a d . T h i s  ceremony did not actually launch 
the building program at McComb. Emmerich had already 
started construction on three homesteads; he added five more 
within a week and planned to keep enlarging the construction 
program until all twenty-five houses were underway at once. 
Between April and September, 1934, Emmerich completed twenty 
homesteads. The McComb houses were all frame clapboard 
structures except for two frame shingle structures; eight 
had four rooms, ten five rooms, and one six rooms.. The 
original project plan called for equipping them with running 
water, indoor toilets, electric lights, gas for cooking and 
heating, and telephone service; but electricity, gas, and 
telephones were later dropped due to high installation costs. 
Emmerich's engineers divided the 364 acres into different 
sized plots. Nineteen homesteads ranged from four to fourteen 
acres each, and one had a twenty-four acre plot. In addition 
to the dwelling, each unit contained a garage and well-house 
and a combination cow stall, chicken house, and store room.
All of the homesteaders had some wooded land, a truck garden, 
and an orchard, as well as the use of a thirty-seven acre
18Ibid., April 27, 1934.
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community pasture. Emmerich let contracts for drilling a 
well for each unit, and for installing individual septic 
tanks. Each homesteader had his own sow, milch cow, mare, 
twenty-five to fifty hens, and essential farm equipment.
FERA labor built dirt roads through the project connecting 
the homesteads with each other and with existing roads. For 
recreation, homesteaders had a seventeen-acre park and a 
thirteen-acre lake, but no other community facilities were 
provided.19
As early as January, Emmerich called for applicants 
even though he had not yet received the proper application 
forms. He invited all interested persons to leave their
90names and addresses with the McComb Chamber of Commerce.
When application forms came in, they could fill them out and 
make formal application. Within two weeks, 232 people had 
applied for homesteads; by April, the number had risen to 
518. ̂  To handle family selection, the Division of Sub­
sistence Homesteads set up a series of four committees from 
local to national level. First, a committee of McComb 
citizens interviewed all applicants and drew up a list of 
the most likely families. Then the board of directors of
•^For the floor plans see ibid., March 15, 1935? Re­
settlement Administration, "Project Description Book," March- 
December,. 1936, R. G. 96, National Archives; see also McComb 
Enterprise, January 18, 1935.
20lbid., January 5, 1934.
21Ibid., January 19, 1934; April 6, 1934.
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McComb Homesteads formed a selection committee of its own
membership, reviewed the citizen committee's list, and in
turn made its recommendations to a state committee. This
committee served as a clearing house for family selection on
all Mississippi subsistence homesteads; its members, Miss
Ann Jordan of Mississippi State College and I. R. Bradshaw,
went over the choices again and passed the revised list on
to Washington. Mrs. Charlotte Smith of the Division of
Subsistence Homesteads headed the national committee which
made the final selection for all projects in the nation.
The Division of Subsistence Homesteads was looking for
thrifty, industrious, honest people who had already proven
themselves reliable. The most preferred families were those
who earned part of their income in local industrial work.
Heads of families had to be under fifty years of age, possess
a reputation for good character, and show ability to pay for
22the homestead.
By April, the Division of Subsistence Homesteads had 
approved nine applicants: a linotype operator, railroad
switchman, brakeman, truck driver, cotton mill worker, black­
smith, restaurant cook, printer, and mechanic.22 Their
22Ibid.,. April 6. 1934; John B. Holt, An Analysis of 
Methods and Criteria Used in Selecting Families for Coloniza­
tion Projects, Social Research Report No. 1 of the U. S. 
Department of Agriculture, Farm Security Administration, and 
the Bureau of Agricultural Economics (Washington, 1937), 36, 
37.
23j4cComb Enterprise. April 6, 1934.
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average annual income ran between $1,000 and $1,200. The 
McComb project probably attracted these people because of 
the security and stability they believed it would afford.
Most homestead families were interested above all in home 
ownership. In the Subsistence Homestead Division's plan, 
each homesteader occupied the homesteads under "temporary 
licensing agreements,” a contract calling for monthly rental 
payments based on the size and cost of each unit. The home­
stead corporation would later offer each family a sales con­
tract with payments amortized over a thirty-year period at 
three per cent interest. What each family had paid as 
licensees would apply to reduce the final purchase price of
their homestead unit. As permanent residents, they would
24.continue making monthly payments.
Emmerich planned for families to occupy the home­
steads as they were completed. In early June, 1934, Guy A. 
Betz, a mechanic and night watchman, took the first home­
stead.^ Two other families, those of J. R. Butler and M. T. 
Rhodes, soon followed. Emmerich initially advised them that 
the homesteads would each cost $2,500, more or less; he could 
not determine the exact price until construction was further 
advanced. But somewhat later, he presented the three fami­
lies with licensing agreements based on a purchase cost of
24conkin, Tomorrow a New World, 127.
^McComb Enterprise. June 8, 1934.
$3,200. Betz refused to sign, and so did Butler and Rhodes, 
objecting that the price was unreasonably high. On instruc­
tions from Washington, Emmerich ordered them to vacate their 
homesteads. For the time being, the Division of Subsistence 
Homesteads decided not to move any more families into the 
project. The Betz episode may have contributed to the 
decision, but it was not the only reason. McComb Homesteads 
of Mississippi had wired the finished houses for electricity, 
but then decided the cost of extending power lines to the 
project was too high. Thus the McComb homesteaders were 
without lights? and since all well pumps were electric, they 
were also without water.^6
In early 1935,tthe Division of Subsistence Homesteads 
came up with a plan for reorganizing McComb. After a re­
study of the project, Charles E. Pynchon, Wilson's successor 
as head of the Federal Subsistence Homesteads Corporation, 
proposed to construct ten more houses, bringing the total to 
thirty-five, and to reduce the larger homestead plots. 
Although he contemplated spending an additional $26,000 at 
McComb, Pynchon pointed out that these changes would lower 
the average cost of each homestead from about $3,800 to 
$2,865— a price that he hoped would attract settlers to the 
project. Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Iekes gave
26project Analysis Questionnaire, McComb, Mississippi 
Project No. 27, n.d., R. G. 207, National Archives; McComb 
Homestead Project SH-MS 4, Report of Examination, dated 
June 22, 1937. ibid.
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approval, then apparently changed his mind. After February, 
1935, the Division of Subsistence Homesteads suspended all 
activity at McComb except for such work as planting trees 
along project roads. Since no permanent residents were on 
the project and no effort was being made to find any, McComb 
Homesteads went into a kind of limbo until the Resettlement 
Administration took it over three months later.27
Soon after construction started at McComb, the 
Division of Subsistence Homesteads launched building programs 
at Tupelo, Hattiesburg, and Meridian. Tupelo Homesteads of 
Mississippi purchased a 171-acre tract for $6,259.37, built 
twenty-five clapboard homes of English and colonial American 
design, and leased them primarily to low-income families 
employed in the textile industry. Tupelo had three parks 
and a six-acre lake with a community pavilion. The Wilson 
Dam power plant of the Tennessee Valley Authority supplied 
electricity for the project, and all occupants had one-party 
telephone service.28 Magnolia Homesteads, near Meridian, 
consisted of 233 acres of land in three tracts costing a 
total of $5,325.00. Mrs. L. C. Gray, general manager of
27Charles E. Pynchon, Memorandum to the Secretary of 
the Interior, February 5, 1935, Record Group 48, Records of 
the Office of the Secretary of the interior, National 
Archives (to be cited hereafter as R. G. 48, National 
Archives); McComb Enterprise. January 18, 1935.
28Resettlement Administration, "Project Description 
Book"; Mississippi Projects, June 1, 1935, R. G. 96, 
National Archives.
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Magnolia, was the only woman in the nation to manage a sub­
sistence homesteads project. The homes at Magnolia were 
bungalow-type frame structures, with electric lights but no 
gas or telephone service. Like McComb and Tupelo, Magnolia 
had a park and lake for recreational purposes.^9 Hatties­
burg Homesteads invested $2,379.20 in a mere 129-acre-tract, 
the smallest project in the state. Hattiesburg had twenty- 
four frame clapboard houses, a park but no lake or other 
community facilities and no utilities at all.30 At Laurel, 
the Division of Subsistence Homesteads purchased a 183-acre
tract costing $2,010.33, but the Laurel project never even
31got as far as construction. x
The Division of Subsistence Homesteads, in fact, did 
not exist long enough to complete any of the Mississippi 
projects. In late April, 1935, President Roosevelt re­
organized the New Deal community program and abolished the 
Division of Subsistence Homesteads after an existence of 
twenty-one months. The new Resettlement Administration
^Project Analysis Questionnaire, Magnolia Gardens, 
Meridian, Mississippi, R. G. 207, National Archives; Thomas 
K. Shuff, Memorandum to Lee Pressman, July 15, 1935, ibid.
30Rexford G. Tugwell to William M. Colmer, May 20, 
1936, R. G. 96, National Archives; Report on Examination, 
Hattiesburg Homestead Association, dated September 20, 1943, 
ibid.; A. T . McCurdie to H. V. Rouse, June 20, 1935, R. G. 
207, National Archives.
^Mississippi Projects, June 1, 1935, R. G. 96, 
National Archives; Report of the Division of Subsistence 
Homesteads and Federal Subsistence Homesteads Corporation, 
June, 1934, ibid.
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inherited the subsistence homesteads program on May 15, 
1935.32 As Resettlement Administrator, Rexford G. Tugwell 
assigned the five Mississippi industrial-type projects to 
the Suburban Resettlement Division; but in August, he trans­
ferred them to the Management Division, which would assume 
responsibility for completing and then operating t h e m . 33
One of T . Roy Reid's first tasks as director of 
Region Six was the unfinished business of the Division of 
Subsistence Homesteads in Mississippi. After examining the 
status of each project, he decided to drop Laurel, since it 
was so far from completion; but he went ahead with McComb, 
Tupelo, Hattiesburg, and Meridian. With one exception, no 
major construction was undertaken on any of the projects 
beyond finishing what had already been started. The Con­
struction Division built ten additional houses at Tupelo, 
bringing the total number of units to thirty-five and making 
it the largest of the Mississippi projects. James B. Lawson, 
chief of the regional Management Division, made only minor 
repairs at Hattiesburg and Meridian, as some of the homes 
were badl^ydeteriorated. At McComb, Lawson redivided the 
land and enlarged some of the homestead tracts, erected more
3?T# h . Hibben, Memorandum to R. G. Tugwell, June 29, 
1935, ibid.; Tugwell, Memorandum to John S. Lansill, July 10, 
1935, ibid.; see also Mas tin G. White to F . K. Ethridge, 
October 2, 1937, R. G. 207, National Archives.
33Rexfor(j Tugwell to Harry L. Hopkins, July 18,
1935, R. G. 96, National Archives; R. R. Ehrlish, Memorandum 
to R. K. Straus, October 17, 1935, ibid.
82
outbuildings, and installed gasoline well pumps. In addition, 
the Management Division investigated and selected families 
for all twenty units at McComb, and filled the vacancies at 
Tupelo, Hattiesburg, and Meridian.3^
Beyond this point, the Resettlement Administration 
program differed slightly from that of the Division of Sub­
sistence Homesteads. Once each project was fully occupied, 
the regional office organized the families into a local home­
stead association, the same kind of organization that the 
Resettlement Administration used for operating all of its own 
community projects. At first, both old homesteaders and new 
families remained under the terms of their old licensing 
agreements. When the new homestead association took over, 
the Resettlement Administration offered them a chance, after 
a one-year trial period, to enter into a Tenure Form A con­
tract, a forty-year purchase agreement. Those not wanting 
to purchase their homesteads could take a Tenure B contract, 
a monthly lease based on the unit's selling price. The 
Resettlement Administration required occupants to follow a 
live-at-home program of home management in order to help 
them reduce theitiliving expenses.35
^Management Division, News Letter, July 1, 1935 to 
January 1, 1936, Region VI, ibid.; Rexford G. Tugwell to T. 
Roy Reid, February 2, 1937, ibid.; "Subsistence Homesteads," 
April, 1935, Ibid.? "Mississippi Projects," June 1, 1935, 
ibid. See Leon Shirman, Memorandum to Mrs. L. M. Walker, 
February 9, 1937, ibid.; Edward Stone, Memorandum to Mrs.
L. M. Walker, December 14, 1936, ibid.
35Conkin, Tomorrow a New World. 215, 216.
For the next five years (1935 to 1940) , the Resettle­
ment Administration and then the Farm Security Administration 
struggled unsuccessfully with the problem of the Mississippi 
subsistence homesteads. At McComb, Lawson quickly ran up 
against the project's old nemesis. "The selection of 
families and the filling of the houses on the McComb project 
are progressing in accordance with our anticipation, " he 
wrote in November, 1935, "that is, we are having trouble in 
getting the houses filled. . . ." Families who could qualify, 
he reported, refused to accept the properties under the terms 
of the temporary licensing agreements.36 By June 15, 1935, 
however, Lawson had filled nineteen out of the twenty home­
steads, using basically the criteria drawn up by the Division 
of Subsistence Homesteads.37 a  year later (the probation 
period), the regional office incorporated McComb Homesteads 
Association under Mississippi law on January 12, 1937, for a 
period of fifty years. The association had authority to 
issue 250 shares of common stock with a par value of three 
dollars per share. According to the Charter of Incorporation, 
the McComb Homesteads Association was to "participate in the 
+
3®J. B. Lawson to Robert K. Straus, November 6, 1935,
R. G. 96, National Archives. See T. Roy Reid to Rexford G. 
Tugwell, December 9, 1935, ibid.; Wendell Lund, Memorandum 
to Mrs. Loretta M. Walker, March 10, 1937, ibid.? John 0. 
Walker to Reid, April 17, 1937, ibid.; Walker to Reid, May 
17, 1939, ibid.
•^Rexford g . Tugwell to Dan R. McGehee, June 30,
1936, ibid.
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establishment, maintenance and development of a community at 
McComb Homesteads . . . for the mutual benefit of the members 
of such community; to engage in activities designed to 
rehabilitate such members and make them self supporting; and 
to do and perform all acts and things necessary, convenient, 
useful or incidental to the accomplishment of these purposes ." 38 
The regional office next drew up plans for selling the project 
property and assets to the association for $44,360.00, less 
credits of $2,250.17 for rent paid, leaving a net price of 
$42,109.83. In contrast, the total estimated cost of the 
McComb project was $110,088.00. Homesteaders would pay an 
average of $2,218.00 for their units, with monthly install­
ments over a forty-year period at three per cent interest.39
Despite the $65,728 write off, the Resettlement 
Administration's plans for a homestead association at McComb 
failed miserably. The new project manager, John S. Grant, 
offered each family the option of signing a Tenure A purchase 
contract with the association or staying for a reasonable 
length of time under the old agreement while looking for a 
new home. Most took the latter course. In July, 1938,
3®The Charter of Incorporation of McComb Homestead 
Association, dated January 12, 1937, R. G. 207, National 
Archives. The charter is published in McComb Enterprise. 
February 11, 1937.
39Edward Stone, Memorandum to Donald MacGuiness, 
March 17, 1937, R. G. 207, National Archives; Mastin G. 
White, Memorandum for the Secretary of Agriculture, July 18,
1938, ibid-
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there were only five families in occupany, all under tempo­
rary licensing agreements. The McComb project experienced 
difficulty keeping occupants because of its distance from 
the corporate limits of McComb, its lack of utilities, and 
its generally poor soil. Like all subsistence homesteads in 
Mississippi, McComb also suffered from the lack of employment 
opportunities in nearby towns.
After conferring with local citizens of McComb, 
regional officials decided to scrap the plan for a homestead 
association. If the units were simply offered at an average 
price of $1,200 per unit at six per cent interest with a 
twenty-year term, McComb citizens contended, then enough 
interest could be aroused to fill the project. Although 
such an arrangement would come close to eliminating govern­
ment control over the project, the Farm Security Administra­
tion went ahead. In July, 1938, FSA officials mad§ an 
outright sale to individual clients, giving a deed to each 
homesteader and taking a mortgage and promissory note. 
Homesteaders agreed to repay the purchase price in equal 
monthly installments amortized over twenty years at five 
per cent, with average monthly payments of $14.25. At 
$1,200, the government lost $3,114.00 per unit, or a total
4°Milo Perkins, Memorandum for the Secretary of Agri­
culture, July 14, 1938, Record Group 16, Records of the 
office of the Secretary of Agriculture, National Archives 
(to be cited hereafter as R. G. 16, National Archives) ?
J. 0. Walker, Memorandum for the solicitor [Mastin G. White], 
April 15, 1938, R. G. 207, National Archives.
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or $62,292.00. At last, the Farm Security Administration 
had little trouble finding occupants for the project.^-*-
Hattiesburg and Meridian were the only two projects 
in the nation that defaulted after being organized into 
homestead associations. On September 30, 1936, the Resettle­
ment Administration sold the Meridian project to the Meridian 
Homesteads Association for $60,000, less $2,424.67 in credits 
for rent paid.^2 Hattiesburg Homestead Association acquired 
the Hattiesburg property and assets on October 1, 1936, for 
$49,720.00, minus credits of $3,473.61.^ Meridian had cost 
$92,488.20, Hattiesburg $91,035.36. The Meridian homesteaders 
bought their individual units for an average price of 
$2,400.00, with an average monthly payment of $18.64, while 
at Hattiesburg each unit sold for an average of $2,075.00, 
with an $18.08 monthly payment. At both Hattiesburg and
Meridian, regional officials and interested local citizens
*
had agreed that the price represented not only the fair 
market value of the homesteads; it was also in line with
^Mastin G. White, Memorandum for the Secretary of 
Agriculture, July 18, 1938, ibid.; T. Roy Reid to Rexford G.
Tugwell, Sepfembef 4, 1936, R. G. 96, National Archives;
Leon Shiman, Memorandum to Edward Stone, September 11, 1936, 
ibid.
^2Ibid.; Milo Perkins, Memorandum for the Secretary 
of Agriculture, July 18, 1938, R. G. 16, National Archives.
42Milo Perkins, Memorandum for the Secretary of 
Agriculture, July 14, 1938, ibid.; E. E. Agger to T. Roy
Reid, January 22, 1937, R. G. 96, National Archives. See
Hattiesburg American, December 9, 1936.
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real estate values in the locality and imposed no undue 
burden on the homesteaders.44
The Resettlement Administration found it difficult to 
attract families at either project and almost impossible to 
keep them once they came. For one reason, the regional 
office built up a heritage of misunderstanding when it tried 
to purge both projects of undesirable occupants before 
offering purchase contracts. After the cooperative associa­
tions were organized, other residents withdrew voluntarily 
because they felt themselves unable tommake the necessary 
payments. At Hattiesburg, especially, the homesteaders were 
not satisfied with the terms and conditions of the Tenure A 
contracts. "The chief reason," Reid reported, "probably is 
that the total monthly outlay under Tenure Form 'A' is a few 
dollars more than it was under the Temporary Licensing 
Agreement."45 They also objected to the cooperative associa­
tion; "that is," Reid wrote, "some of the individuals feel 
that they should be allowed to purchase directly from the 
Government and not through the association, thereby relieving 
them of any responsibility in connection with the balance of 
the property." In addition, some felt they should not bear
44^110 perkins, Memorandum for the Secretary of Agri­
culture, July 14, 1938, R. G. 16, National Archives; Milo 
Perkins, Memorandum for the Secretary of Agriculture, July 
18, 1938, ibid.
45t . Roy Reid to Rexford G. Tugwell, November 4, 1936, 
R. G. 96, National Archives.
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any of the management expense; and some were worried about 
the forty-year clause, although none of them could make a 
substantial down payment. "I believe," Reid wrote, "that 
all of the above reasons are due primarily to the lack of 
business experience of a group of people such as we have on 
the project. . . ."46
From 1934 to 1938, Hattiesburg experienced a ninety- 
two per cent turnover. By July, 1938, there were only six 
families in occupancy.47 Meridian's record was similar. 
Neither association could make their first payment when.it 
came due on October 31, 1937, and neither ever met any 
future payment on their obligations. In 1938, after 
reappraising the project, the Farm Security Administration 
lowered monthly charges to $16.24, an amount based on an 
average selling price of $1,840.00; at Hattiesburg, the new 
figures were $14.74 per month and $1,578.42 per unit.4®
This reduction made the projects more attractive, but it was 
not a permanent solution. In March, 1941, acting regional 
director T. B. Fatherree wrote: "The affairs of the
Magnolia and Hattiesburg Homestead Associations are so badly
46Ibid.
47John O. Walker, Memorandum for Will W. Alexander, 
July 9, 1938, ibid.
48John 0. Walker to T. Roy Reid, July 28, 1938, ibid.; 
Walker to Reid, July 30, 194, ibid.; Milo Perkins, Memorandum 
for the Secretary of Agriculture, July 18, 1938, R. G. 16, 
National Archives.
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involved as to be considered insolvent, and to all purposes 
are looked upon as such by those of us responsible for 
their operation."^9
Tupelo was the last project to be conveyed to a home­
stead association. The Resettlement Administration formed 
the Tupelo Homestead Association on May 17, 1937, and 
approved the sale of the $149,290 project for $110,000.50 
The Tupelo Homesteaders did not wait until after the project 
had been sold before they started voicing complaints. When 
the new board of directors put the questions of sale to a 
vote, the homesteaders turned it down cold. The Resettlement 
Administration had not taken into consideration recent 
changes in Tupelo real estate values. In April, 1936, a 
tornado had swept through the city killing 201 people, 
injuring more than 1,000, and causing considerable property 
damage. As a result, building activity increased sharply 
and peaked in early 1937. By May, there were more rental 
apartments and homes in Tupelo than before the tornado, and 
the new buildings were superior to the ones lost. The RA's 
Land Utilization Division, with the assistance of local
49t . B. Fatherree to C. B. Baldwin, March 22, 1941,
R. G. 96, National Archives.
50Will W. Alexander, Memorandum for the Secretary of 
Agriculture, April 15, 1937, R. G. 16, National Archives; 
Alexander, Memorandum for the Secretary of Agriculture, 
October 2, 1937, ibid.? The Charter of Incorporation of 
Tupelo Homestead Association, Dated May 17, 1937. A copy 
is published in Tupelo Daily News, May 31, 1937, R. G. 96, 
National Archives.
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citizens, reappraised the project and recommended that the 
price be dropped to $95,557.50, making a net loss of 
$53,732.50. The board of directors favored the offer, but 
the homesteaders still objected strongly. After the regional 
office reappraised the project a second time, the associa­
tion finally agreed on October 1, 1938 to purchase the pro­
ject for $73,182.00. Tupelo could still not look forward to 
a stable future. Since a large number of the families were 
Tennessee Valley Authority employees, not Tupelo natives,
C  1they were not interested in purchasing their homes.
In Region Six, the Farm Security Administration started 
its liquidation program with the Mississippi subsistence 
homesteads. For practical purposes, McComb had been in a 
state of liquidation ever since the project had been opened 
for sale to homesteaders in 1938. On October 31, 1940, 
according to a memorandum of understanding between the 
Secretary of the Interior, the National Park Service took 
over the Tupelo project and made it part of its Natchez 
Trace Parkway system.^ in December, 1941, both Hattiesburg 
and Meridian homestead associations transferred all assets,
^Mastin q . White to Brooks Hays, September 21, 1938, 
R. G. 207, National Archives; Hays to White, September 29, 
1938, ibid.; Report of Examination, Tupelo Homestead Associa 
tion, For the Period November 15, 1934 to October 10, 1940, 
R. G. 96, National Archives; Deed of Trust Note, dated 
October 1, 1938, ibid.
52Frank W. Hancock to John E. Rankin, December 4, 
1944, ibid.; John 0. Walker to T. Roy Reid, October 5, 1940, 
ibid.
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real and personal property, to the united States Government, 
and then voluntarily dissolved.53 Bureau of Plant
Industry had already taken over five units at Meridian for 
its Horticulture Field Station there.^4 But now the Farm 
Security Administration sold the remaining homes to indi­
vidual purchasers, either current homesteaders or new fami­
lies who filled the unoccupied units. As World War II 
stimulated employment, FSA officials found it less difficult 
to obtain occupants than ever before, especially since they 
were now offering these units at ridiculously low prices.
On October 1, 1942, Farm Security Administrator C. B. 
Baldwin transferred to the Federal Public Housing Authority 
all resettlement projects on which clients did not earn 
their principal income from agriculture.^5 The Mississippi 
subsistence homesteads came under this classification. 
Alexander T. McCurdie opened an office for the Federal 
Public Housing Authority in Hattiesburg and operated the 
three remaining projects, McComb, Hattiesburg, and Meridian, 
throughout World War II. McCurdie, who had been one of the 
Division of Subsistence Homesteads1 project managers in
B. Baldwin, Memorandum to the Secretary of Agri­
culture, March 8, 1942, ibid.; D.-L. Hopkins to E. G. Benser, 
July 20, 1943, ibid.
54john O. Walker to T. Roy Reid, July 3.0, 1940, ibid.
55Mason Barr, to A. D. Stewart, September 30, 1942,
ibid.
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Mississippi, functioned chiefly as a rent collector. After 
the end of the war, he handled the liquidation of the Missis­
sippi projects. Under the Federal Public Housing Authority, 
occupants could receive quitclaim deeds to their homesteads 
when they had paid twenty per cent of the purchase price of 
their units, signing a note and mortgage as security for the 
balance.5® By June, 1946, McCurdie had sold all units on the
three projects and issued the homesteaders quitclaim deeds.
57On June 28, he closed his Hattiesburg office. That was the 
end of government responsibility for managing the Missis­
sippi subsistence homesteads.
With a minimum of prior experience, the Division of 
Subsistence Homesteads launched a rather ambitious program 
of industrial-type projects in Mississippi. Like many of 
the division's projects, the Mississippi subsistence home­
steads possessed an amateurish quality? and in the long run, 
they were among the most unsuccessful of all projects in 
Region Six. Mississippi officials located the projects on 
rather poor soil, did not always insure sufficient employment 
opportunities for occupants, and sometimes furnished rather 
haphazard management. Despite such mistakes, McComb, Tupelo, 
Hattiesburg, and Meridian all blazed trails that the Resettle 
ment Administration and the Farm Security Administration
56conkin. Tomorrow a New World. 231, 232.
^Oliver C. Winston, Memorandum to John P. Broome,
May 1, 1946, R. G. 207, National Archives? A. T. McCurdie; 
Memorandum to Arthur Taylor, June 5, 1946, ibid.
would profitably follow, if they avoided the pitfalls. In 
fact, T. Roy Reid's regional organization cut its teeth on 
the Mississippi subsistence homesteads. The Management 
Division, for example, gained its first practical experience 
in the management of resettlement projects when it took over 
the subsistence homesteads program. One of the family 
selection unit's first assignments was to fill the vacancies 
at McComb. In addition, the regional office had its first 
chance to experiment with cooperative associations in 
Mississippi, and later it first confronted the problems of 
liquidation on these projects. If the Division of Sub­
sistence Homesteads had not pointed out some of the hazards, 
or if the Mississippi projects had not provided an oppor­
tunity for "practice," perhaps the Resettlement Administra­
tion would have made more mistakes than it did in launching, 
developing, and operating its own resettlement program.
CHAPTER IV
DYESS COLONY: A. FEDERAL EMERGENCY RELIEF
ADMINISTRATION COMMUNITY
Soon after dark on January 14, 1936, the Southerner, 
a Douglass twin-motor American Airlines plane, took off at 
Memphis, Tennessee, for Little Rock. John T. Shea, a pas­
senger who had just left the plane, noticed that one of the 
Southerner’s motors did not "sound right." At 7:18, veteran 
pilot Jerry Marshall, flying at 3,000 feet twenty-five miles 
west of Memphis, reported scattered clouds at 4,500 feet and 
a fifty-five degree temperature. That was the last contact 
with the Southerner. Beyond Forrest City, the night fog was 
already hanging over the eastern Arkansas swamps. At about 
7:20, two farmers near Goodwin saw the plane flying low over 
the woods, with an engine popping and missing. Helplessly, 
they watched the plane disappear into the trees and fog, 
heard a terrific crash, and then silence. George Jones, 
another farmer, walked to a nearby store and reported that 
he had heard a deafening roar to the northeast. The 
Southerner crashed of unknown causes in four or five feet of 
water in a swamp two miles from the Little Rock-Memphis 
highway, killing all seventeen persons aboard. At the time,
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it was the worst tragedy in American aviation history. Among 
the dead was William R. Dyess, Works Progress Administrator 
for Arkansas and founder of the largest.of all New Deal farm 
colonies.
W. R. Dyess was six feet tall, slender, prematurely 
gray, and, at the time of his death, forty-one years of age.^ 
Born in Hazelhurst, Mississippi, and educated at Mississippi 
State College, he became a successful farmer and contractor 
specializing in levees, railroad beds, and gravel roads. He 
first came to Arkansas in 1926 with a contract to improve 
the levees on the Mississippi and White rivers. In 1930,
Dyess bought a large Mississippi County plantation, in north­
east Arkansas, and made Osceola his home. Three years later, 
he entered public service as head of the Mississippi County 
Committee on local relief. In August, 1933, Harry L.
Hopkins, Federal Emergency Relief Administrator, appointed 
Dyess FERA state director for Arkansas. Governor J. Marion 
Futrell had strongly backed Dyess for the job,^ perhaps as a 
political pay-off for the latter's support during the 1932
■̂•Arkansas Gazette (Little Rock) , January 15 through 
18, 1936.
^For brief biographies of Dyess, see Arkansas Gazette, 
January 15, January 16, 1936; Osceola Times. January 17,
1936.
3j. m . Futrell to Harry L. Hopkins, June 20, 1933, 
Record Group 69, Records of the Works Projects Administration, 
National Archives (to be cited hereafter as R. G. 69, National 
Archives) ; Aubrey Williams to Harry L. Hopkins, August 9,
1933, ibid.
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gubernatorial campaign. Even though he had no social work 
experience of any kind, Dyess made a favorable impression on 
Aubrey Williams, Hopkin's right-hand man. "Dyess is a young 
chap of thirty-eight," Williams wrote Hopkins, "a big planter, 
college man, and does not have any employment . . . which I 
figure should make for [financial] i n d e p e n d e n c e . i n  
November, 1933, he became Civil Works Administrator; when 
the FERA was revived in April, 1934, he. returned as Emergency 
Relief Administrator. From July, 1935, until his death, he 
was WPA director for Arkansas.®
After his appointment as Emergency Relief Administra­
tor, Dyess wasted no time in setting up a state relief 
organization. He named Floyd Sharp as Director of opera­
tions and executive secretary. Sharp was thirty-seven years 
old, a University of Arkansas Law School graduate, and a 
member of the state Committee on Unemployment.® (As the 
number-two man in the Federal relief organization, he took 
Dyess' place as administrator in 1936.) Under Dyess, the 
Arkansas Emergency Relief Administration consisted of two 
assistant directors of operations, two assistant comptrollers,
^Aubrey Williams to Harry [L. Hopkins], August 6,
1936. ibid.
5J. M. Futrell to Harry L. Hopkins, September 23,
1933. ibid.; Arkansas Gazette, January 15, 1936.
®Field Men, State Emergency Relief Commission, Arkan­
sas, n.d., R. G. 69, National Archives? Fay Williams,
Arkansas of the Years (4 vols.? Little Rock, 1951-1954), II, 
368-83.
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social service field representative, and seven divisions: 
works, rural rehabilitation, auditor, commodities, research 
and statistics, transients, and education. Dyess' job was to 
channel Federal relief funds into the hands of needy Arkan­
sans. The Emergency Relief Administration and its successor 
agencies stressed work relief in preference to the "dole." 
Thus Arkansas relief workers built roads, streets, airports, 
water plants, schools, sewers, hospitals, public buildings, 
recreational facilities, canning plants, utility systems, 
libraries, levees, light plants, and other such projects.7
Since Arkansas was an agricultural state, one of 
Dyess' most important tasks was rural rehabilitation. 
Following the lead of most FERA state directors, Dyess 
placed all rural relief work under a state rural rehabilita­
tion corporation. A  Delaware corporation formed on May 30, 
1934, the Arkansas Rural Rehabilitation Corporation was a 
device to handle certain legal and financial problems.
Using Federal funds, the Arkansas RR Corporation loaned money 
to relief clients, purchased land for rehabilitation pur­
poses, and established a revolving trust fund to insure the 
corporation's existence after the FERA was abolished.
Unlike later cooperative associations set up under the
7See Arkansas Emergency Relief Administration, A 
Review of Work Relief Activities in Arkansas. April 1st.
1934. to July 1st. 1935 (Little Rock, 1935); Arkansas 
Emergency Relief Administration, Traveling Recovery Road:
The Story of Relief. Work-relief. and Rehabilitation in 
Arkansas. August 30. 1932 to November 15. 1936 (Little Rock, 
1936).
Resettlement Administration, the Arkansas Rural Rehabilita­
tion Corporation limited its membership to a small circle of 
stockholders. No rehabilitation client was eligible to 
purchase stock in the corporation.8
Dyess relied on the Rural Rehabilitation Division to 
administer the actual rural rehabilitation programs. In 
late 1933, Dyess recruited E. B. Whitaker from the Extension 
Service and made him head of rural relief in Arkansas.
During the next eighteen months, Whitaker developed the same 
kind of program that he would later operate for the Resettle­
ment Administration and Farm Security Administration. In 
1934, according to ERA estimates, there were over 30,000 farm 
families in Arkansas eligible for rural rehabilitation. They 
included a wide variety of groups: landowners who had lost
all of their equity in their farms, former landowners and 
share tenants who were unable to get credit to make a crop, 
sharecroppers who had been displaced from the land, and even 
mill workers and coal miners who had rural backgrounds and 
wanted to get back to the farm. The ultimate aim for all 
rural rehabilitation clients was independent land ownership. 
Whitaker rehabilitated some clients where they were, if the
8M. J. Miller to Aubrey Williams, November 10, 1934,
R. G. 69, National Archives? Audit Report on Arkansas Rural 
Rehabilitation Corporation, May 28, 1934 to June 30, 1935, 
ibid.? Miller Memorandum to Williams, October 1, 1934, Record 
Group 96, Records of the Farmers Home Administration,
National Archives (to be cited hereafter as R. G. 96,
National Archives) ? see Blvtheville Courier News, October 16, 
1934? Osceola Times, May 25, 1934.
99
land they owned or rented was good enough. In the case of 
families stranded in submarginal areas, he resettled them on 
better land. The rehabilitation division repaired the home­
steads or erected low-cost houses, mapped out a farm and 
home management plan for each rehabilitation client, and 
loaned him the necessary capital for equipment, workstock, 
and subsistence. Thus the Emergency Relief Administration 
stressed long-term rehabilitation rather than merely immedi­
ate relief.9
A planter and humanitarian, W. R. Dyess was especially 
interested in rural relief. As the depression wore on, he 
apparently reacted as did many Americans: people, the saying
went, had to get "back to the land." Dyess wanted to 
develop a farm colony, a complete community, for relief 
clients. "He conceived the idea of building an agricultural 
community,” wrote assistant ERA director of operations H. C. 
Baker after Dyess1 death. "A colony of five hundred homes—  
homes which were to be modern, liveable homes with electricity, 
running water, private sewage systems and other advantages 
usually associated only with urban communities, and which 
would raise the standard for farm homes to a high level. He 
conceived in his plan a hospital, schools, churches, in fact 
a new order of things for those who through no fault of their
9'Plan of Work for Rural Rehabilitation in Arkansas, 
1935, Mimeographed, R. G. 69, National Archives.
own found it almost impossible to make their way. it was
hafdly an original idea, either in American agricultural 
history or in the early New Deal. The Division of Subsis­
tence Homesteads had already launched its community program 
for part-time industrial workers. In 1932, Lawrence West­
brook had built a Prench-style farm community near Houston, 
Texas; and, as assistant Federal Emergency Relief Adminis­
trator, he favored more such projects. What made Dyess 
successful was that he possessed executive ability and 
experience in both construction and agriculture. More 
important, he had the ability to sell his ideas to Federal 
authorities. In early 1934, Dyess personally submitted his 
plan to Harry Hopkins. According to ERA assistant director 
Baker, "Mr. Hopkins listened attentively.” More likely, 
Westbrook was the one who did the listening and urged 
approval. At any rate, Hopkins did agree to Dyess' plans 
and released federal funds for the project. That was the
beginning of Dyess Colony.H
(
Dyess had already picked out a location for his colony. 
He hoped to acquire a total of about 20,000 acres in separate 
but adjacent tracts from the Creamery Package Company,
Drainage District Number Nine, and Lee Wilson and Company; 
but he was only partially successful.^ in early 1934, the
•̂ Traveling Recovery Road. 153. -̂ I b id.
•̂ Blythevilie Courier News, May 19, 1934.
Arkansas Rural Rehabilitation Corporation purchased 15,144 
acres of unimproved cutover timber land ten miles from 
Wilson, Arkansas, and about twenty miles from Osceola, Dyess1 
home town. Geographically, the tract lay in Township 11 and 
12 North, Range 8 and 9 East, with the Tyronza River cutting 
through it from northeast to southwest. A  lumber company 
had previously owned part of the land, cut the best timber, 
and when the Depression hit forfeited it for taxes. Dyess 
was able to purchase it for an average of $2.50 per acre. 
Payment of state taxes, redemptions, and purchase of state 
title raised the average cost per acre up to about eight 
dollars. Even during the Depression, improved land of 
comparable quality brought sixty to one hundred dollars per 
acre. Contemporary newspaper reports said only that Dyess 
had bought about 16,000 acres at an average of $2.50 per 
acre without specifying the total amount paid or the total 
acreage. In 1936, however, Russell Brown and Company, Certi­
fied Public Accountants of Little Rock, audited the colony's 
books and reported the total cost of land to have been 
$136,994.48.13
The selection of this particular land, wrote H. C. 
Baker, was a demonstration of "rare judgment." He doubted
  l^Ibid.; Osceola Times. May 25, 1934; Traveling Re­
covery Road. 153, 154; A Review of Work Relief Activities in 
Arkansas. 130; Dyess Farms, Arkansas: The First Experiment
with a New Kind of Rural Community, dated, May 7, 1941, R.G. 
96, National Archives; Audit Report, Dyess Colony, Incor­
porated, Dyess Arkansas, February 29, 1936, ibid.
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that "anywhere in America could land of greater potential 
possibilities have been c h o s e n . "14 Until about 1900, much 
of the northeast Arkansas Delta, including Mississippi 
County and the Dyess Colony land, was largely swampland and 
dense, almost tropical, forest. By 1920, army engineers had 
built levees and drained the swamps, while lumbermen had 
removed most of the virgin timber: white, black, and red
oak, ash, elm, maple, gum of several varieties, cottonwood, 
and cypress. What they revealed was a fabulously rich agri­
cultural region. The Mississippi River had spent centuries 
building up the alluvial soil, a black loam running from 
forty to several hundred feet deep. Fertilizer was prac­
tically unknown. The climate, too, was perfect for agricul­
ture, with a growing season of seven and a half months free 
from frost. After large planters moved in, Mississippi 
County gained a reputation for growing more cotton than any 
other county in the nation. In 1930, cotton was not only 
the dominant crop; it was virtually the only crop. Ninety 
per cent of the farmers of the county depended almost solely 
on cotton for their income. But nine out of ten farmers were 
either tenants or sharecroppers. They needed land to farm 
and credit to finance their farming operations; the
1%[. C. Baker, "Dyess Colony,” in Traveling Recovery 
Road, 153.
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Depression made both difficult to get.-^
In May, 1934, Dyess launched "colonization Project 
No. 1," the colony's original designation. Construction 
crews literally had to hack and chop the colony out of a 
veritable jungle. After the virgin timberhhad been removed, 
Baker recalled, "dense impenetrable underbrush had taken its 
place. Trees left at the time of the original cutting had 
grown to enormous size, and the whole area was almost in a 
wilderness. 0 .  G. Norment, construction supervisor, was 
a member of the first crew that invaded this wilderness.
With a truck, tractor, and other equipment, he and his men 
entered the project through a winding trail that reminded 
him of an Indian path. "I shall never forget what a 
seeming[ly] unsurmountable [sic] task we had before us the 
first morning I arrived . . . ," he wrote later. "Practie 
cally the entire acreage consisted of cut-over hardwood 
timber land. . . .  There were a few cleared spots where old 
logging camps had been established, most of these grown up, 
however, into a mass of bushes and small saplings. . .
■^A Review of Work Relief Activities in Arkansas, 
120922; Dyess-Farms, Arkansas: The First Experiment with a
New Kind of Rural Community, dated May 7, 1941, R. G. 96, 
National Archives; Mabel F. Edrington, History of Mississippi 
County. Arkansas (Ocala, Florida, 1962), 75-87, 91, 92, 378, 
382.
•^Traveling Recovery Road, 154.
17(5. G. Norment to R. G. Tugwell, January 15, 1936,
R. G. 96, National Archives.
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A  few squatters lived in small log or box shacks on small 
patches of cleared land. Otherwise, the colony land was 
uninhabited, inhospitable, and forbidding.
Cone Murphy was the over-all construction supervisor. 
After gathering 115 logging mules, wagons, and equipment at 
the northeast corner of the project, he put several hundred 
unskilled men to work felling trees, while a force of 
skilled laborers set up two or three saw mills. To hold 
costs down, Dyess' plan called for using lumber cut and 
sawed on the colony's own land for as much construction work 
as possible. In a few weeks, Murphy had seven saw mills in 
operation, one a large steam-powered mill, the others 
gasoline-powered including two portable mills. Their com­
bined daily capacity was about 65,000 feet of lumber.
By June 15, Murphy' s men had completed the first 
buildings on the project, a temporary headquarters complex 
including administrative building, barracks, kitchen, and 
mess halls. The barracks consisted of four screened and 
electrically lighted bunk houses with accommodations for 
about 400 men. Before their living quarters were finished, 
workmen came from Osceola by truck every day; afterward, 
almost t;he entire labor force lived a kind of camp life on
IQlbid.; Report of Roland R. Pyne, Regional Engineer, 
Period Ending November 10, 1934, Harry L. Hopkins Papers,
Box 79, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York 
(to be cited hereafter as Hopkins Papers, FDRL); A  Review of 
Work Relief Activities in Arkansas, 132.
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the project itself. Each man slept on an iron cot, cotton 
mattress, feather pillow, with clean sheets and blankets.
The kitchen served three mess halls, two for white workers 
and one for Negro. The workmen were housed and fed for about 
seventy-five cents a day, which was deducted from their wages. 
By mid-summer, the temporary headquarters consisted of more 
bunk houses, barns, stables, blacksmith shop, supply depot, 
general office building, payroll building, first-aid build­
ing, dynamite building (more than a mile away), two shower
1 9bath houses, and various store houses.
From July to September, 1934, Murphy consistently had 
1,400 workers under his supervision.2® Most of them came 
off relief rolls. Dyess obtained common labor through the 
Mississippi County office of the National Reemployment 
Service and skilled labor from the state office. Using the 
National Recovery Administration' s wage scale for timber and 
mill workers, he paid skilled labor three to five dollars a 
day and unskilled labor slightly less, both roughly the
•*-90. G. Norment to R. G. Tugwell, January 15, 1936,
R. G. 96, National Archives; A  Review of Work Relief Activi­
ties, in Arkansas. 132, 136; Osceola Times, June 22, 1934; 
Arkansas Gazette, June 17, 1934.
2®Report of Roland R. Pyne, Regional Engineer, Period
Ending November 10, 1934, Hopkins Papers, Box 79, FDRL; O. G.
Norment to R. G. Tugwell, January 15, 1936, R. G. 96,
National Archives; A  Review of Work Relief Activities in
Arkansas, 138.
prevailing rates for northeast Arkansas.21 But when Blythe- 
ville labor union leaders protested in early July, Nels 
Anderson of the American Federation of Labor and George D. 
Babcock, United States District Engineer, investigated the 
colony's labor practices. As a result, they recommended a 
higher wage scale for all workers. On July 7, the National 
Reemployment Service ordered Dyess to begin paying common 
labor thirty cents an hour and skilled carpenters from 
seventy-five cents to a dollar an hour, while shortening the 
work-week to thirty-six hours. Dyess argued that this 
change would interfere with his desire to keep the invest­
ment as low as possible for families who would occupy the 
farm units. The higher wage scale both increased expenses 
and momentarily slowed up construction, with unexpected 
results. Since the men could work only six hours a day, 
they now had lots of leisure time on their hands. After 
several fights broke out at the colony, officials organized 
boxing matches in order to let the men work off excess 
energy and to accommodate those wanting to fight somebody. 
Boxing became a regular Saturday afternoon diversion and 
almost the only available form of recreation. Soon, colony 
officials furnished material for building two boxing rings, 
and matches were held at night as well.22
21John H. Caufield to Lawrence Westbrook, July 7, 1934, 
R. G. 96, National Archives.
22A review of Work Relief Activities in Arkansas. 
122, 132, 136.
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With preliminary construction out of the way, Murphy 
began building the farmsteads on July 13. On these sample 
farmsteads, he personally supervised a crew of twenty-five 
carpenters, and then put each one in charge of their own 
crews for erecting the rest of the farmsteads. Little Rock 
architect Howard Eichenbaum designed the basic plans for 
three-, four-, and five-room type houses. Like the first 
farmsteads, all cottages at Dyess were frame structures, 
simple, convenient (indoor toilets), and modern (electric 
lights). The three-room house, with one bedroom, living 
room, and kitchen, would accommodate a family of three or 
four members. The four-room house, for a family of five or 
six, had two bedrooms, while the five-room house provided 
three bedrooms for families over six. Although Murphy's 
carpenters followed one basic plan for each type of house, 
they varied the location of rooms,, porches, doors, and 
windows enough to avoid monotony. The houses were painted 
white, with green, dark red, or brown trimming. Workers 
cleared about two acres of land immediately around each 
house and barn, but the colonists themselves had to clear 
the rest of the land, colony officials furnished the sample 
houses in order to determine the cost ($195.00 for three 
bedrooms, living room, and kitchen) and made them into
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temporary sleeping quarters for some of the workers . 3 3
According to Dyess1 original plan, there would be 500 
three-, four-, and five-room cottages located on farm units 
of thirty, forty, and fifty acres, respectively. The colo­
nists would purchase them at cost with payments amortized 
over a ten-year period. He estimated that the house and 
barn together would average $600, $800, and $1 ,0 0 0 , depending 
on size. But in late August, Dyess revised the colony plan, 
the first of many changes. Now he intended to build 750 
cottages, while limiting all farm units to tzwenty acres 
e a c h . D u r i n g  the summer and fall, Murphy's work crews 
regularly completed ten to fifteen houses each week. On 
October 15, Murphy had 101 houses either finished or under 
construction. By the end of 1934, there were 146 farm cot­
tages ready for occupancy; seven months later, the number 
had risen to 277 completed and sixteen under construction.
In January, 1936, Dyess Colony contained 490 completed farm 
homes . 3 3
Since the colony was mostly wilderness, one of 
Murphy's earliest tasks was to build roads and bridges and
23ibid.. 1 3 2 , 136, 138; "Rural Industrial Community 
Projects: Woodlake, Texas, Osceola,. Arkansas, and Red House,
West Virginia," Architectural Record, LXXVII (January, 1935), 
13.
24a  Review of Work Relief Activities in Arkansas. .
122-24.
2 5 Ibid.. 140, 143, 145; 0. G. Norment to R. G. Tugwell, 
January 15, 1936, R. G. 96, National Archives.
dig drainage ditches. As soon as the saw mills began buzz­
ing, three draglines, two caterpillar tractors, and a pile 
driver went to work on both new roads and old county roads. 
Radiating out in all directions from the temporary head­
quarters, road crews cleared right-of-ways, graded roads, 
and spread gravel. When completed, the colony's road system 
followed the section, half section, and sometimes quarter 
section lines, forming a grill-like pattern. In all, Murphy 
completed about thirty-five miles of gravel roads, built 
twenty-four main bridges and numerous small bridges, and dug 
some ninety miles of drainage ditches. What made the task 
of road building easier was the fact that no one lived on 
the land the roads were traversing. The road builders, wrote 
Norment with obvious satisfaction, did not have "to consider 
what this property owner or that influential citizen had to 
say about it, or institute an condemnation proceeding or 
experience any useless d e l a y . L i k e  any small town, the 
project also needed a railroad. The St. Louis and San 
Francisco Railroad agreed to run a train to the colony, pro­
vided the colony would construct about five miles of track 
from the spur southeast of Wilson, Arkansas. The colony 
sawmills provided 24,600 oak cross ties for this five miles, 
several sets of switch ties, and additional cross ties for a 
half mile of switch track that served the warehouse and
26Ibid.
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cotton gin. On November 15, the Frisco Railroad began 
running one train to the colony and back to Wilson each 
day . ̂
Near the heart of the project, Dyess set aside about 
150 acres for the community center. When he first began 
laying plans for an agricultural colony, he knew that low- 
income families would be unable to provide for themselves 
normal community needs like education, medical care, and 
recreation. With Eichenbaum's help, Dyess created not 
merely a community center but a veritable small town business 
district. In early September, Murphy assigned a crew of men 
the task of clearing the community center grounds and staking 
out the building sites for administration building group, 
while other men laid out the streets and boulevards. In 
October, construction crews stafcted work on the administra­
tion buildings, including the administration building proper, 
commissary, cafe, and various stores. In November, work 
began on the hospital and school buildings. As the year 
ended, Murphy sharply cut back work on farmsteads and con­
centrated on the community center. By January 31, 1935, the 
administration was ninety-five per cent complete, with com­
missary, hospital, cafe, and store buildings not far behind. 
In early May, the administrative staff moved their offices 
from the temporary headquarters to the new administration




The Social Service Division of the Arkansas Emergency 
Relief Administration supervised the selection of colonists. 
"The choice of Colony families is made on a very rigid selec­
tive basis," wrote Mrs. Dot Kennan, Division director.29 
Realizing how crucial family selection was, she was looking 
for people with leadership qualities, stability, and resource­
fulness, people who would help make Dyess Colony a successful 
community of self-governing individuals. Mrs. Kennan's 
staff gave first consideration to former ERA rehabilitation 
clients, especially those who had lost their homes and farm 
equipment during the Depression. To qualify, applicants had 
to have farming experience, submit references from leading 
citizens in their home communities, and prove their good 
health by passing a physical examination.20
After a year of experience, the Social Service staff 
tightened their selection criteria. They began requiring a 
physical examination of each member of the family, not just 
the family head, with a Wassermann test on parents and grown 
Children. They stressed the selection of people with skills,
2 8 Ibid., 127, 128, 140.
29The Procedure Followed in Selecting Applicants for 
Dyess Colony Project— Mississippi County, Arkansas, n.d.,
R. G. 96, National Archives.
20John B. Holt, An Analysis of Methods and Criteria 
Used in Selecting Families for Colonization Projects. Social 
Research Report No. 1 of the U. S. Department of Agriculture> 
Farm Security Administration, and the Bureau of Agricultural 
Economics (Washington, 1937), 45-50.
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in addition to farming experience, that could be utilized at 
the colony. More important, they checked closely the atti­
tudes of applicants toward colonization, farm ownership, and 
the contribution they could make to the colony. Did they 
want to plant deep roots in a farm, or was colonization 
simply a "way out" until something better opened up? The 
Social Service staff also paid more attention to religious 
affiliation: "experience has shown that emotional insta­
bility iexperienced in excessive religious fervor of certain 
religious sects was a disturbing element, and was inter­
fering with work at the colony." Since a few families had 
come to the colony with a mistaken impression of requirements 
or conditions or had otherwise proved unsuited to the pro­
ject, the Social Service Division began arranging for pros­
pective colonists to visit the colony with their county 
administrator in order to make sure they thoroughly under­
stood what they would be getting into.3-*-
The Emergency Relief Administration established a 
definite procedure for locating and approving qualified 
families. At the request of the Social Service Division, 
each ERA county caseworker and rural supervisor recommended 
"one or two eligible families whom they considered most 
likely to succeed in the colonization program." If
31Sociai Service Division, Report on Colonization 
Project No. 1, dated March 25, 1935, R. G. 96, National 
Archives; A Review of Work Relief Activities in Arkansas.
123, 127. >
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interested, the families filled out appropriate applicant 
forms. The county administrator and his staff verified the 
information given, studied the records of these families, and 
made recommendations to the state ERA office, specificing 
first and second choice. A committee made up of Mrs. Kennan 
and W. A. Rooksberry of the Social Service Division, Mrs. 
Hilda K. Cornish, director of Women's Work, and E. B. Whit­
aker, director of rural rehabilitation, went over.each 
application and made the final selections. When notified, 
the county administrator gave approved clients a "twenty-four 
hour preparatory notice" for removal to the colony on a 
given date, with ERA providing transportation. 2 2
On October 25, 1934, the first colonists arrived at 
Dyess Colony, thirteen families from thirteen different 
counties. One of these families was W. H. ("Harve") Smith, 
his wife and five children, from Bassett, Arkansas, seven 
miles away. A  cash tenant who rented land outright, Harve 
Smith had been a cotton farmer all his life. Then the 
Depression left him destitute. With cotton hovering around 
six cents a pound, he could no longer pay rent for land, nor 
could he find a place as a sharecropper. Forced on relief, 
he and his family struggled through the winter of 1933-1934.
22The Procedure Followed in Selecting Applicants for
Dyess Colonization Project No. 1— Mississippi County,......
Arkansas, n.d., R. G. 96, National Archives; Holt, An Analy­
sis of Methods and Criteria Used in Selecting Families for
Colonization Projects, 46, 48, 49.
In early May, 1934, he became a rural rehabilitation client 
and quickly demonstrated that his plight was due not to his 
own incompetence but to circumstances beyond his control.
He grew enough produce for his family, paid back his relief 
loan, and had enough left to buy a mule from the ERA.. When 
he arrived at Dyess Colony, he brought with him his own cow 
and calf, 105 chickens, enough forage to carry his stock 
through the coming winter, and enough canned food to feed 
his family. Before moving, the Smiths lived in a leaky 
three-room cabin; when it rained, they had to move all the 
furniture out of one room. At Dyess, Smith moved his family 
into a new five-room home, still smelling of fresh paint, 
located on a thirty-acre tract. He spent the winter clears 
ing the land and working part-time for the colony itself.
In the spring of 1935, he had his unit ready for cultivation 
If he stuck to it, one day he could own both the house and 
the land . 3 3
FERA officials began finding fault with family selec­
tion at Dyess as early as November, 1934. "Dyess Colony is 
troubling everyone," wrote regional social worker Loula Dunn 
Until recently, she said, the colony had no qualified social 
worker, and the basis of family selection was still
3 3 A  Review of Work Relief Activities in Arkansas.
123, 126.
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puzzling.34 jn 1 9 3 5 t there were further complaints that the 
pace of family selection consistently ran behind farmstead 
construction; available houses at the colony were not being 
filled fast enough.^ After the first thirteen families 
came in October, 1934, ten families arrived in November, 
eighteen in December, and four in January, bringing the total 
to forty-five families. As a result, a large number of 
houses stood empty during the crop year of 1935 when they
1might have been used. By November, the Emergency Relief 
Administration had selected a total of 161 families, thirty- 
eight of whom returned home after a short stay, leaving 133
o r
families then living on the colony. In contrast, there 
were over 300 cottages completed and ready for occupancy.
In November, 1935, the Resettlement Administration 
took over family selection for Dyess Colony. The Little 
Rock regional office had developed an efficient staff of 
family selection specialists— a staff that could possibly 
provide the guidance needed at Dyess. A senior selection 
specialist took up residence at the colony itself, while a
S^Loula Dunn, Memorandum to Josephine C. Brown, 
December 3, 1934, R. G. 69, National Archives; Dunn to W. R. 
Dyess, November 30, 1934, ibid.
•^social Service Division, Report on Colonization 
Project No. 1, dated March 25, 1935, R. G. 96, National 
Archives; Loula Dunn to Malcolm J. Miller, March 20, 1935,
R. G. 69, National Archives.
36pinal Report on Selection Program, Dyess Colony, 
May114, 1936, R. G. 96, National Archives.
116
five-man staff worked in the field visiting and interviewing 
rural rehabilitation clients. The Resettlement Administra­
tion approved only two families for Dyess in December, but 
thirteen in January, sixty-four in February, 128 in March,
120 in April, and twenty-two by mid-May. In six or seven 
months, the RA had assigned 349 families to Dyess, filling 
all but eighteen of the farmsteads at the colony, and these
q 7were filled soon afterward. '
As families arrived, colony officials assigned them 
to farm units according to the number of family members. A 
husband and wife with one or two children received a twenty- 
acre tract. Larger families had more manpower available, so 
they settled on thirty-acre tracts. Exceptionally large 
families, perhaps around ten members, took the forty-acre 
units. In effect, most newly arrived families went on 
temporary relief. Since most arrived without adequate house­
hold equipment, the Emergency Relief Administration immedi­
ately supplied them with beds, mattresses, and stoves, 
expecting these to be paid for later. To get them on their 
feet, relief officials also took care of anything they could 
not provide for themselvess food, clothing, tools, house­
hold necessities, medical attention. In return, the head of
•^Management Division, News Letter, July 1, 1935 to 
January 1, 1936, Region VI. ibid.; Charles L. Gaines, Jr., to 
Mrs. Katherine A. Kellock, November 13, 1935, ibid.? Final 
Report on Selection Program, Dyess Colony, March 14, 1936,. 
ibid.? T. Roy Reid to R. G. Tugwell, December 9, 1935, ibid.
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each family worked a certain number of days on colony con­
struction, usually as unskilled labor.3®
The social service supervisor and the rural super­
visor helped the colonists establish homes and farms at 
Dyess. Appointed October 26, 1934, one day after the first 
families arrived, Mrs. Ed L. Salyers supervised home demon­
stration work . 3 9  Stressing self-sufficiency, she worked with 
the wives in preparing household budgets and gave instruc­
tion in canning, sewing, and other homemaking arts. To aid 
families with home furnishings, she converted one of the 
farm cottages into a home demonstration house, using furni­
ture that carpenters could easily copy at the colony work 
shop with lumber cut on the colony land. Starting November 
26, Jake Terry, rural supervisor, helped family heads plan 
the best use for their land.4® He advised farmers through 
weekly group meetings, individual visits to their tracts, 
and published bulletins. Based on the Extension Service 
program of diversified farming, Terry's farm management pro­
gram emphasized four basic principles: food for the family,
3®A Review of Work Relief Activities in Arkansas.
126, 127.
3^Traveling- Recovery Road, 157 ? A Review of Work 
Relief Activities in Arkansas. 147 ? Osceola Times. February 
15, 1935.
40a  Review of Work Relief Activities in Arkansas.
126, 146, 147? Connie J. Bonslagel to Colonel Lawrence West­
brook, November 12, 1934, R. G. 96, National Archives; 
Arkansas Gazette, JMav 12, 1935.
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feed for livestock, cash income, and soil income and soil 
improvement. Thus colonists planted not only cotton, but 
corn, truck gardens, hay crops, and pastures. In addition, 
each farmer had a flock of chickens, a sow, at least one 
milch cow, and a mule for plowing. As rural supervisor,
Terry sought to build a community of farmers who were both 
self-reliant and ready to act as a group when this would 
give them an advantage.^
After two years of construction, the Emergency Relief 
Administration halted work on community facilities and farm­
steads at Dyess Colony in the early summer of 1936. By 
then, Dyess was a community of about 3,000 people. At the 
center of the project, the community center had grown into a 
small city, with city blocks, paved streets and sidewalks, 
stores, official buildings, and residential sections. The 
main administration building, a two-story brick veneer 
structure, with smaller brick veneer buildings on either 
side, formed a semicircle around a memorial plaque to the 
colony's founder. The building to the right contained a 
community department or general store, the left one a cafe, 
barber shop, and post office (with rural free delivery). Two 
blocks away stood a combination grade school and high school, 
while three other grade schools were located in other sec­
tions of the project. Nearby, a wood-working and furniture
41a  Review of Work Relief Activities in Arkansas.
146, 147.
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factory, canning plant, saw mills, machine shops, cotton gin, 
and grist mill provided employment for a few colonists and 
vital services for all. In addition, community facilities 
included a filling station, railroad depot, canning plant, 
ice house, laundry, garage, barn, and four warehouses; later 
there would be a print shop and credit union. A baseball 
field and grandstand faced the Tryronza River. Across the 
street were a swimming pool, bath houses, tennis courts, and 
not far away, a city park. The community hall, a T-shaped 
building, held a library and movie theatre-auditorium, plus 
space for a variety of indoor entertainment. Besides the 
community buildings, there were about forty private resi­
dences for the families of administration p e r s o n n e l . 42
Completely surrounding the community center, the 
colony land stretched out in every direction. When con­
struction ended, Dyess colony consisted of 500 farmsteads of 
varying sizes: sixty-one three-room, 233 four-room, and 206
five-room houses. Similarly, the land had been broken up 
into 500 farm units: 334 farms of twenty acres, sixty-four
of thirty acres, and 102 of forty acres. By spring planting 
time in 1936, colonists had cleared only about 4,875 acres. 
In all, the Emergency Relief Administration had invested 
$3,645,193.00 in Dyess Colony— a total that included
42ibid., 128, 129; 0. G. Norment to R. G. Tugwell, 
January 15, 1936; R. G. 96, National Archives; Final Report 
onoEfelection Program, Dyess Colony, March 14, 1936, ibid.; 
Arkansas Gazette, January 9, 1938.
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everything from land and all construction' to direct relief 
for individual colonists.
At the start of 1936, Dyess Colony had several serious 
deficiencies for a project almost two years old. Except for 
construction supervisor Cone Murphy, no one administrative 
officer had ever been in charge of the entire project.
Instead, W. R. Dyess relied on a half dozen people— Murphy,
E. B. Whitaker, Jake Terry, Mrs. Ed Salyers, Howard Eichen- 
baum, and Dr. L. L. Huebner, colony physician— with each 
person responsible only for the specific tasks assigned to 
him, nothing more. Until his death on January 14, Dyess 
himself seems to have provided the only overall direction 
the colony had. Perhaps more serious, Dyess Colony still 
had no organizational structure. The Arkansas Rural Reha­
bilitation Corporation had launched Colinization Project 
Number One and still held title to the project property; but 
Dyess was only part of its total program of rural rehabilita­
tion, and indeed was only one of the community projects it 
undertook. What Dyess Colony needed was its own organiza­
tion, one that would allow the colony to achieve maturity as 
an independent and self-sufficient community. Nor had another 
important matter been definitely worked out. The colonists 
did not know what obligations they had incurred by moving to
^3Audit Report, Dyess Colony, Incorporated, Dyess, 
Arkansas, February 29, 1936, R. G. 96, National Archives; 
Traveling Recovery Road. 154, 155.
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Dyess; they had no idea how much their farmsteads would cost 
or how long they would have to pay it off. All they had was 
faith in the good will of the government. ̂ 4
After Dyess' death, the new Works Progress Adminis­
tration for Arkansas, Ployd Sharp, could no longer postpone 
these problems as his predecessor had done. The Resettlement 
Administration already had plans for absorbing the Arkansas 
Rural Rehabilitation Corporation within a few weeks. Sharp 
had to take immediate action if Dyess Colony was not to be 
absorbed along with it.^5 At a special meeting on February 
17, 1936, the board of directors of the Arkansas Rural 
Rehabilitation Corporation formed a new organization, Dyess 
Colony, Incorporated, to take over the management of the 
Colony and carry W. R. Dyess' plans to conclusion. Floyd 
Sharp, Henry B. Baker, and R. C. Limerick comprised both the 
board of directors and the stockholders of the new corpora­
tion, each holding one share of no par value stock. They
^Report of Roland ER Pyne, Regional Engineer, Period 
Ending November 10, 1934, Hopkins Papers, Box 79, FDRL.
45see Rexford G. Tugwell to Harry L. Hopkins, n.d.,
R. G. 69, National Archives; Carl C. Taylor to Hopkins, 
September 18, 1935, ibid.; W. R. Dyess to Colonel Lawrence 
Westbrook, November 11, 1935, ibid.; Dyess to Westbrook,
July 22, 1935, ibid.; Dyess to Westbrook, July 17, 1935, 
ibid.; Dyess to Taylor (telegram), July 6 , 1935, ibid,; T. 
Roy Reid to Taylor, November 19, 1935, R. G. 96, National 
Archives; Reid to Taylor, July 11, 1935, ibid. Three FERA 
communities were not turned over to the Resettlement Admin­
istration in 1935s Pine Mountain Valley, near Columbus, . 
Georgia; Cherry Lake Farms, near Madison, Florida; and 
Dyess Colony. Paul K. Conkin, Tomorrow a New Worlds The 
New Deal Community Program (Ithaca, N.-Y., 1959), 137.
pledged their stock to the WPA national director, Harry 
Hopkins, who held it "in trust against the faithful perform­
ance of duties on the part of the Board of Directors . ” 4 8  
Since all three were also stockholders in the Arkansas RR 
Corporation, the meeting turned into a joint conference of 
officers of both corporations. The Arkansas Rural Reha­
bilitation Corporation sold for one dollar all real and 
personal property of Colonization Project Number One to Dyess 
Colony, Inc.4  ̂ Then they discussed plans for the formation 
of a subsidiary corporation to manage the colony and com­
munity facilities and sell stock to the colony residents. 
"Under this plan," Sharp explained, "the residents of the 
colony will eventually own the land they are now purchasing 
and in addition will own the corporation that operates the 
community center . " 4 8  At last, Dyess Colony had not only the 
kind of organization it needed for permanence, but a new 
name as well. The term "Dyess colony" had been used almost 
from the start, but it did not become the official designa­
tion of the colony until after Dyess1 death and the creation
Arkansas Gazette. February 18, 1936? Osceola Times, 
February 21, 1936; Extract of Minutes, Arkansas Rural Reha­
bilitation Corporation, dated February 17, 1936, R. G. 96, 
National Archives. See Floyd Sharp, Memorandum to All Resi­
dents of the Dyess Colony, February 10, 1936, ibid.
47Raymond 0. Denham to Rexford G. Tugwell, July 15, 
1936, ibid.
48Arkansas Gazette. February 18, 1936.
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of Dyess Colony, Inc.^
Less than a week after the creation of Dyess Colony, 
Inc., Sharp gave E. S. Dudley a leave of absence from his 
job as state director of the WPA's Division of Employment 
and appointed him colony administrator.5® That left only 
one unsolved problems the terms on which colonists could 
get possession of their homes and farms. Again, colony 
authorities had to reach a decision soon. Cone Murphy, who 
had stayed on as superintendent of construction, would have 
the last of 500 farmsteads ready in June or July.5-1- The 
Resettlement Administration planned to be through with 
family selection by early June, and about 350 new families 
would want to know exactly where they stood in regard to 
future ownership. More important, a new crop year had 
virtually arrived, and Dyess Colony could be successful only 
if full use were made of its land and facilities. Within a 
few weeks, Sharp, Baker, and Limerick, with the help of the 
colony's special council, Lawrence Westbrook, worked out 
what they considered to be a fair and equitable plan for home 
ownership. Perhaps to impress the colonists with the impor­
tance of this step, Westbrook visited Dyess and personally 
explained the details of the purchase plan.
...... 4®Blvtheville Courier News, May 23, 1934; Daily
Graphic (Pine Bluff), January 18, 1936.
5®Arkansas Gazette. February 22, 1936.
5 1 Ibid.
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Everyone would have a chance to own his own farm, 
Westbrook assured the colonists in a speech in early August 
of 1936. Until then, they had been merely "licensees” 
renting their land. But, Westbrook explained, Dyess Colony, 
Inc., would have each tract of land and its improvements 
appraised. The appraisers would consider the earning power 
of the property— not only its value as a home but the ability 
of the land and improvements to produce a living— the tax 
rate, replacement value, and market price. Then the Dyess 
corporation would offer to sell each family the house and 
land they occupied at the appraised value, less ten per cent. 
"We are," Westbrook explained, "making this deduction to the
family living there not as any special mark of favor, but
<
because we think it would cost about that much to get some­
one else established there." Finally, Westbrook said, the 
corporation Dyess Colony, Inc., and each purchaser would 
enter into a sales contract, with the selling price amortized 
over a thirty-year period at six per cent annual interest.
The colonists could make monthly, quarterly, or semi-annual 
payments as they wished; and at its discretion, the corpora­
tion could defer all or any part of a payment and extend the 
loan in emergency situations.No one would be permitted to 
re-sell their farm except to the colony corporation. All of 
this was in the future for most colonists, however, since 
each family had to serve a two-year probationary period
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before becoming eligible for a purchase contract.
From 1936 to 1940, Dyess Colony, Inc., operated the 
project under WPA direction. The colony became perhaps the 
most highly organized community project of Region Six; 
because of its size, it had to be. As colony administrator, 
Dudley was responsible for three large areas of activity: 
farm operations, business management, and community govern­
ment.^ He assigned farm operations to his assistant 
administrator, Jake Terry, and a staff of farm advisors; they, 
in turn, worked closely with the colony's home demonstration 
agent and 4-H Clubs to coordinate farm and home management 
planning. Dudley retained major responsibility for business, 
marketing, and cooperative activities, while delegating 
specific tasks to a business manager and accountant. After 
October 31, 1936, Dudley marketed all cash crops grown at 
the colony through Dyess Colony Corporative Association, an 
organization in which all project residents owned stock.^
In addition, the cooperative association operated the store, 
gin, feed mill, cannery, commissary, lumber mill, blacksmith
52address to the Arkansas Farm Tenancy Commission by 
Lawrence Westbrook, September 21, 1936, Hopkins Papers, Box 
116, FDRL; Lawrence Westbrook to Paul V. Maris, August 10, 
1936, and enclosures, R. G. 96, National Archives; see 
Arkansas Gazette. January 9, 1938.
53azile Aaron to W. A. Rooksberry, March 25, 1936,
R. G. 96, National Archives.
^Articles of Incorporation of Dyess Colony Coopera­
tive Association, dated October 31, 1936, Arkansas Secretary 
of State, Corporations Department, State Capital, Little 
Rock, Arkansas.
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shop, furniture factory, and all other community facilities. 
" 1 Cooperation' must be our watchword . . . , " Westbrook told 
the colonists. "In this community here we aim to apply the 
principles of co-operation to all our important activities 
and at the same time to preserve and develop that spirit of 
competitive individualism which seems necessary for the 
highest achievement in any line of human endeavor."5^ As 
time went on, the colonists themselves, through the Dyess 
Cooperative Colony Association, were expected to purchase 
the cooperative facilities and take on more and more the 
tasks of running their own community. As for community 
government, Dudley functioned as a city manager coordinating 
the work of schools, utilities, public health and sanita­
tion services, police and fire departments, plus religious, 
civic, and recreational activities.56
By 1939, the air had begun visibly seeping out of the 
Dyess balloon. To some of its supporters, like Lawrence 
Westbrook, the development of Dyess Colony was a romantic 
vision of rugged, pioneer farm families engaged in "carving 
their homes out of the wilderness.”5  ̂ Undoubtedly, the 
colony's early years did afford challenge, excitement, a
5^Lawrence Westbrook to Paul V. Maris, August 10, 
1936, and enclosures, R. G. 96, National Archives.
56Azile Aaron to W. A. Rooksberry, March 25, 1936, 
and enclosures, ibid.
^^Arkansas Gazette, June 10, 1936.
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sense of blazing new trails for others to follow if the 
colony were successful. For the colonists, the future was 
to be glorious. "I predict that within ten years, this will 
be the most prosperous community in Arkansas or any other 
State," Westbrook once told the colonists. "There will be 
no rich people here, but everyone will be well-to-do . ” 5 8  
Westbrook's promises, however, never caught up to reality. 
Life at Dyess was much like life at any other rural com­
munity during the Depression. It was hard. There was 
little romance in cutting down trees and clearing land, 
walking behind a mule all day long, or picking cotton from 
sun up to sun down. "Any colonist with a modicum of indus­
try, ” Henry Baker wrote in 1936, "can be assured of owning 
his own home within a reasonable time . " 5 8  Yet in early 
1938, for example, only 155 families had deeds to their 
homesteads, leaving about 445 families still on probationary 
status. There was a constant turnover of families. Between 
October, 1934, and April, 1938, a total of 649 families lived 
in the colony at some time; of these, 252 or thirty-nine per 
cent moved away . 8 8  As a WPA project, Dyess Colony was a 
financial failure. Dyess Colony, Inc., lost $386,729.02 in
58Lawrence Westbrook to Paul V. Maris, August 10,
1936, and enclosures, R. G. 96, National Archives.
5traveling Recovery Road. 156.
SOcharles P. Loomis and Dwight Davidson, Jr., "Soci­
ometrics and the Study of theNew Rural Communities," 
Sociometry, II (January, 1939), 57, 58.
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1937, $221,325.70 in 1938, and $144,181.35 in 1939, though 
its operations did show constant i m p r o v e m e n t . T h e  seeds 
of future trouble had already started to sprout.
^Audit Report, Dyess Colony, Inc., Dyess, Arkansas, 
February 28, 1937, R. G. 96, National Archives; Audit Report, 
Dyess Colony, Inc., Dyess, Arkansas, February 28, 1938, 
ibid.; Audit Report,.. Dyess Colony, Inc., Dyess Arkansas, 
February 28, 1939, ibid.
CHAPTER V
DYESS COLONY: POLITICS AND DENOUEMENT
During the twelve-year history of the New Deal com­
munity program, Dyess Colony generated more internal quarrels 
and political controversy than any other project in Region 
Six. One of Dyesfi 1 most persistent problems was unrest among 
the colonists. When discontent first appeared in 1936,
Dyess authorities took the position that the colony offered 
residents opportunities on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. "No 
one of you is under any obligation to stay here if he doesn't 
think he will like it," Lawrence Westbrook told the colonists, 
"nor is the Corporation under any obligation to keep anyone 
here if its officers feel that that person would not make good 
and cooperate with the Corporation and with his neighbors. 
There is no compulsion on either side." Westbrook added, "I 
merely mention the matter because I have heard that there 
are a few, a very few, people here in the community who have 
not understood that the Government was offering them an 
opportunity they might take on the Government's terms or 
leave without rancor or prejudice, if they didn't want this 
particular kind of chance."-1'
^Lawrence Westbrook to Paul V. Maris, August 10, 1936,
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Most of the colonists, then and later, did put forth 
an honest effort to take advantage of their new opportunity, 
made few complaints, and remained confident that the colony 
administration had their best interests at heart. Harve 
Smith, one of the original thirteen colonists, was probably 
characteristic of the majority of Dyess residents. A  news­
paper reporter talked to Smith after he had lived at Dyess 
for three and a half years . 2
"What do you think of this place now?"
"it's the best proposition a poor man ever had,"
Smith said.
"In what respects?"
"Well, there's nothing against a man here. A man 
does need more acreage, but still I've got feed enough to do 
two mules and my other stock this winter. Here, they've 
given a man a chance when it looked like no one else would."
"Think you'3il have any trouble buying your place?"
"Nope. I'll buy it all right."
"What do you think of the co-operative idea for opera­
tion of the community center?"
"Swell idea." (Harve was not much of a talker.)
"What do you like best about the place?" the reporter
and enclosures, Harry L. Hopkins Papers, Box 110, Franklin 
D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York (to be cited here­
after as Hopkins Papers, FDRL).
2Arkansas Gazette (Little Rock), January 9, 1938.
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persisted.
"Well, I've got a home and some good land— best in
the world, and an opportunity to buy them. If we boys will
just line with them [the colony directors] they'll back us, 
but we wouldn't have a chance without this place. Let me 
tell you, the sentiment of the farmers is looking up."
“Anything you don't like about it?“
"Well, yes, but it can't be helped. The only thing 
hurtin' now is this 'PWA' that is putting us on jobs and 
keeping us off our farms."
Harve was working for the PWA because he was broke. 
After he had cleared thirty-one acres of land, he lost "near 
everything" in the floods of 1937: his corn crop, most of
his feed, hay, hogs, chickens, and other stores. After the 
flood, he tried to make a go of it on a twenty-acre tract. 
But like many other colonists, he was forced to go to work 
for the PWA until he could get on his feet again. Smith 
wanted desperately to get back to farming. He asked: "Why
not give me a $25 mortgage on my cow and let me go on my 
farm and make it back?"
"They've been awful nice to us>" Harve concluded. 
"They've given me a good school for my kids, a good hospital 
— and a chance."
"I don't suppose you're interested in politics?" 
[Translation: Are you part of any dissension movement?]
"Nope," Smith grinned. "We ain't interested in poli­
tics . *’ I guess w e ' d just do what ' they' wanted us to."
132
But by 1938, an increasing number of families had 
developed an interest in "politics." Like all communities, 
Dyess contained its share of trouble-makers. Discouraged, 
many families left the project when they saw only hard work 
ahead. Other dissidents stayed on and found plenty to criti­
cize, but only sporadically did discontent flare into the 
open. In April, 1938, for example, Dudley discharged two 
men, the colony store manager and the dry goods department 
manager. He explained that this aetion was taken in order 
to enable the colony to hire more experienced personnel.-^ 
"They did not have enough experience in merchandizing to 
operate the general store," Floyd Sharp commented. But in 
protest, 156 colonists signed a petition asking that the 
store clerks be rehired; and 2 0 0  sent a second petition to 
Mrs. Roosevelt, who had visited and expressed an interest in 
Dyess, requesting her to investigate the "administrative 
activities" of the colony. After Sharp refused to rehire 
them, the protest gradually subsided. "As to an investiga­
tion, " he said, "I am sure that the clerks would not welcome 
one.”^ Until 1939, however, no major dissension movement 
challenged the colony's leadership, largely because colo­
nists discontent lacked an issue and, most important, leader­
ship .
3 Ibid., April 27, 1938; Osceola Times, April 25, 1938.
4ibid.
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Suddenly, it seemed, the dissidents found both. On 
March 17, 1938, colony officials served eviction notices on 
two colonists, ordering them to vacate their houses within 
three days. One was S. B. Funk, fifty-two, a raw-boned 
farmer and one-time veterinarian from Haskell in Saline 
County, and a resident of the colony since 1934; the other,
A. J. McGravin, also fifty-two, a native of Morrillton who 
came to Dyess in 1935.5 They were both incompetent, colony 
authorities maintained, and they had performed insufficient 
work during the customary two-year probation period to merit 
further occupancy. In addition, Funk owed the colony over 
$1,600 and had been a constant source of trouble. McGavin 
was in better financial condition, but he had continually 
refused to participate in any of the colony's cooperative 
enterprises. Since both refused to leave, Dyess Colony, Inc., 
initiated a suit against them for unlawful detainer and cut 
off their credit at the colony store. But Funk and McGravin 
obtained credit outside the colony, employed A. F. Barham, 
an Osceola lawyer, to represent their case, and apparently 
spent their spare time building up support among other colo­
nists. The lawsuit, they later claimed, was the start of 
"open indignation” at Dyess; before then, other colonists had
^Arkansas Gazette. April 2, 1939. Both Funk and 
McGravin took their cases to the Arkansas Supreme Court and 
lost. Arkansas Reports: Cases Determined in the Supreme
Court of Arkansas from March 1940 to October, 1940 (Little
Rock, 1940), CC, 180-93.
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been afraid to discuss openly their dissatisfaction. When 
others saw they might also lose their farms, Funk and Mc­
Gravin said, they "at first bided their time but last fall 
[1938] decided nothing was to be done about the present 
management and decided they must interest the public."® So 
in 1939, Funk and McGravin emerged as the ringleaders of a 
dissident element made up of about a third of the total 
colony population. (There were then about 375 families at 
Dyess.)
When refused permission to hold protest meetings at 
the colony, on March 17 a group of about 250 Dyess residents 
— men, women, and children, not family heads— gathered at 
the courthouse in Osceola to protest against what they 
called "unfair and discriminatory management . " 7 The pro­
testers claimed they had been charged eexorbitant prices for 
land they bought at the colony. On March 29, 275 held a 
second mass meeting in Osceola, this time an all-day affair 
climaxed with the sending of telegrams to President Roosevelt 
and Governor Carl E. Bailey. In the telegram to Bailey, they 
requested that the Governor use his "influence with Mrs. 
Roosevelt to put an end to the intolerable conditions exist­
ing here." "The records of this county show," the telegram 
read, "that this land was purchased at $2.50 per acre. Our 
contracts call for its sale to us at its actual cost plus
^Arkansas Gazette, April 1, 1939.
7Ibid., March 18, 1939; Osceola Times. May 19, 1939.
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improvements, but officials have now insisted that we agree 
to pay from $75 to $100 per acre— many times the value of 
the land." If they failed to pay, they faced the threat of 
being thrown off the colony. "Unless you can prevent this 
. . . ," they said, "we will lose four years of labor and 
our last chance for a home. Please help us . " 8
The most vocal dissenter, Funk was probably the author 
of the telegram. "I bought 38 acres to be paid for over a 
period of years and thought I was to get it at $2.50 an acre," 
he complained. "After I had worked it for three years I 
found out they had charged me $3,900." Colony officials, he 
further charged, had meted out brutal treatment to dissenting 
colonists. In June, 1938, a Dyess farm supervisor had 
supposedly beaten one colonist unconscious and injured four 
others who were holding a meeting at a schoolhouse in the 
colony. When a speaker from outside the colony attempted to 
make a talk, colony authorities ordered him out? then, as he 
attempted to go on with his remarks, Funk claimed the farm 
supervisor and a deputy sheriff assaulted him, too . 8
Scarcely bowing to the more spectacular charges, 
colony officials countered with facts and figures. Resident 
manager E . S ..Dudley denied that anyone had been charged 
exbrbithnfct prices. "Prices of the tracts are based on the
8 Arkansas Gazette. March 30, 1939; Daily Graphic.
March 30, 1939.
9Arkansas Gazette. April 2. 1939.
size and the amount of the improvements," he explained.
"The land is appraised and the improvements, such as drain­
age ditches, roads, schools and other conveniences, are 
figured in as part of the purchase price. ”1° R. A. Lile, 
colony accountant, admitted that some of the land had been 
purchased for $2.50 per acre, but that did not represent the 
entire cost of obtaining title. Lile placed the actual cost 
at $9.82 per acre— a figure that included the cost of land, 
legal expenses, quitclaim deeds, surveying and payment of 
delinquent taxes. For example, Funk's land alone cost 
$382.88. But counting improvements, he was paying $76.93 an 
acre on 38.99 acres. The average cost of improvements—  
five-room house, barn and poultry house of the type built on 
the Funk tract— was $2,291.88, while the cost of drainage 
ditches amounted to $7.18 per acre or $279.95. "In view of 
the fact that various tracts were to be sold to the home­
steaders as cleared land," said Lile, "$15 per acre was 
included in the cost price and set up in a reserve for 
clearing. This added $584.85 to the cost of the land." Thus, 
Lile said, the cost of the Funk tract was $1,247.68; with 
improvements, it came to $3,539.56. But he received a 
$273.90 credit, or fifteen dollars per acre, for land which 
he had cleared, reducing the cost of the tract to $3,265.66.
1 0 Ibid.. March 18. 1939. Dudley, however, seems to 
have been confused about what went into the purchase price 
just as some of the colonists were. See Lile's statement 
next.
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Finally, allowing him ten per cent off, the sales price to 
Funk was $ 2 , 9 9 9 . 5 2 .  Dyess Colony, Inc., had added no inter­
est, nor prorated the cost of roads and bridges. Funk's 
annual payments were $ 1 5 3 . 0 3 ,  or about four dollars per acre 
per year; and he had thirty years to pay.
There were several reasons for the dissension at 
Dyess. The Emergency Relief Administration had made at least 
two major mistakes that plagued the colony for years after­
ward. From the start, FERA region engineer Roland R. Pyne 
warned against the danger of not thoroughly acquainting 
clients with the size of the financial obligations they 
assumed as Dyess colonists.12 This mistake was never fully 
corrected, and it did immeasurable harm. A number of colo­
nists, like Funk and McGravin, expected to buy their land 
and homes at a cheaper price than the colony could offer. 
Newspaper stories of $ 2 . 5 0  an acre land and $ 1 , 0 0 0  homes had 
made such a deep impression that it could never be eradicated. 
Equally serious, family selection specialists allowed a num­
ber of poor choices to slip through. The project, Dudley 
later explained, was set up to assist only persons with 
farming backgrounds, but relief agencies had admitted people 
who were not primarily farmers, people who were, for example, 
carpenters or who worked at other trades.^3 One colonist,
Hlbid., April 1, 1 9 3 9 .
l2Report of Roland R. Pyne, Regional Engineer, Period 
Ending November 1 0 ,  1 9 3 4 ,  Hopkins Papers, Box 7 9 ,  FDRL.
•^Arkansas Gazette, April 2, 1939.
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Homer Williams, put it this ways
When this thing started out back in 1934, they brought 
us here people who hadn't had anything before in their 
lives. They were on relief. They took them from all 
walks of life and from all parts of the state, and put 
them down here on an equal basis, doing the same thing 
— farming. As time went on, they began to sift down.
Some of them couldn't take it. Others made a go of it.
You just can't take so many different types of people 
and set them down doing the same thing without having 
a little trouble.14
Many colonists may have started out with high hopes, worked 
hard for the first year or two, but, after repeated disap­
pointments, lost their enthusiasm. Some found it difficult 
to adjust to the full-time job of farming, to the sticky 
black gumbo soil, to the "buffalo gnats" common in that part 
of eastern Arkansas. A  few colonists, it seems, were unable 
to understand the legal documents and technicalities involved 
in purchasing their homes.
Both the Emergency Relief Administration and the Re­
settlement Administration share responsibility for selection 
mistakes at Dyess. But probably the ERA should take the 
greatest blame. Funk, who came to Dyess in November, 1934, 
and McGravin, who came in April, 1935, were both ERA choices. 
Dyess Colony, after all, was the Emergency Relief Adminis­
tration's first colonization effort in Arkansas. No one in 
1934 or 1935 had the experience in community building avail­
able a few years later. Even the Resettlement Administration's 
family selection staff, young and inexperienced in 1936, had
^ibid.
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undertaken no major selection task except for the Mississippi 
subsistence homesteads. It is likely that they, too, were 
feeling their own way.
Since the dissenters represented only a minority, 
other colonists resented the unfavorable publicity they gave 
the colony. In early April, one group, a newspaper reported, 
was planning to send petitions to President Roosevelt and 
Governor Bailey denying all charges in the dissidents1 peti­
tions and expressing satisfaction with the opportunity of 
living at Dyess . 1 5  (Whether they actually did so was unre­
ported.) Colonists C. E. Tarpley reflected the attitude of 
some toward Funk and McGravin when he said, "If those two 
birds were in paradise they wouldn't be satisfied unless 
they were raising a ruckus." They were "sore because they 
don't want to get down to work."1^ One reporter found the 
colonists divided into three groups: those strongly favor­
able to the colony, those strongly opposed, and those in the 
middle, not highly favorable but not discontented either.
The majority took the third course. Homer Williams was one 
of those in the middle. "If they don't like it here," he 
remarked, "I would move." Williams, however, had actually 
signed the dissenters' petitions, not because he was dis­
satisfied, but because he was willing to help those who asked 
him to sign to improve their condition. Williams had no
iSibid., April 2, 1939. ^ibid.
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grievances against the colony or its management; they had 
always given him a square deal, he said, and he was making 
progress toward acquiring his home and land . - 1*7
In Arkansas politics, Dyess Colony was always a 
potential issue, especially as deficits mounted and dis­
senters grew more vocal. At first, the colony's identifica­
tion with W. R. Dyess was alone enough to attract controversy. 
As a large planter and businessman, Bill Dyess had been 
involved in politics since moving to Arkansas in 1930— first 
local, then state politics. In Mississippi County, the most 
important political fact was its division into rival northern 
and southern sections. The largest county in Arkansas, 
Mississippi County had two courthouses, one at Blytheville in 
the northern section, the other at Osceola in the southern 
section; the existence of two courthouses not only indicated 
the size of the county but the bitterness of the sectional 
rivalry.
Since Dyess* home was at Osceola, he had built politi­
cal ties in the southern section with, for example, Ben F. 
Butler, farm implement dealer and landowner, and R. E. Lee 
Wilson, a large planter who owned the entire town of Wilson, 
Arkansas, a few miles south of Osceola .-*-8  Later, as
1 7 Ibid.
18Qeorge D. Babcock to Winthrop D. Lane, July 13,
1934, Record Group 69, Records of the Works Projects Adminis­
tration, National Archives (to be cited hereafter as R. G.
69,. National Archives); Nels Anderson to Lane, July 9, 1934, 
ibid.
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Emergency Relief Administrator, Dyess became a powerful 
force in statewide politics, with large amounts of Federal 
funds to dispense on relief projects and thousands of jobs 
to fill in every part of the state. In 1932, Dyess had 
supported J. M. Futrell for governor against Dwight H. Black 
wood of Blytheville, and he did much to win the county for 
Futrell. In 1933, Futrell in turn backed him for the job as 
relief administrator; and in turn, Dyess threw his relief 
organization behind the Governor's campaign for reelection 
in 1934. According to current rumors, Dyess himself was 
ambitious for elective office? and he planned to run for 
governor in 1936 after Futrell stepped down— or perhaps for 
United States S e n a t o r . H e  probably had a good chance for 
either office. He was already well known among political 
leaders, across the state, had built up a favorable popular 
image as relief administrator, and possessed a magnetic 
personality. ERA social service chief Gertrude S. Gates, 
who was one of Dyess* severist critics, admitted that "he 
could charm the birds off the trees if he chose."20 But at 
times, Dyess' political ambitions and activities made the 
colony a political football. When political foes attacked
■^Gertrude S. Gates, Memorandum to Winthrop Lane,
June 18, 1934, ibid. Dyess denies his political ambitions, 
in Blytheville Courier News, July 6 , 1934; Arkansas Gazette, 
July 7, 1934.
20Gertrude s. Gates, Memorandum to Winthrop Lane, 
June 18, 1934, R. G. 69, National Archives.
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him# they usually wound up attacking the colony as well; it 
was a soft spot few could resist.
During the 1934 gubernatorial campaign# for example# 
Dyess' involvement in local and state politics combined to 
drag the colonization project# then only a few weeks old# 
into the first primary as a political issue. ^  A strong 
Futrell partisan, he found himself facing a number of embar­
rassing charges— charges intended, the Osceola Times said# 
to "react upon the present state administration."22 Had the 
Emergency Relief Administration shown favoritism to the 
southern half of Mississippi County# the least populated 
part? Why did most of the relief labor being used at the 
colony come from Osceola rather than from Blytheville? How# 
indeed# did the colony itself come to be located not only in 
Dyess' home county, but in the very part of that county 
where he himself lived? Was it not true that a substantial 
part of the land purchased for the colony, if not all of it# 
had been owned by none other than Lee Wilson? Had he, with 
Dyess' help, neatly unloaded a large tract of worthless land 
on the government? What about Dyess' political favoritism# 
such as the purchasing of building materials and machinery 
from his friend Ben Butler in the early days of the coloniza­
tion project? Why# too, had ERA crews improved roads running
2-^See Arkansas Gazette# June 17, 1934; Blytheville 
Courier News. July 6 # July 11, 1934.
22oSceola Times# July 6# 1934.
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past Dyess' private land in Mississippi County? Why had 
there been extensive resurfacing of thirty or forty miles of 
formerly gravel roads near Wilson, Arkansas?2** Why, why, 
why?
As a result of such criticism, George Babdock, Nels 
Anderson, and Winthrop D. Lane, all FERA representatives, 
spent three days in Mississippi County investigating charges 
against Dyess. Anderson took a less toleraht attitude toward 
Dyess* conduct than did Babcock. By improving roads on land 
which he and Wilson owned, Anderson emphasized, Dyess had 
committed a clear indiscretion. As for the development of 
the colonization project, Babcock believed that Dyess had 
shown no "unusual” favoritism to the Southern section of the 
county. "That the location of this project," Babcock noted, 
’'happened to have been in the part of the county which is 
generally considered as that section in which our executive 
lives, and almost surrounded by property owned by one who 
seems to be one of his strongest friends [Wilson], should not 
be a particular reason for criticism." "In fact,” he con­
tinued, "I believe that if his home had not been located in 
this Southern section region there would have been little 
criticism of any kind so far as selection and location were
22George D. Babcock to Winthrop D. Lane, July 13, 
1934, R. G. 69,. National Archives; Nels Anderson to Lane, 
July 9, 1934, ibid.
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c o n c e r n e d 24 Dyess' home, Babcock pointed out, was at 
least twenty-five miles from the colony and at the very 
northern border of the Southern section of the county. In 
summary, Lane reported finding "serious indiscretions but no 
criminal acts or acts justifying removal." He added: "I am
still uncertain whether I shall recommend a new state adminis­
trator.”^  The Federal Emergency Relief Administration did 
not fire Dyess, though that was a possibility; and in 
Arkansas, the criticism died down after Futrell won a second 
term. But this was not the last time Dyess Colony would 
become involved in state politics.
In 1939, a political feud between Floyd Sharp and 
Governor Bailey caught Dyess colony squarely in the middle. 
Bailey and Sharp had been at odds politically for two or 
three years. According to the Governor's supporters, Sharp 
had made the Arkansas WPA into a powerful political machine 
and had used it with deadly effect against Bailey when the 
latter ran for United States Senator in 1937 (John E. Miller 
defeated him to fill Senator Joseph T. Robinson's unexpired 
term) Apparently, Bailey was determined to get revenge.
On February 25, 1939, Representatives B. Frank Williams,
24Qeorge D . Babcock to Winthrop D . Lane, July 13, 
1934, ibid.
25winthrop D. Lane to Aubrey Williams, July 10, 1934,
ibid.
26see Arkansas Gazette. March 8, 1939.
L. H. Autry, and Woodrow A. Hutton of Mississippi County 
introduced an administration-sponsored bill into the House 
directing the Arkansas Corporation Commission to audit the 
affairs of Dyess Colony, Inc.; Senator Ivy W. Crawford of 
Blytheville sponsored the bill in the Senate . 2 7  The bill 
called for an investigation "to determine the extent of the 
State of Arkansas's interest in the establishment, manage­
ment, and disposition of Dyess Colony." The Williams-Autry- 
Hutton bill passed the House, but in the Senate it quickly 
ran into opposition. The bill's opponents denounced it as a 
political maneuver. "I'm going to tell-you what's behind 
this bill," Senator Ellis M. Fagan of Little Rock said.
"I'm speaking for a man who can't speak for himself— Floyd 
Sharp.” The fact that the bill called for only an investi­
gation of Dyess Colony, ignoring the Arkansas Rural Reha­
bilitation Corporation, Fagan said, showed it was "aimed to 
embarrass Mr. Sharp and to enliven agitation for his removal." 
The Corporation Commission was responsible only to the 
Governor, he asserted, and it will bring out the report it is . 
told to bring out. Senator Jeff Bratton of Paragould also 
opposed the investigations "Instead of trying to investigate 
the how and why of Dyess Colony, we ought to be glad the
 27Journal of the House of Representatives of the
Fifty-Second General Assembly, State of Arkansas. .(Newark,. 
Arkansas,. 193,9)986;. Journal of the Senate of Arkansas of 
the Fifty-Second General Assembly,. State of Arkansas (Newark, 
Arkansas, 1939), 1300; Arkansas Gazette. February 26. 1939.
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federal government has given the money to some of our
people."28
On March 7, Senate opponents amended the bill to place 
the investigation under the attorney general's office— and 
out of reach of the Corporation Commission, some of whose 
members were known to be hostile to Dyess C o l o n y . F o r  an 
instant, it looked as if they had averted any threat of 
investigation. Then, unexpectedly, Bailey's forces accepted 
the amendment and lined up enough votes to pass the new 
version of the bill. But on March 8 , with the legislative 
session scheduled to end at noon the next day, Pagan and 
twelve other senators filibustered the bill to death. To­
gether, they kept the floor of the Senate for nearly eight 
hours, the longest filibuster in recent Arkansas history. 
Pagan read a voluminous report of a federal audit of Dyess 
colony, interrupting the narrative with comments on the high 
cost of living, termites, and the Far Eastern situation. He 
took almost three hours alone reading the first page of the 
report and two explanatory letters. The Senate adjourned at 
eleven o'clock that night without taking a vote . 2 0
But Bailey had held back a trump card. On March 6, 
the very day of the first mass demonstration of colonists at
28 a11 quotes from ibid., March 8 , 1939.
29senate Journal, 1408.
30lbid.. 1412, 1439, 1460; Arkansas Gazette. March 8,
1939.
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Osceola courthouse, he dissolved Dyess Colony, Inc., leaving 
the $3,000,000 corporation without legal right to do busi­
ness in Arkansas. In an executive proclamation, the Governor 
ordered the dissolution of 153 domestic and thirty-seven 
foreign corporations which had failed to file reports and pay 
Arkansas franchise taxes for the past three years. Dyess was 
only one of these, but the intent was clear. Dyess Colony, 
Inc., Bailey said, had failed to pay thirty-three dollars in 
franchise taxes due the state. Former Governor J. M. Futrell, 
colony attorney, had recently advised the Arkansas Corpora­
tion Commission that Dyess Colony, Inc., contended it was a 
federal agency and not liable for the state franchise tax; 
in turn, the Arkansas Tax Division's secretary, colony 
officials claimed, notified them that the commission would 
accept this contention. But the commissioners apparently 
changed their minds. Now they claimed that Dyess Colony,
Inc., possessed the same powers as any other business corpora­
tion, with nothing in its articles of incorporation restric­
ting its operations to a non-profit basis or establishing it 
as an instrument of the Federal government.
Sharp, perhaps a little stunned, declared that the 
dissolution of Dyess Colony, Inc., was a waste of time if it 
were an effort to oust him from the project. ” 1  have asked 
Harry L. Hopkins to be relieved of my duties with the
3-LIbid., March 17, 1939.
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colony," he announced . 3 2  on March 22, he obtained a new 
Arkansas charter setting up Dyess Rural Rehabilitation 
Corporation as the successor to Dyess Colony, Inc. Like 
Dyess Colony, Inc., the new organization was a "benevolent, 
non-profit corporation" whose major objective was "to reha­
bilitate individuals and families as self-sustaining human 
beings.” Secretary of State C. G. Hall issued the new 
charter upon payment of the usual fee of ten dollars. Legally, 
Dyess Colony was back in business . 3 3
Thus, at the end of March, 1939, Dyess Colony was in 
serious trouble; it was on the verge of financial collapse, 
a third of the colonists were in open revolt, and a state 
investigation had been just barely averted. As Sharp rea­
lized, the only way he could safely protect the colony from 
Bailey's vendetta was to cut all ties between it and the 
WPA. Besides, the Works Progress Administration had been 
under congressional orders since mid-1938 to wind up the 
affairs of the old Federal Emergency Relief Administration, 
including the liquidation of WPA interests in three rural 
community corporations: Pine Mountain Valley, Georgia;
3 2 Ibid., March 23, 1939. Sharp, however, stayed on 
as president of Dyess Rural Rehabilitation Corporation.
33Articles of Incorporation of Dyess Rural Rehabilita­
tion Corporation, March 22, 1939, Secretary of state, 
Corporation Department, State Capital, Little Rock,
Arkansas.
Cherry Lake, Florida; and Dyess.34 m  February, 1939, soon 
after the Bailey feud started to heat up, Sharp approached 
regional director T. Roy Reid about the possibility of trans­
ferring Dyess colony to the Farm Security Administration . 3 3  
In August, the FSA agreed to take over Dyess, but no one 
appeared in any hurry to do so. As Paul Conkin notes, Dyess 
colony was hardly a welcome addition to the FSA's communi­
ties.3^ In September, Reid stressed that the FSA should not 
move too rapidly in taking control of the project. There 
was "considerable unrest" at Dyess, he advised, and the FSA 
take-over was expected to greatly increase that unrest. The 
Dyess Rural Rehabilitation Corporation was planning to ask 
forty or fifty families to vacate their units; and the pres­
ent management, Reid contended, should ask them to leave 
before the FSA took over. It would be hard for the FSA, he 
argued, to assume management and then demand their withdrawal 
immediately after taking charge. Nor should the FSA take 
over until after the corporation finished out a final full
3 ^H. M. Colvin, Memorandum to William E. Linden, 
February 2, 1939, Record Group 96, Records of the Farmers 
Home Administration, National Archives (to be cited hereafter 
as R. G. 96, National Archives).
3 5 r . Roy Reid to W. W. Alexander, February 2 3 ,  1 9 3 9 ,  
ibid.; Reid to Alexander, March 2 1 ,  1 9 3 9 ,  ibid.; R. W. 
Hudgens, Memorandum to Monroe Oppenheimer and J. 0. Walker, 
August 3 0 ,  1 9 3 9 ,  ibid.
33Paul K. Conkin, Tomorrow a New World: The New Deal
Community Program (Ithaca, N. Y., 1959), p. 138.
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year for accounting purposes . 3 7
Finally, the FSA decided to go ahead with transfer.
On November 22, the board of directors of the Dyess Rural 
Rehabilitation Corporation held a special meeting; and,
Floyd Sharp, H. C. Baker, and R. C. Limerick, resigned.
Then FSA personnel— Reid, resettlement director E. B. Whit­
aker, and regional finance director James T. Holliday— took 
their places as president, secretary, and treasurer, respec­
tively . ^ 8 Soon after, the new board of directors trans­
ferred their Dyess corporation stock in trust to the 
Secretary of Agriculture, as the old state Rural Rehabilita­
tion Corporations had done in 1936. The main purpose of this 
move was to place eviction cases at Dyess in Federal court 
and guarantee speedy conviction . 8 8
When the Farm Security Administration took over Dyess, 
Reid had already set up a committee under E. B. Whitaker to 
visit the project, report on conditions there, and recommend
37T . Roy Reid to W. W. Alexander, September 15, 1939, 
R. G. 96, National Archives? Reid to Alexander, September 21, 
1939, ibid.; see G. E. Lukas, Memorandum to J. O. Walker, 
October 9, 1939, ibid.
3 8 E. B. Whitaker to W. W. Alexander, November 27,
1939, ibid.; Mastin G. White, Memorandum for Alexander, 
December 4, 1939? ibid.? see Alexander to Corrington Gill,
October 23, 1939, ibid.? T. C. Donnahue to Baird Snyder,
December 5, 1939, ibid.? Arkansas Gazette.
3 8 E. B..Whitaker, Memorandum for T. Roy Reid, December
20, 1939, R. G. 96, National Archives? Whitaker, Memorandum 
for Reid, December 22, 1999, ibid.? see G.E. Lukas, Memo­
randum for C. B. Baldwin, January 20, 1940, ibid.
future action. Whitaker found 339 families living at Dyess 
with a total population of nearly 2 , 0 0 0  people? about 1 , 0 0 0  
were school-age children. The Resettlement Administration's 
Management Division had selected about two-thirds of these 
families, and about eighty per cent of the population had 
been residents of Dyess three years or longer. The colony 
contained 518 farm units; 332 were twenty-five acre units, 
while 186 were between twenty-five and forty-five acres, 
making the size of the average unit about twenty-five acres . ^ 0  
Dyess Colony, Inc., had let its farm management program 
dwindle. The basic community services were still in opera- 
tion: gin, store, blacksmith shop, schools, hospital,
library, and some others. The physical property had never 
been put back in first-class condition after the flood of 
1937. With the project under the Tyronza River, about six 
inches of water stood inside most of the homes; as a result, 
their floors and walls were out of plumb and in need of 
repair. There was very little fencing on any of the units, 
and some had no barns or other outbuildings.^ Roads through 
the project were in poor conditions, some of them almost 
impassable. "In general, the physical condition of the
40t . Roy Reid to W. W. Alexander, August 16, 1939, 
ibid.; Dyess Farms: Project Date, n.d., ibid.; E. B.
Whitaker, Memorandum for T. Roy Reid, January 3, 1940, ibid.; 
Whitaker, Memorandum for Reid, December 29, 1939, ibid.
41jjConomic Justification, Dyess Farms, Inc., Summary, 
n.d., ibid.
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community and its various structures is good," district 
engineer Troy C. Donnahue reported, "in fact, considering 
the size of the property and various damaging elements to 
which it has been exposed, such as the flood of 1937, the 
cost of putting this large project in good physical condition 
is comparatively moderate."42 yet Whitaker estimated that 
it would take an expenditure of $830,697.81 to put the Dyess 
on a par with other projects in the region. This would 
represent a cost of $2,770 per unit assuming the project 
were finally divided into 300 units.43
In the spring of 1940, the Farm Security Administra­
tion launched a long-range program of reorganization at 
Dyess. On June 19, the regional office set up Dyess Farms, 
Inc., a cooperative association composed of the heads of 
families living on the project.44 ^s the master association,
42preliminary Engineering Report on Dyess Community, 
Mississippi County, Arkansas, December 1939, ibid.
43e. b. Whitaker, Memorandum for T. Roy Reid, January
3, 1940, ibid.
4 4 By-Laws of Dyess Farms, Inc., June 19, 1940, ibid. 
Under the FSA, Dyess would be known as Dyess Farms, not Dyess 
Colony. "The name has been officially changed from 'Dyess 
Colony' to 'Dyess Farms, '"Reid wrote in early 1940, "to give 
emphasis to the fact that this is a farming enterprise and 
to remove the general impression that it is a government 
colony for the segregation of a number of relief clients who 
are being cared for by the government." The change of name 
also eliminated a somewhat collectivist sounding word and 
substituted another which emphasized the individualistic 
nature of the project. Dyess had never stressed collective 
ownership of farm land, but in 1940 the FSA could not afford 
to take any chances. T. Roy Reid, Quarterly Report, Region 
VI, January-March, 1940,ibid.
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Dyess Farms intended to purchase the entire project, all 
15,144 acres and nearly 600 structures, from Dyess Rural 
Rehabilitation Corporation, although the latter retained 
title for another year. In the meantime, Ray D. Johnston, 
the new community manager, went ahead with Dyess' most 
pressing needs the reorganization of individual farm units. 
Whitaker's committee had reported that many of the original 
518 farmsteads were too small to support a family. So 
Johnston re-subdivided the farm land, combined adjacent 
units, and brought uncleared land into cultivation. He 
increased the size of the units to an average of forty acres 
wherever possible and decreased tht total number of farm units 
to 300, expanding the amount of available crop land from 
9,600 to about 12,000 acres.45 jn addition, the FSA provided 
Dyess Farms with a $872,920 loan to cover the cost of putting 
the project structures in good repair and a $30,000 loan for 
operating capital. As soon as possible, Johnston made neces­
sary repairs to the buildings on all 300 of the reorganized 
units, improved the drainage system, reconditioned roads, 
cleared more land, constructed fences, and insured an ade­
quate water supply.46
45Dyess Farms, Inc., Economic Justification, Organiza­
tion and Management, n.d., ibid.; Dyess Farms, Inc., Economic 
Justification, Summary, n.d., ibid.
Roy Reid to W. W. Alexander, May 22, 1940 and en­
closures, ibid.? Reid to C. B. Baldwin, August 7, 1940, ibid.? 
Loan Agreement, dated June 29, 1940, ibid.; Alexander to Reid, 
June 29, 1940, ibid.? J. 0. Walker, Memorandum for R. W. 
Hudgens, June 25, 1940, ibid.
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As units were repaired and reorganized, the Farm 
Security Administration sold them to the occupant families, 
if they could qualify under the FSA's standards, or to other 
families selected for residence at Dyess. About 200 of the 
families then living on the project already held deeds from 
Dyess Colony, Inc., although most had made little progress 
toward purchasing the units. The rest had year-to-year 
rental contracts. Since Dyess Farms could not make any 
improvements until the old deeds had been canceled, the asso­
ciation requested most of the residents, especially those 
living on smaller units, to surrender their deeds in return 
for a new purchase contract. The Dyess Farms contracts took 
into account the increase in size of each farm as well as 
home improvements; each family received credit for any 
equities they had in their unit. Dyess Farms based the cost 
of the additional land and improvements on an appraisal of 
the earning capacity of each unit. The conversion from WPA 
deeds to FSA contracts was an extremely slow process; by 
July, 1943, Dyess Farms had executed only ninety-six new 
contracts. The board of directors of Dyess Farms and the 
project manager had to consult with each family, adjust 
their past indebtedness, and work out the exchange to the 
satisfaction of the families while protecting the govern­
ment's interests. To insure the success of farm operations 
on the new units, Dyess Farms mapped out a new farm and home 
management plan in which each family supplied its own beef,
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pork, milk, eggs, garden vegetables and any other subsis­
tence goods. As before, all Dyess farmers continued to own 
and operate their units i n d i v i d u a l l y .47
Under the WPA, the cooperative services program had 
gradually dwindled. In 1936, the Dyess Colony Cooperative 
Association leased the store, cafe, filling station, and 
blacksmith shop; but it was a financial failure. Dyess 
Colony, Inc., took back the store after only six months of 
unsuccessful operation. Since then, the colony cooperative 
had subleased the blacksmith shop to an individual resident; 
so by 1939, it was reduced to operating only the cafe and 
filling station, and the cafe was selling only soft drinljs 
and cigarettes.48 The Dyess hospital had never set up a 
cooperative medical association; it was still in operation 
but under an informal association of project families on a 
monthly fee basis. The colony store had long suffered from 
lack of participation. None of the families had supported 
the store fully, and by 1939 only about 200 of the resident 
families were patronizing it at all. The gin was somewhat
47;Dyess Farms, Arkansas: The First Experiment with a
New Kind of Rural Community, dated May 7, 1941, ibid.; John 
UewAjfriiBtrong to John L. McClellan, July 21, 1943, ibid.;
John Fischer to Mrs. A. B. Adams, April 26, 1940, ibid.;
Dyess Farms, Inc., Economic Justification, Organization and 
Management, n.d., ibid.
T. Frazier,. Memorandum for Brice M. Mace, Jr., 
December 19, 1939, ibid.; U. S. Department of Agriculture, 
Farm Security Administration, Monthly Narrative Report, Dyess 
Farms, May 1, 1940, ibid.
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better patronized, although some of its 300 customers had 
ginned as little as one bale of cotton each since it opened. 
Many of the other community facilities were simply not in 
use.49 "One of the main problems that must be overcome 
before a cooperative association can hope to be successful 
on this project is the apparent lack of knowledge of co­
operative principles and of cooperative spirit among the 
families now residing on the project," cooperative specialist 
W. T. Frazier reported. "it is my understanding that the 
present cooperative association has only about 40 members 
out of the 370 families. . . ."50 The Dyess school system, 
on the other hand, was apparently the only unqualifiedly 
successful community activity on the project.
The Farm Security Administration streamlined the com­
munity program by reorganizing the basic enterprises and 
eliminating the more superfluous ones. On March 1, 1940, 
with FSA help, the farmers at Dyess formed the Dyess Coopera­
tive Store Association and borrowed $5,000 for operating 
capital; The store association leased the store building 
from Dyess Rural Rehabilitation Corporation and purchased 
the inventory of merchandise on hand for $1 0 , 0 0 0  over a ten-
49Rate Fulton, Memorandum to E. B. Whitaker, December 
19, 1939, ibid.
50W . T. Frazier, Memorandum for Brice M. Mace, Jr., 
December 19, 1939, ibid.
157
year period.51 During the summer# the Dyess Hospital and 
Health Association began operations with a $4#760 grant.
Two physicians# a registered nurse# and the community hos­
pital provided members with medical care at an annual cost 
of twenty-two dollars per family . 5 2  On September 9# Dyess 
farmers organized the Dyess Cooperative Gin Association, 
borrowed $6,000 from the FSA# leased the project's gin, and 
started ginning their 1940 cotton crop.5  ̂ Dyess Farms leased 
other facilities from the Dyess RR Corporation and subleased 
them to individual operators: blacksmith shop# gasoline
station, garage# and feed mill. No provision was made for 
the operation of the shoe and harness shop# canning plant, 
cafe, or craft building. The local school district con­
tinued to operate the school system as before.5^ Finally, 
on June 2# 1941# Dyess Rural Rehabilitation Corporation and 
Dyess Farms# Inc.# entered into as "Agreement for Sale of 
Dyess Colony." The initial purchase price was $650,000 for
5-*-Mastin G. White, Memorandum for C. B. Baldwin# July 
2, 1940, ibid.; Mason Barr, Memorandum for J. 0. Walker, 
November 28, 1940, ibid. ? E. B. Whitaker to W. W. Alexander, 
June 20, 1940, ibid.; A. D. Stewart to C. B. Baldwin, April 
26, 1941, ibid.
52Dyess Farms, Arkansas: The First Experiment with a
New Kind of Rural Community, dated May 5, 1941, ibid.
5 2 J. 0. Walker, Memorandum for R. W. Hudgens,. August 
10, 1940, ibid. ? E. B. Whitaker to W. W. Alexander, June 20, 
1940, ibid.; J. T. Holliday to Carl H. Bass> October 4,
1940, ibid.
54j}yess Farms, Inc., Economic Justification, Summary, 
n.d.. ibid.
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the farm property, not including the community center and 
facilities. After the project had been fully reorganized, 
the FSA would appraise the property in terms of its earning 
capacity and then establish the final purchase price, not to 
exceed the initial $650,000. According to the terns of the 
agreement, Dyess Farms would begin making annual installments 
ten years after the date of conveyance. But in June, 1941, 
the association began legal occupancy of the project.55 
The Works Project Administration left a legacy of 
unrest among the colonists. When the FSA took over, the 
unrest, if anything, increased. "The proposed transfer of 
the management of Dyess Colony Community to the Farm Security 
Administration," wrote family selection specialist Kate 
Fulton in December, 1939, "is contributing to the already 
unsettled state of mind in the Community."5^ Many colonists 
were guessing how the FSA program would operate. Some were 
afraid they would no longer be able to supplement their 
incomes with WPA work. Some believed they should not have 
to repay the full amount of their old indebtedness. The 
Farm Security Administration naturally wanted to end uncer­
tainty, establish a harmonious relationship with the
55Mason Barr, Memorandum for J. O. Walker, March 11, 
1941, ibid.; C. B. Baldwin to A. D. Stewart, April 3,. 1941, 
ibid.; Agreement for Sale of Dyess Colony, dated June 2, 
1941, ibid.? see J. O. Walker, Memorandum for R. W. Hudgens, 
June 25, 1940, ibid.
56£ate Fulton, Memorandum to E. B. Whitaker, December 
19, 1939, ibid.
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colonists, and restore their faith in the colony. Regional 
director T. Roy Reid and assistant director E. B. Whitaker 
made a trip to Dyess in early January, 1940, and spoke at a 
colony-wide meeting in the community center. They invited 
the colonists to elect an "advisory committee" to consult 
with the management on matters of mutual concern. Although 
such committees were standard policy on all PSA community 
projects, Reid was especially anxious for the Dyess committee 
to secure the confidence of the people and insure active 
cooperation on the part of everyone. But soon after the 
election results came in, he found that the whole idea had 
backfired: a majority of the new committeemen were members
of the Southern Tenant Farmers' Union.57
Organized in late 1939, STPU Local Number 29 claimed 
to represent more than two-thirds of the total number of 
colonists on the project.58 whatever its strength, it was 
active and well organized. Before the FSA could undertake 
any reforms, local president L. J. Brantley and secretary 
Floyd Slayton drew up a petition of grievances, and the 
membership passed it unanimously at a meeting on February 22, 
1940. "The main element which has been lacking in the 
operation of the Dyess project heretofore," the petition
57ip. R0y Reid to W. W. Alexander, January 4, 1940,
ibid.
58See T. Roy Reid to W. L. Ford, Jr., March 26, 1940,
ibid.
read, "has been the failure of the management to recognize 
and encourage Democratic operation of the project." Speaking 
for the union members, they asked for a greater share in the 
making of important decisions affecting their welfare. "The 
colonists have no desire to take away any of the rights of 
the management to protect the investments of the Corporation," 
they said. "The colonists desire only the right to be con­
sulted and the right to negotiation of disputed matters as 
between management and colonists." The election of an 
advisory committee was a step in the right direction, but 
they wanted the scope of the committee enlarged and its power 
extended. "It should become a bargaining agent as between 
management on the ond hand and the committee representing 
the colonists on the other hand." Specifically, the com­
mittee should have power bargain about such matters as loans 
and repayment plans, discipline action against colonists, 
equitable settlement of old indebtedness, and the right b<E 
colonists to be consulted on the plans for management for 
the coming year, and their right to have a voice in the 
selection of project supervisors.^9
On March 3, a delegation of STFU members presented 
the petition to Farm Security Administrator Will W. Alexander 
at his office in Washington. H. L. Mitchell, one of the 
founders of the STFU, headed the delegation; and Slayton was
59To the Officials of the Farm Security Administra­
tion, dated February 22, 1940, ibid.
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there to represent Local Number 29. Mitchell offered evi­
dence that a majority of the families at Dyess were members 
of the union and repeated the request that the Dyess advisory 
committee be recognized as the "bargaining committee" of the 
project. According to newspaper reports the next day—  
reports based on an interview Mitchell gave the Associated 
Press— the STFU won a complete victory; Alexander recognized 
the union as the bargaining agent for the Dyess colonists. 
"Dr. Alexander said he agreed to bargain with the union 
because it represented a majority of the project colonists," 
the AP reported, paraphrasing Mitchell. "He said he would 
grant similar recognition to any group on any FSA project, 
whether it be a union or not, as long as it represented a 
majority." Mitchell added that FSA recognition would pave 
the way for unionization of sharecroppers and tenants on 
privately-owned cotton plantations . ® 0 If the report is cor­
rect, Reid moaned, "our actions in attempting to get harmony 
in the administration at Dyess are nullified."63-
In reality, Alexander had granted nothing. Either 
Mitchell misunderstood what Alexander was saying, or the 
Associated Press misunderstood Mitchell. "I believe," 
Alexander wrote Reid immediately, "I made it perfectly plain
60Arkansas Gazette. March 3, 1940 ? Arkansas Democrat 
(Little Rock), March 2, 1940. See Commercial Appeal (Memphis, 
Tennessee), March 9, 1940.
Roy Reid to Pate R. W. Hudgens, March 3, 1940,
R. G. 96, National Archives.
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that such committees are purely advisory, and the responsi­
bility for the management and operations of the project must 
rest with PSA officials." "I agreed, of course, that the 
Advisory Committee recently elected at Dyess Colony should 
be recognized as representing the project residents. . . .
It was well understood," Alexander said, "by everyone in the 
meeting that the Committee could be recognized as representing 
project residents and not the Southern Tenant Farmers Union.
Two days later, on March 6, Reid and Whitaker went 
back to Dyess and, with Ray Johnston, met with advisory com­
mittee. When Reid asked Tom Hale, chairman of the committee, 
to preside at the meeting, Hale objected that L. J. Brantley 
should take charge, since the union was to be recognized as 
the colony's bargaining agent.
I immediately advised him [Reid reported] that the 
Farm Security Administration wanted the advice and 
counsel of the committee which had been selected by 
the people, but did not consider any organization or 
committee from any organization as a bargaining 
agency. He stated that we should so consider it since 
Washington had authorized such action. I then read 
your letter. [Reid had set Hale up nicely.] We had 
about a five minute discussion and the committee 
seemed to feel that it was all right and that it would 
be best for us to deal with them as a committee re­
porting to the residents of Dyess Farms.
The meeting then moved on to a calm, two and a half hour dis­
cussion of the requests listed in their petition.
The committee seemed pleased that we are taking steps
W. Alexander to T. Roy Reid, March 4, 1940, 
ibid. See William Lightfoot, Jr., to E. P. Coleman, March 
14, 1940, ibid.
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to appraise the farms and rewrite the contracts on 
the basis of the appraised value or present contract 
value, whichever is less. . . . They were advised 
that it would not be possible for them to make changes 
in our loan policy but we asked for suggestions from 
them. Apparently they were misunderstanding on some 
provisions and they were not insistent on any point; 
however, they were strongest in their views that we 
should not take second mortgages on this year's crops 
to secure their past indebtedness to the Dyess Rural 
Rehabilitation Corporation, but they seemed to under­
stand the purpose of this and raised no real objec­
tion to it.63
The basis of the colonists' request for a voice in personnel 
selection, Reid learned, was the fact that they objected to 
two men already employed at Dyess, a farm foreman and the 
clerk in charge of the main office. The foreman had also 
served as a dephty sheriff, and he was the man who had 
allegedly broken up a protest meeting in 1938. Reid 
promised an investigation of both men, and later transferred, 
the foreman and fired the clerk for incompetence. The PSA 
had as much trouble with factionalism among the colonists as 
it did with STFU petitions. A group of five men, for 
example, had asked for a meeting; so Reid and Whitaker stayed 
overnight at the colony and met with them the following 
morning. Unlike the other group, these men opposed the 
announcement that the STFU had been granted bargaining rights 
at Dyess, and they spoke for a large number of colonists who 
felt as they did. Reid read Alexander's letter a second time, 
and they seemed pleased. STFU organizers, they told Reid,
®^T. Roy Reid to WT. W. Alexander, March 9, 1940,
ibid.
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had been using the newspaper statement to coerce colonists 
into the union. Reid left, satisfied with the results of 
both meetings. "I think we made progress in handling our 
relations with the people on Dyess Farms," he wrote, “and 
that we can now make more progress."®4
To further set matters straight, Reid published 
Alexander's March 4 letter in the press. After this experi­
ence, however, he was determined to keep Dyess Colony out of 
the news as much as possible. During the coming weeks, news­
paper editors and reporters applied considerable pressure to 
regional information advisor George Wolf for news about Dyess, 
but he successfully stalled for time. "Reid is not in favor 
or any publicity for some time to come," Wolf wrote, "as we 
have not had time to accomplish anything worth mention­
ing."®^ Reporters could still go directly to the colony. 
"Fortunately," he commented, "the roads into the project are 
so bad that newspaper men don't drop by there lightly."®®
As for congressional inquiries, ESA policy was to "speak 
about Dyess only when spoken to" until project affairs had 
reached a more settled state.®7
64Ibid.
®5George Wolf to John Fischer, May 16, 1940, ibid.
66(3e o r g e  wolf to Nathan W. Robertson, April 11, 1940,
ibid.
67Jack H. Bryan to George Wolf, April 7, 1941, ibid.
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Some of the colonists, like Floyd Slayton, seemed to
have made a career out of dissent. In 1939, Slayton had
been one of the demonstrators who claimed they had been
charged e.ekorbitant land prices at the Osceola courthouse.®8
About that time, Kate Fulton of the Family Selection staff
reviewed Slayton's case and recommended he be evicted, but
no action was taken.69 After Funk and McGarvin's evictions
in 1940, he graduated to ringleader of the dissident faction
as both secretary of the STFU local and a member of the
advisory committee. Although Local Number 29 soon disbanded,
Slayton and four or five others kept up a running battle
70with FSA officials. Most of his clique were holders of 
old Dyess Colony deeds, and they claimed that Dyess Farms, 
Inc., had no right of control over the actions of such deed 
holders except to collect payments. They insisted they did 
not have to abide by the rules and regulations of the new 
management. In January, 1943, Slayton was behind a petition, 
with sixty-eight signatures, proposing the removal of the 
board of directors and the revision of Dyess Farms land
68See Arkansas Gazette. March 18, 1939.
69Homer N. Hall, to A. M. Rogers, January 3, 1942,
R. G. 96, National Archives.
^8See, for example, Floyd Slayton to Brice M. Mace, 
Jr., October 15, 1940, ibid.
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purchase contracts.71 "Mr. Slayton's record here shows that 
he has not cooperated with the organization at any time and 
that he has gone out of his way to cause dissatisfaction 
among other members," community manager Homer N. Hall wrote 
in 1943. "So long as he and his four or five buddies are 
permitted to carry on as they are now doing, it will not be 
possible for us to put the program over as it must be put 
over." With people like Slayton, Hall believed, the FSA had 
reached an impasse; it was either Slayton or the colony.
"This whole thing hinges on whether or not the Farm Security 
Administration is going to manage the operation of this Pro­
ject of have it operated by Floyd Slayton, Dewey Smothers,
W. M. Hodnett and two or three others." "I think the exis­
tence of this Project depends on the elimination of this 
bunch."72 in 1943 and 1944, the FSA took a number of colo­
nists, including Slayton, to court on eviction suits and won; 
but as late as 1945, there was still a group at Dyess who
71Homer N. Hall to A. M. Rogers, January 3, 1943, with 
enclosed copy of Petition for Call of Meeting, signed by 
sixty-eight people, ibid. Yet when a group of twenty-four 
persons signed a letter to the Arkansas congressional dele­
gation in March, 1942, defending the FSA's management of 
Dyess, there was Slayton's name along with the others. To 
the Honorable Senators and Congressmen from Arkansas, dated 
March 23, 1942, ibid.; Ray D. Johnston to E. B. Whitaker, 
April 0, 1942. ibid.
7^see Homer N. Hall to T. B. Fatherree, November. 15, 
1943, ibid.; Hall to A. M. Rogers, January 3, 1943, ibid.
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were trying to form another STFU local.
Even after allowing for the trouble-makers, no one 
can overlook the possibility that many colonists complained 
because they had something worth complaining about. In 
January, 1944, just before liquidating Dyess, regional 
director A. D. Stewart, Reid's successor, admitted that 
"Many of the claims of unfair treatment of Dyess farmers 
arising from conditions existing prior to 1940 . . . are 
j u s t i f i e d . "74 WPA purchase contracts, he said, were not only 
unfair but against the principles of sound agricultural 
planning. The units were too small for a cotton economy, he 
pointed out, and they cost toommuch. When the FSA took over, 
the new management had to enlarge and reorganize the units 
and, "in an effort to adjust the unreasonable contracts they 
had signed," offered colonists additional land at an average 
of ten dollars an acre. In addition, the FSA marked off the 
greater part of the indebtedness charged against farmers 
prior to 1940. But the correction of past mistakes in turn 
created new problems. "From this reorganization," Stewart 
said, "has come much discontent and controversy because of 
the lack of understanding by the farmers of what we were
7^David Burgess, Memorandum to H. L. Mitchell, May 21, 
1945, Southern Tenant Farmers1 Union Papers, Box 47, univer­
sity of North Carolina Library, Chapel Hill, North Carolina.
74Arkansas Gazette, January 9, 1944; A. D. Stewart 
to Floyd Sharp, January 22, 1944, R. G. 96, National 
Archives.
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attempting to do." Some did not understand, for example, 
why they had to turn in their old contracts in exchange for 
new ones. "Not understanding that they are bound by the old 
purchase contract, no matter how unfair, until they relin­
quish it and sign a new document, some farmers have refused 
to meetfi this request and for this reason have yet to receive 
their deeds."75
Stewart did not say the former management had been 
unreasonable, but he did stress that "because of the neces­
sity for changing plans[,] some claims of unfair treatment 
by occupants were probably j u s t i f i e d . "76 consider, for 
example, the case of a hypothetical farmer who came to Dyess 
in 1934 and lived through every change in management down to 
liquidation in 1944. When he first arrived, he expected to 
have a chance to purchase his own farm. He did indeed get a 
tract of uncleared land and a new home, but he had to wait 
two years, until 1936, before he knew the exact terms he was 
offered. He also had to go through a two-year probationary 
period in order to qualify for a purchase contract. But even 
after he finished his second year at Dyess, there was still 
no contract. Dyess Colony, Inc., did not issue any sales 
contracts until after the lapse of three years, in 1937. As
7^Arkansas Gazette, January 9, 1944? see John L. 
McClellan to C. B. Baldwin, July 10, 1943, R. G. 96, National 
Archives.
  76a . Stewart to Floyd Sharp, January 22, 1944,
ibid.
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farmers began finding out how much they had been charged, 
unrest broke into the open7 but our hypothetical farmer, let 
us say, along with about 200 others, did receive contracts. 
Then, in 1940, the FSA took control of management, changed 
the program substantially, and announced that all old deeds 
would have to be canceled and new ones issued. Almost as 
soon as this change had been made, Dyess Colony went into 
liuqidation, and his new sales contract had to be exchanged 
again— this time for a deed and mortgage. But at last, he 
did have a deed to his farm. He had a deed, that is, if he 
had not already been evicted as a trouble-maker. "Plans for 
the sale of units changing at different intervals during the 
operation have caused some of the occupants who talked to 
me," Stewart said, "to lose faith in any person offering 
proposals and to lose faith in all proposals for the final 
liquidation of this Project."77
When the Farm Security Administration started liqui­
dating the resettlement projects in 1943, Dyess had still 
not completed its reorganization program. .A large number of 
families, highly dissatisfied with the new sales contracts, 
had simply refused to complete negotiations with Dyess Farms 
for the purchase and repair of their units. At the time of 
liquidation, Dyess Farms had executed only about 125 new con­
tracts, while seventy-five units were still occupied under
77Ibid.
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contracts entered into with Dyess Colony, Inc., and the re­
maining 100 or so units were under annual leases.^8 After 
several tries and much delay, the Farm Security Administra­
tion worked out a plan for the liquidation of Dyess colony 
that would satisfy all project residents. "Each worthy and 
eligible occupant now living at the farms," Stewart promised, 
"will be given an opportunity to buy his unit at a price 
reasonable to him and fair to the government.”79 The board 
of directors of Dyess Farms, Inc., stressed the desire of 
resident families to secure deeds to their farms immediately. 
On the other hand, the board refused to consideraa plan in 
which Dyess Rural Rehabilitation Corporation would deliver 
deeds to the residents and insisted on dealing directly with 
the government.80 On Juhe 16, 1944, Dyess Farms held a 
special business meeting, and about 120 members approved a 
plan of liquidation. Many of the colonists who were under 
eviction suits attended, and they raised no objection. The 
members passed every required resolution without a dissenting 
vote? it was the first time everyone at Dyess had been able 
to agree on anything for years.8^
7Qw. T. Frazier, Memorandum to Frank Hancock, March 
24, 1944, ibid.
7^Arkansas Gazette, January 9, 1944.
80W. T. Frazier, Memorandum to Frank Hancock, March 24, 
1944, R. G. 96, National Archives.
81a . D. Stewart to C. Stott Noble, June 21, 1944,
ibid.
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Thus, on June 17, Dyess Rural Rehabilitation Corpora­
tion transferred title to the colony's 13,711 acres of farm 
land to Dyess Farms, Inc., waiving the payment of $650,000 
provided for in the "Agreement of Sale" of April 2, 1941.8^ 
Then Dyess Farms canceled all purchase contracts and deeds, 
gave each family a note, deed, and mortgage to their units, 
and sold the family farm units occupied under rental con­
tracts to applicants eligible for farm ownership under the 
terms of the Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act. The united 
States government took a mortgage on the land and arranged 
to make all collections from purchasers without the help of 
either Dyess RR Corporation or Dyess Farms. Next, the Farm 
Security Administration amended the loan agreement of June 
29, 1940, so that, as part of the final arrangement, Dyess 
Farms could make improvement loans to individual purchasers 
of farm units. No loan could exceed $1,000 unless it was 
personally approved by the regional director. Each farmer's 
note and mortgage would include the amount of the improve­
ment loan if any were made. Since most of its $872,820 loan 
was still unspent, Dyess Farms refunded all excess loan funds 
not previously used for repairs and not needed for improve­
ment loans. The refund came to about $325,000. The coopera­
tive association agreed to convey all of its assets— real
8^Agreement of Transfer between the Dyess Rural 
Rehabilitation Corporation and the Dyess Farms, Inc., 
September 30, 1945, ibid.
estate, notes, mortgages, and other property— to the govern­
ment upon request.83 By October, 1944, Dyess Farms had 
converted to deed and mortgage 220 FSA purchase contracts 
and fifty-six old Dyess Colony deeds, leaving only thirty- 
two units still unsold.84
After disposing of individual farm units, Dyess RR 
Corporation still owned the community center, a village of 
about forty-five buildings, and 2,596 acres of undeveloped 
land. In 1945, the corporation began disposing of most of 
its surplus property. The Dyess Health Association paid 
$1,200 for the hospital building and the block on which it 
stood. The Dyess Cooperative Gin Association bought the gin 
building and machinery for $22,500, and the Cooperative Store 
Association paid $5,000 for the store building and lot. The 
Arkansas Power and Light Company purchased the electric power 
distribution system and began furnishing power to the pro­
ject. 85 in November, 1945, Dyess Rural Rehabilitation 
Corporation opened bids on the remainder of the community
83a . stewart to Frank Hancock, February 12, 1944, 
ibid.; Robert H. Shields, Memorandum to Hancock, April 4, 
1944, ibid.; Hancock to Stewart, April 5, 1944, ibid.
84Dyess Colony, Memorandum by A. W. Palmer, October 
9, 1944, ibid.
83Dillard B. Lasseter, Memorandum to E. B. Whitaker, 
July 26, 1946, ibid.; Dyess Cooperative Gin Association, 
Annual Report For Fiscal Year Ending February 28,11946, ibid. 
E. B. Whitaker, Memorandum to Lasseter, March 1, 1945, ibid. ? 
Whitaker to J. W. Fulbright, March 1, 1946, ibid.
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center buildings and land. Lee Wilson and Company, which 
had sold a considerable part of the original project land to 
W. R. Dyess, submitted the highest bid of $50,100 cash for 
the community village as a unit; but the regional office 
rejected the offer as they thought a much better price could 
be obtained through negotiations. On the second round, Lee 
Wilson was high again with a bid of $60,000, and again he 
was rejected. By this time, some of the families who had 
bought farm units had objected that the purchase of the 
entire village by one large commercial organization would 
depreciate the value of their small holdings. Conceding their 
point, the regional office then sold the community center 
piecemeal. By March, 1946, the Dyess school district, 
churches, and ten individuals together had purchased nineteen 
structures and seven vacant lots for $26,206.00; twenty-two 
houses, the administration building and community building, 
three warehouses, and seventeen vacant lots were still on 
the m a r k e t . O n  May 7, 1948, a notice appeared in the 
Lepanto, Arkansas, News Record offering for sale 614 acres 
of cut-over timberland, with no improvements and no cultiva­
tion; that was all that remained unsold of the Dyess project 
property.87
Prior to 1939, the Federal Emergency Relief Adminis-
86ibid.« Thirty-four People to Bill Fulbright, March 
5, 1946, ibid.
87]ffews Record (Lepanto, Arkansas), May 7, 1948.
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tration granted Dyess colony a total of $3,396/250.00. With 
these funds, W. R. Dyess spent $136,994,48 for land, invested 
$982,284.11 in farm buildings, and built a community center 
for $265,123.81. From 1934 to September 1946, Dyess colony 
suffered a net loss from all sources totaling $1,364,890.59. 
Down to 1939, Dyess Colony, Inc., had.built up a deficit of 
$811,546.91, while Dyess RR Corporation lost $553,343.68 
from 1939 to 1945. In. addition, the colony wrote off 
$252,149.35 through debt adjustment.8® After 1940, Dyess RR 
Corporation gradually decreased operations because of the 
transfer of the farm units to Dyess Farms, Inc., and the 
store, gin, and hospital to other cooperative associations. 
Somewhat more successful, Dyess Farms operated at a profit 
of $11,423.12 in 1941, but suffered a loss of $2,981.21 in 
1942, and then went into liquidation. ® 8
After 1946, the Farmers Home Administration, successor 
to the FSA's successor, took responsibility for liquidating 
the resettlement program. At Dyess, the FSA had not left 
much to do. In 1951, both the Dyess Rural Rehabilitation
®8Audit Report, Dyess Rural Rehabilitation Corpora­
tion, Dyess, Mississippi County, Arkansas, For the Period 
March 22, 1939 to September 30, 1945, R. G. 96, National 
Archives.
89Dyess Farms, Inc., Annual Financial Report, For the 
Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 1943, ibid.; Dyess Farms,
Inc., Annual Financial Report, For the Period October 22, 
1941 to December 31, 1941, ibid.; Dyess Farms, Inc., Annual 
Financial Report, For the Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 
1942, ibid.
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Corporation and Dyess Farms, Inc., turned their remaining 
assets back over to the parent agency of the Dyess project, 
the Arkansas Rural Rehabilitation Corporation, which still 
maintained a revolving trust fund under the supervision of 
the Secretary of Agriculture. Since all government mortgages 
against Dyess Farms had been paid in full, and Dyess RR 
Corporation had disposed of its property, the FHA's next 
step was the dissolution of the other two corporations.^  on 
June 27, 1951, the Dyess RR Corporation dissolved itself, an 
easy task because the corporation had only three stockholders 
who could easily meet and take the necessary steps for dis­
solution. The Farmers' Home Administration consistently 
maintained that all FSA cooperative associationsranudt be dis­
solved in order to comply with the congressional liquidation 
mandate. Yet for Dyess Farms, Inc., the matter was more 
difficult. According to Ray Johnston, who was then FHA 
county supervisor at Dyess, the current membership list had 
been lost out of the minute books. In any case, during the 
last years it had been difficult to obtain a quorum (twenty- 
five per cent of the members) at the annual membership 
meetings, and Johnston doubted that the necessary two-thirds
90o . N. Spring, Memorandum to D. B. Lasseter, April 
23, 1948, ibid.? Minutes of Annual Meeting of Board of 
Directors of Dyess Rural Rehabilitation Corporation, held 
June 1, 1951, ibid.y J. V . Highful, Memorandum to Lasseter, 
August 16, 1951, ibid.? Spring to Highfull, October 9, 1951, 
ibid.? Highful, Memorandum to Lasseter, January 17, 1952, 
ibid.
would show up for a meeting that held little importance for 
them. Dyess Farms, however, was for all practical purposes 
already dissolved. It had no debts and no assets, and its 
membership no longer carried on any business as an organiza­
tion. In 1951, the Farmers Home Administration simply 
closed its files on Dyess Farms, Inc., and on Dyess Colony.
9-*-Dan P. Chisholm to J. V. Highful, April 24, .1952, 
ibid.; Highful to D. B. Lasseter, April 28. 1952, ibid . 7 
Lasseter, Memorandum to Highful, March 15, 1952, ibid.
CHAPTER VI
THE RESETTLEMENT ADMINISTRATION IN REGION SIX
The main highway leading through Plum Bayou was a 
solid line of cars. At project headquarters, a large crowd 
assembled in front of a temporary stage made of unpainted . 
lumber. It was Friday, November 20, 1936. The Resettlement 
Administration had invited the public to the ceremonies offi­
cially dedicating Plum Bayou, near Wright, Arkansas, the 
first RA resettlement project in the nation to be so honored. 
After working all summer, the Construction Division had five 
homesteads ready for occupancy and over ninety other houses 
in various phases of construction. Regional director T. Roy 
Reid, acting as master of ceremonies, introduced the pro­
ject's special guests: Secretary of Agriculture Henry A.
Wallace, Resettlement Administrator Rexford G. Tugwell, 
assistant administrator Will W. Alexander, and AAA Director 
Howard R. Tolley. Representing Arkansas were Senators Joseph 
T. Robinson and Hattie W. Caraway, Congressman John L. . 
McClellan, Governor J. M. Futrell, and Governor-elect Carl 
E. Bailey. Most of the guests made brief speeches. . "I want 
businessmen to see this experiment in farmstead operation," 
Wallace said, so they will be "convinced that thousands of
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houses like this one [referring to the nearest homestead] 
can be built and thousands of farms like this sold on a 
business basis as a paying proposition." "People who live 
in the country," Tugwe11 remarked, "have a right to security 
of possession that is beyond question, to an income suf­
ficient for a decent standard of living, to rear healthy 
families." The first three families selected for Plum Bayou 
were present to accept the keys to their homes. "These are 
not keys to houses— " Tugwell told them, "they are keys to 
the future." Each farmer, alone or with his family, crossed 
the stage and accepted his keys from Tugwell: "I sure do
thank you." Although much more remained to be done, Reid's 
organization had already invested months of work in Plum 
Bayou.̂
The Resettlement Administration followed one basic 
pattern in developing all resettlement projects. Tugwell 
delegated his regional directors authority to select land 
for resettlement purposes, although he himself made the final 
decision on all proposals.^ In other words, Reid was respon­
sible for exploring resettlement possibilities in Region Six 
and recommending specific projects to Washington. After
^Arkansas Gazette (Little Rock), November 21, 1936.
See Arkansas Gazette. November 8 , November 15, 1936. Daily 
Graphic (Pine Bluff), November 20, November 21, 1936.
2Rexford G. Tugwell to Theodore G. Bilbo, July 1,
1936, Record Group 96, Records of the Farmers Home Adminis­
tration, National Archives (to be cited hereafter as R. G.
96, National Archives).
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receiving approval for a project, Reid had to purchase and 
develop the land, construct the homesteads, and select the 
families to occupy the farm units. He organized the project 
families into a cooperative association, a legal device to 
enable the project to borrow federal funds and carry on 
certain cooperative activities. The typical resettlement 
project contained a community center, cooperative store, 
cooperative gin, and perhaps a school. Finally, Reid brought 
in a community manager, farm advisor, and home management 
supervisor to take charge of the project's operations on a 
day-to-day basis.^
Reid drew on every available resource, both inside 
and outside his organization, for help in locating land 
suitable for resettlement purposes. E. B. Whitaker (resettle­
ment director), B. M. Gile (land use director), and Reid 
himself all possessed a vast knowledge of agriculture, land, 
and land values in Region Six. The Regional Land Use Com­
mittee and the State Land Use Committees located and approved 
possible resettlement areas. To help with this task, Reid 
also sought the advice of the land grant colleges, agricul­
tural extension services, and essperiment stations of the
3paul K. Conkin, Tomorrow a New World: The New Deal
Community Program (Ithaca, N. Y., 1959), 168; Joseph W. Eaton, 
Exploring Tomorrow1s Agriculture (New York, 1943), 87-93.
180
respective states.^ in addition, he received many unsolic­
ited suggestions from individuals with land for sale and 
from groups wanting federal money spent in their community.
For example, Oscar Ameringer, socialist editor of the American 
Guardian (Oklahoma City), tried to sell the RA a 5,500-acre 
plantation in Louisiana which he described as "my personally 
conducted resettlement project . " 5 In 1936, a group of 
citizens of Attala County, Mississippi, complained to 
Senator Pat Harrison that the RA had not bought any land, in 
their county for some time; they wanted to sell the govern­
ment more land.® At the same time, other people voluntarily 
warned of fradulent schemes for selling worthless land to 
the government. In early 1936, Mississippi Senator Theodore 
G. Bilbo reported that "a lot of high powered real estate 
agents, racketeers, and lawyers bought from the state a lot 
of land [which had been forfeited for taxes] . . . all for 
the purpose of unloading this on the Federal Govern­
ment. . . . "^
^Resettlement Administration, Annual Report of Assis­
tant Regional Director, in Charge of Rural Resettlement [E.B. 
Whitaker], July 1, 1935 to December 31, R. G. 96, National 
Archives.
5T. Roy Reid to C. B. Baldwin, September 14, 1937, 
ibid.; Oscar Ameringer to Will W. Alexander, January 14, 1937, 
ibid.; Oscar Ameringer, "No Thoroughfare to Utopia," Reader* s 
Digest. XXXVII (July, 1940), 13-16.
®Pat Harrison to E. B. Whitaker, August 21, 1936, R. G. 
96, National Archives. See T. Roy Reid to Will W. Alexander, 
March 31, 1938, ibid.
7Theodore G. Bilbo to Rexford G. Tugwell, June 12,
1936, ibid.
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Once a general resettlement area was approved, 
Whitaker's job was to find and purchase suitable land. First, 
he sent out someone with a general knowledge of land values 
to canvass the area. This person, perhaps a county agent or 
the man designated project manager, located and took options 
on likely tracts of land owned by people wanting to sell . 8  
In some cases, Whitaker also issued a press release inviting 
tenders on. farm land, an announcement that both urban and 
small town newspapers would carry . 9  The Resettlement Admin­
istration did not engage in land speculation. Whitaker was 
anxious to buy land on a strictly competitive bases— the 
best land available for the lowest possible price. After the 
initial options were taken, Gile's Land Utilization Division 
undertook a thorough appraisal of the land and made its 
recommendation to the regional office, which then passed 
them on to Washington. The Resettlement Administration 
demanded that land meet certain standards of price, market 
value, and productivity. Whitaker wanted to buy productive 
farm land, land that was under cultivation, free from flood­
ing, and containing little timber. Ideally, he preferred 
land located near improved roads and power lines and 
accessible to schools, churches, towns, and markets. After
8Madison Journal (Tallulah, Louisiana), February 21, 
1936; Resettlement Administration, Annual Report of Assistant 
Regional Director, in Charge of Rural Resettlement, July 1, 
1935 to December 31, 1936, R. G. 96, National Archives.
9 See, for example Madison Journal, February 14, 1936.
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Gile submitted his appraisals, Whitaker usually took new 
options at the appraised value or less if possible .-*-0  
Finally, the Federal government actually paid for land only 
if the vendor could furnish a title acceptable to the United 
States Department of Justice.•*••*•
The Resettlement Administration purchased only the 
best land for the resettlement program. Whitaker was under 
no compulsion to settle for anything but the best since the 
Depression had knocked the bottom out from under land values 
all over the region. "Almost without exception," wrote 
Whitaker in 1936, "the land selected for resettlement pur­
poses has an average yield higher than the average yield of 
the basic crops in the community where the land is located. 
At the same time, the RA's policy was not to take advantage 
of any landowner in distress. Whitaker was careful not to 
force anyone to sell his property; he purchased land only 
from those who really wanted to sell .-*-3 But he did take 
advantage of certain conditions created by the Depression.
^Resettlement Administration, Annual Report of 
Assistant Regional Director, in Charge of Rural Resettlement, 
July 1, 1935 to December 31, 1936, R. G. 96, National 
Archives; Madison Journal, February 14, August 21, 1936.
B. Whitaker to Will M. Whittington, February 25, 
1937, R. G. 96, National Archives.
12Resettlement Administration, Annual Report of 
Assistant Regional Director, in Charge of Rural Resettle­
ment, July 1, 1935 to December 21, 1936, ijaid.
^Madison Journal, August 21, 1936.
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As he explained:
It was the exception, rather than the rule, if such 
land was not owned by an absentee landowner. A 
number of larger tracts were bought from banks or 
insurance companies in the process of liquidation, 
and the fact that the national government was in a 
position to pay one hundred percent cash made the 
Resettlement Administration a very desirable pur­
chaser of the tracts in question. This enabled us 
to buy land at a much lower cash price than the 
same land would have sold for to a private concern 
where from fifty to seventy-five percent of the 
purchase price would have been deferred.14
In Region Six, the Resettlement Administration purchased 
194,481,934 acres of land for resettlement, a total invest­
ment of $4,823,927.92. Overall, Whitaker paid an average of 
$24.80 per acre. The lowest priced land bought was in 
Arkansas ($21.55 per acre), while the cost of land in 
Louisiana ($28.00) and Mississippi ($28.57) was somewhat 
higher.
Each resettlement project involved painstaking plan­
ning and months of work from conception to authorization, 
construction, and finally completion. After locating land 
for a possible resettlement project, Whitaker and Reid sub­
mitted a preliminary proposal to Washington showing that the 
project had enough merit to warrant the expenditure of time
^Resettlement Administration, Annual Report of 
Assistant Regional Director, in Charge of Rural Resettlement, 
July 1, 1935 to December 31, 1936, R. G. 96, National 
Archives.
15u. S. Department of Agriculture, Farm Security Ad­
ministration, "Resettlement Projects, Land and Source of 
Acquisition, Also Status of Unit Development, Vendor, Acre­
age and Number of Units Developed or Undeveloped, Region 
Six, " January 1, 1941, mimeographed, ibid.
and money needed to prepare a "project plan." The assistant 
administrator checked the proposal and, if he approved, 
authorized a detailed study made of the project and released 
allotments for that purpose. Only then could Whitaker begin 
taking options on the necessary land. In the project plan, 
Whitaker in effect had to present a justification of the pro­
ject, demonstrating the need for it and giving full details 
on everything involved in its development: would it need a
cooperative store, a gin, or a school? What crops could be 
grown profitably? Did local landbwners and businessmen 
favor the idea of a project? What were the estimated costs 
of land, of construction, and of administrating the project? 
Then Reid submitted the project plan to Tugwell, who checked 
it for feasibility, soundness, legality, and availability of 
funds. If satisfied, he authorized the construction of the 
project. The regional office then went ahead with pur­
chasing the land and drawing up construction plans, specifi­
cations, and maps for a final check by the Washington office. 
Tugwell reviewed the plans a last time to compare them with 
budget estimates. After receiving word of final approval, 
Whitaker immediately went ahead with building the homesteads, 
dividing the land into individual farm units, and selecting 
families.^-®
At first, the Resettlement Administration did all of
^Resettlement Administration, Administrative Order 
162 (Revision 1), July 8, 1936, ibid.
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its own construction work, using WPA labor and occasionally 
some of its own clients. But the Construction Division's 
building costs ran far beyond what low-income farmers could 
ever hope to repay. ^  After 1937, the Farm Security Adminis­
tration fought to hold construction costs to an absolute 
minimum. Farm Security Administrator Will W. Alexander 
placed a cost limitation of $1,300 on houses built in the 
South and, because of the harsher climate, $2,100 on houses 
built in the N o r t h . I n  1938, the FSA turned all construc­
tion over to private contractors who could build houses more 
cheaply than the Construction Division. On community type 
projects in Region Six, private construction firms negotiated 
a single contract for building all necessary structures, 
with the FSA acting as consultant and architect.-*-8  On the 
farm tenant security projects or anywhere units were 
scattered, contractors had to make separate contracts for 
the construction of each homestead.
l^Henry A. Wallace to the President, March 19, 1937, 
Official File 1568, Box 2, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library,
Hyde Park, New York; Will M. Whittington to Will W. Alexander,
July 26, 1938, R. G. 96, National Archives.
lQNathan W. Robertson to Paul Wooton, March 1, 1939, 
ibid.; Conkin, Tomorrow a New World. 171.
1QC. B. Baldwin to Will M. Whittington, August 19,
1938, R. G. 96, National Archives; R. B. Lord to T. Roy 
Reid, April 5, 1939, ibid. See Resettlement Administration, 
Construction Division, Progress Report for Projects in Devel­
opment and Planning, Period July 1, 1936 to August 1, 1936, 
ibid.
20»fha [FSA] Helps Construction. 11 Construction News,
V (September 28, 1938) , 5, 6 ; C. B. Baldwin to Leonard Allen, 
November 24, 1937, R. G. 96, National Archives.
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To further keep costs down, the PSA. experimented with 
precutting and prefabrication building methods. Prefabrica­
tion was most successful where fifty or more houses were 
erected within a radius of about twenty-five miles. Setting 
up a small portable sawmill on the project and using a 
limited number of house plans, a construction crew cut all 
lumber to exact specifications and assembled as many parts 
as possible in this central shop. They completed entire 
sections: wall panels, gables, window and door casings, and
floor frames. Then the components were trucked to the build-
21ing sites and nailed together. Whitaker first tried pre­
fabrication in Arkansas and later Mississippi, but he never 
used it on a large s c a l e . ^ 2
The Farm Security Administration built about fifteen 
different types of houses in Region Six. All of them were 
conventional wood-frame structures stressing utility and 
simplicity. PSA architects eliminated all purely decorative 
features as well as every unnecessary gable, beam, and 
rafter. They standardized house plans as much as possible 
without making the various types look too much alike. Built
^Nathan W. Robertson to Paul Woo ton, March 1, 1939, 
ibid.; Farm Security Administration, Report of the Adminis­
trator of the Farm Security Administration. 1938 (Washington, 
1938) , 18, 19; Farm Security Administration, Report of the 
Administrator of the Farm Security Administration. 1940 
(Washington, 1940), 17-19.
22c. B. Baldwin to Pat Harrison, February 16, 1938,
R. G. 96, National Archives.
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on concrete piers, the typical resettlement home contained 
three to five bedrooms, living room, kitchen, built-in sink, 
shelving, pantry, and screened porch. Newspaper reporters 
generally described project houses as modern, comfortable, 
and convenient; but the structures did not measure up to all 
of these standards. The houses, for example, had no indoor 
plumbing, although each one had a storeroom designed for 
conversion into a bath when the family could afford it. The 
exterior of the houses was usually white, the interior 
finished in natural pine, with the kitchen painted enamel.
In addition to the dwelling, the average homestead unit 
included a barn, poultry house, outhouse, all necessary 
fencing, several acres of pasture, and about forty acres of 
farm land.23
While construction crews were at work, the regional 
office started looking for families to occupy the homestead 
units. The Community and Family Services Section of the 
Management Division was responsible for family selection.
Miss Kate Fulton (later Mrs. T. Roy Reid), regional chief of 
this section until 1941, sought families who could measure 
up to rather high standards. The Resettlement Administration 
could not afford to pick clients at random for its
3"FHA [FSA] Helps Construction.M Construction News.
V . (September. 28, 1938) , 5, 6 ; Report of the Administrator of
the Farm Security Administration. 1938,. p. 18; Report of the
Administrator of the Farm Security Administration. 1940. p.
19; Conkin, Tomorrow a New World, 170-73.
resettlement projects.2^ Families were eligible for reset­
tlement if they were low-income farm owners, farm tenants, 
sharecroppers, or farm laborers. No one without farming 
experience could even be considered, nor was anyone qualified 
who could obtain credit at reasonable terms from other Fed­
eral or private lending agencies. Candidates for resettle­
ment had to show evidence of initiative and ambition, have a 
reputation for paying their debts, and show promise of being 
able to repay the cost of their units. They had to be free 
from disease or other physical disabilities and pass a 
medical examination before final acceptance. The Resettle­
ment Administration preferred married couples with one to 
five or six children, a limitation imposed by the size of 
the homesteads. The head of each family had to be at least 
twenty-one years of age and under fifty. The RA and FSA did 
not discriminate on the basis of nationality, race, or creed, 
although both agencies stressed homogeneity, especially on 
community-type projects, to insure smooth relations among 
families living closely together.2^
The regional family services section and the community
24Madison Journal. February 26, 1937.
25Resettlement Administration, Administrative Order 
105 (Revision 3), September 25, 1936, mimeographed, R. G. 96, 
National Archives; Eaton, Exploring- Tomorrow's Agriculture. 
94-99 ? John B . Holt, An Analysis of Methods and Criteria 
Used in Selecting Families for Colonization Projects. Social 
Research Report No. 1 of the U. S . Department of Agriculture, 
Farm Security Administration, and the Bureau of Agricultural 
Economics (Washington, 1937), 6-15.
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managers worked closely together to select qualified fami­
lies. Applications would start pouring into the regional 
office as soon as Whitaker announced the purchase of resettle 
ment land? only in a few cases did the RA have a shortage of 
qualified families to choose from.ByuDfecember 31, 1940, 
the RA and FSA had received over 11,000 applications for 
some 2,700 farm units on resettlement projects.27 county 
extension agents, home demonstration agents, and district 
and county rural rehabilitation supervisors had recommended 
most of these families. On each resettlement project, the 
community manager organized a Family Selection committee, 
consisting of himself as chairman, the regional chief of the 
family services section, a project family selection special­
ist, and usually the home economist and the farm management 
specialist assigned to his project. The committee gave 
preliminary approval to families which seemed most qualified 
and enthusiastic about resettlement. The family selection 
specialist interviewed these families, visited their neigh­
bors, their landlord, the merchants they patronized, and the 
family physician, seeking their opinions as to the family's
26iphe most notable exceptions were Terrebonne and the 
Subsistence homestead projects in Mississippi. See Chapters 
III and VIII.
27community and Family Services Section, Annual Report 
January 1, 1940 to December 31, 1940, R. G. 96, National 
Archives: Farm Security Administration, Report of Family
Selection Applications, Acceptances, and Occupancies for 
Units on Projects as of July 1, 1942, dated August 20, 1942, 
ibid.
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chances for success in home ownership. After consulting 
with the family selection committee, the project manager sub­
mitted a list of names to Kate Fulton, who then reviewed 
each case and made the final decision. The committee ar­
ranged for the approved families to visit the project while 
it was under construction. The community manager had to 
make sure each family understood all of the responsibilities 
and obligations it would assume in becoming a member of the 
project. The family had one week after returning home to 
reach their final decision and to notify the community 
manager. If the answer was yes, he took care of moving their 
household goods to the project.28
The Community and Cooperative Services staff, headed 
by Claude Woolsey, handled the problems of legal organiza­
tion for the Resettlement Division in Region Six. Woolsey 
formed the typical resettlement project into a cooperative 
association . 2 9  Each association had its president and board 
of directors, sold capital stock to its members, and possessed 
authority to engage in all activities related to agricultural 
production. The articles of incorporation of Terrebonne 
Association, Inc., for example, authorized its members
^Resettlement Administration, Administrative Order 
105 (Revision 3), September 25, 1936, ibid.; Eaton,. Explor­
ing Tomorrow's Agriculture, 94, 95; Madison journal. Febru­
ary 26, 1936: Conkin. Tomorrow a New World. 186-88.
29claude Woolsey, interview with the author, January
19, 1968; Eaton. Exploring Tomorrow's Agriculture. 105-12;
Conkin, Tomorrow a. New World. 202-10.
191
To engage in any activity in connection with the 
producing, marketing, selling, harvesting, dairying, 
preserving, drying, processing, canning, packing, 
milling, ginning, compressing, storing, handling, or 
the utilization of any agricultural products produced 
by it or produced or delivered to it by its members; 
or the manufacturing or marketing of the by-products 
thereof? or in connection with the purchase, hiring or 
use by it or its members of supplies, machinery, or 
equipment? or the construction or maintenance of 
houses, barns, sheds, or facilities or its use or the 
use of its members? or in connection with performing 
or purchasing services of an economic or educational 
nature to its members.30
Arkansas and Mississippi already had suitable laws regulating
the formation of cooperatives? but in Louisiana, Woolsey
used a statute governing business corporations until the
state legislature passed an agricultural cooperative law in
1939.31
The cooperative association was primarily a device to 
simplify certain administrative problems on resettlement 
projects. The Resettlement Administration leased to the 
association all project land, houses, community buildings, 
schools, stores, gins, and other community facilities. This 
move allowed the project residents themselves to collect 
rent, maintain and repair buildings, and eventually to manage 
the project. Without the association, the RA would have had
30»Articles of Association of Terrebonne Association, 
Inc.," dated November 8 , 1938, Secretary of State's Office, 
State Capitol, Baton Rouge, Louisiana.
31woolsey interview? Mastin G. White, Memorandum for 
W. W. Alexander, September 26, 1938, R. G. 96, National 
Archives? see Conkin. Tomorrow a New World. 202-13, 215.
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to perform such administrative functions indefinitely. In 
addition, the association received a cooperative loan from 
the government to finance the construction of its homestead 
units and the purchase of necessary farm equipment. By 
loaning the money to the association, the RA made certain 
that development and operating funds would be available at 
allttimes? otherwise, it would have been necessary to go 
back to the United States Treasury every time money was 
needed for anything.22
The Resettlement Administration also dealt with pro­
ject residents through the cooperative associations. The 
head of each family was entitled to membership in the asso­
ciation and to one vote in all of its decisions. Project 
members served as presidents of the association and on its 
board of directors. On most projects, the families sub­
leased individual farm units from the association, not from 
the government itself. After a five-year trial period, each 
family entered into a sales contract with the association 
for purchasing their unit over forty years at three per cent 
interest. On cooperative projects like Terrebonne and Lake 
Dick, farmers had no promise of future ownership of indi­
vidual farms? instead, they worked as day laborers on land 
they all owned in common as members of the association. At
^Establishment of Community Organizations, Memorandum 
approved by the President on December 24, 1936, R. G. 96, 
National Archives; Walter E . Packard to all Regional 
Directors, n.d.. ibid.
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the end of the year, each farmer received a share of the 
profits based on the number of days he had contributed to 
working the association's l a n d . 33
Ultimately, the cooperative associations were to serve 
as the instrument through which projects could become self- 
governing. Under the articles of incorporation,tthe.board 
of directors possessed broad authority to conduct the pro­
ject's business activities. Subject to approval by the 
general membership, the board of directors could select the 
farm manager, determine management policies, authorize budgets, 
set membership requirements, admit new members, and control 
the terms of contracts with its members. But the principle 
of democratic control came into conflict with the need for 
guaranteeing the government' s investment. Thus the RA. and 
FSA, under the provisions of their loan agreement with each 
association, insured the government complete power of con­
trol and veto. The RA-ESA staff on each project exercised 
ejffctive control over the association and over the entire 
project. The regional office appointed the community or pro­
ject manager whose duties were to supervise the work of the 
project staff and to oversee all project activities. Since 
the government paid the salaries of the farm manager, who 
directed day-to-day farm operations, and the project account­
ant, they were for all practical purposes FSA employees,
33yjroolsey interview? E. B. Whitaker, interview with 
the author, January 19, 1968.
194
although both were responsible to the association under the 
terms of the articles of incorporation. In addition, the FSA 
approved all project budgets and controlled every expendi­
ture made by the association from daily wages to dividend 
payments. No change in the articles of incorporation could 
be made without prior permission of the regional office, nor 
could any member be expelled from the project unless the 
government agreed that such action was justified.^4
In addition to the cooperative associations, the 
Resettlement Administration formed subsidiary cooperatives 
to carry on certain specialized tasks. The RA, wrote 
Whitaker, encouraged each farmer "to cooperate with his 
neighbors in owning grain binders, grain separators, trac­
tors, grist mills, blacksmith shops, sweet potato curing 
houses, cooperative stores, cooperative gins . . . and other 
such cooperative activities where the participation of the 
whole community is desirable for the success of the under­
taking . " 3 5  The typical community type project would also 
have a livestock improvement association and several kinds 
of marketing associations.*^ The RA and FSA did not
34Eaton,,Exploring Tomorrow1s Agriculture, 105-13.
35Resettlement Administration, Annual Report of 
Assistant Regional Director, in Charge of Rural Resettle­
ment, July 1, 1935 to December 31, 1936, R. G. 96, National 
Archives.
3®See Farm Security Administration, "Resettlement Pro­
jects," ibid. See J. T. Holliday to G. E. Lukas, April 30, 
1940, ibid.; Shelby Thompson to Frank J. Welch, February 10, 
1942, ibid.
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completely avoid aid to cooperatives that competed with 
private business, nor did they want to force local merchants 
into bankruptcy. Ideally, a project would be justified in 
operating a cooperative store or gin if these services were 
not available nearby.3^
Since poor health was one of the major handicaps of 
many low-income farm families, the Resettlement Administra­
tion also developed medical-care cooperatives which provided 
its clients with a kind of health insurance. Each family 
made a fixed annual payment, usually about twenty-five 
dollars, to a trustee who divided the money into twelve parts, 
one for each month of the year. In case of illness, the 
family could go to any local physician participating in the 
program; and the physician sent his bills each month to the 
trustee. . If the amount on hand was not enoughtto pay all 
bills in full (which was usually the case) , each physician 
received his pro rata share. Even so, this was more than 
they might have received otherwise . 3 8
The purpose of cooperatives was primarily to give 
small farmers the advantages that size conferred on large- 
scale operators. Their use did not represent either a loss 
of faith in individualism and private property or an attempt
3^Rexford G. Tugwell to T. Roy Reid, May 8 , 1936, ibid.
38Report of the Administrator of the Farm Security 
Administration, 1940, p. 21-24; Richard Heilman, "The 
Farmers Try Group Medicine," Harper1 s Magazine. CLXXXII 
(December, 11940), 72-80.
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to rebuild society with collectivist values. On the con­
trary, the Resettlement and Farm Security Administrations in 
Region Six worked hard at encouraging individual effort in 
the resettlement program. Farmers owned their own cows, 
chickens, workstock, and all farm implements that a family- 
size farm would justify them in owning. Above all, they had 
a chance to own their own farms and their own homes. Yet 
cooperative enterprises played an important role on every 
resettlement project. According to the FSA annual report of 
1938:
Large-scale farms that can use highly mechanized 
operation methods have, in some areas, become a 
serious threat to the small, family-sized farm 
enterprise. The small farm, for example, may not 
be large enough to justify the use of a tractor or 
other heavy machinery. If a number of small farmers 
band together, however, they can take advantage of 
these modern, large-scale methods, and at the same 
time preserve the traditional values of independent 
farm ownership.39
Since this banding together took the form of cooperative 
organization, there was no contradiction in pursuing indi­
vidualistic ends with cooperative means.
The Resettlement Administration's stress on coopera­
tive enterprises was not a. sudden or spectacular change in 
Southern agriculture. More than a half century before the 
New Deal, the Grangers had experimented with cooperative 
shipping associations, cooperative fire insurance companies,
3gReport of the Administrator of the Farm Security 
Administration. 1939 (Washington, 1939), 17.
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and especially cooperative stores patterned after those of 
the English Rochdale societies. After World War I, many 
farm leaders saw cooperative action as a means of alleviating 
the effects of the agricultural depression without involving 
direct government action. In 1920, the American Farm Bureau 
Federation launched a campaign to encourage cooperative 
handling and selling of farm products. The Capper-Volstead 
Act of 1922 defined the legal status of farm cooperatives 
and exempted them from antitrust laws. In 1929, President 
Herbert Hoover sponsored the Agricultural Marketing Act 
which set up a Federal Farm Board to administer a 
$500,000,000 revolving fund for encouraging agricultural 
cooperatives. Essentially, cooperatives were a businesslike 
approach to increasing farmers' bargaining power in the 
competitive market place.^0
The Resettlement Administration provided all projects 
with a staff of farm management and home economic super­
visors to teach low-income families the basic tools of 
successful farm living. With many settlers having less than 
a grade school education, resettlement projects took on the 
appearance of an adult education program. Through expert 
supervision, the Resettlement Administration sought to help
40gee Murray R. Benedict, Farm Policies of the United 
States. 1790-1950 (New York, 1953), 135, 136, 184, 237, 238, 
240,. 241?. George B. Tindall, The Emergence of the New South. 
1913-1945 (Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 1967), 116-21, 132, 133. 
See also Robert H. Montgomery, The Cooperative Pattern in 
Cotton (New York, 1929).
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families achieve a satisfactory standard of living and 
enable them to pay for their farms. No family was approved 
for a resettlement homestead unless they were willing to 
participate in the RA's farm and home management program. 
Eairly each year, RA advisors worked with client families pre­
paring plans and budgets for the next twelve months. The 
farm management plan called for a diversified farm program 
rather than a continuation of the South's one-crop system of 
agriculture. Cotton remained the cash crop on most projects, 
but each farmer also planted corn, soy beans, truck crops, 
and raised livestock. Each farm program also had to meet 
certain soil conservation requirements. During the growing 
season itself, farmers conferred with the parish or county 
rural rehabilitation supervisor on proper cultivation 
methods. 41
The wives followed a "live at home" program of produc­
ing as much of the family's needs as possible on the farm 
and reducing store purchases to a minimum. Since most farm 
tenants would not (or could not) cultivate gardens, their 
diets lacked essential foods. But in helping housewives 
plan the home budget for the year, home management super­
visors insisted that each family have a garden and can vege­
tables for the winter months. Farm wives also received 
instruction in sewing, sanitation and hygiene, and household
41^110 Perkins to T. Roy Reid, October 19, 1938, R.
G. 96, National Archivesy Perkins to Reid, November 15,
1938, ibid.
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and yard beautification.42 critics condemned this part of 
the resettlement program as paternalistic. This was indeed 
paternalism, admitted the Helena Record, "but paternalism 
is . . . required to bring the nation's less privileged 
citizens into new and better conditions. "43
For all resettlement families, the Resettlement and 
Farm Security Administrations tried to create a genuine sense 
of community life. All community and most infiltration type 
projects had a community center which provided the focus for 
social and educational activities. Stressing the need for 
recreation, the Resettlement Administration encouraged the 
use of community centers for dances, plays, musical programs, 
and an occasional movie. The Community and Family Services 
staff conducted a broad educational program for resettlement 
clients. Where necessary, the RA built school buildings and 
turned them over to local school boards for operation. Voca­
tional teachers arranged regular class work for adults in 
scientific agriculture, farm management, and cooperative 
organization. The resettlement program furnished vocational 
guidance for school drop-outs, helping them get into CCC 
camps, NYA projects, or trade schools. Religious denomina­
tions held services on many resettlement projects. At Dyess,
42Joyce Mullins, "Some Facts About Resettlement," 
Caldwell Watchman (Columbia, Louisiana), May 21, 1937; Rena
B. Maycock, "Home Economic Work in the Resettlement Adminis­
tration," Journal of Home Economics. XXVIII (October, 1936), 
560-62.
43nelena (Arkansas) Record. June 20, 1938.
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for example, the major denominations leased lots and erected 
church buildings; but on most community projects, Protestant 
groups formed a union church which clients could attend if 
they wished. In addition, the RA and FSA encouraged the 
observance of certain 11 special days" of project activity.
One of the most widely used in Region Six was Settlers' Day, 
an annual open house for an entire project. Resettlement 
families invited friends from outside the project, the com­
munity manager invited prominent people from nearby towns, 
and both clients and manager put the project on public dis­
play. Some projects sponsored a similar Neighborhood 
Training Days program lasting two or three days. If there 
were no established county or parish fair, resettlement 
families substituted a similar event known as Achievement 
Days. Such activities were an effective means of building 
good public relations while contributing to the educational 
and social progress of project f a m i l i e s .  44
From the beginning, the Resettlement Administration 
designed the resettlement program to be self-liquidating.
In other words, all cooperative associations would eventually 
pay back their development loans and take full responsibility 
for managing the project. No resettlement project was to 
remain permanently in government hands. But in 1943, before
44Qeorge wolf to John Fischer, November 18, 1939, R.
G. 96, National Archives; A. D. Stewart to C. B. Baldwin, 
November 10, 1941, ibid.; Community and Family Services Sec­
tion Annual Report, January 1, 1940 to December 31, 1940, 
ibid.
201
this process could run its course, Congress ordered the 
liquidation of the entire resettlement p r o g r a m . T h e  Farm 
Security Administration canceled its leases with all coopera­
tive associations and gave individual farm families a mortgage 
to their land and homestead. By 1945, the FSA had liquidated 
all of the resettlement projects; but most of the families 
who had participated in the program were at last securely on 
the road toward farm ownership.
The resettlement program operated on the assumption 
that society rather than the individual was primarily 
responsible for rural poverty. While relief of distress was 
indeed a goal, the RA and FSA placed major emphasis on 
solving the fundamental causes of distress, an objective 
with revolutionary potential. Yet what is most obvious 
about the resettlement program in Region Six is its cautious 
and, except for projects like Lake Dick and Terrebonne, 
traditional attack on the problems of the rural poor. The 
Resettlement Administration never intended to launch a whole­
sale movement to establish good, bad, and indifferent farm 
tenants on resettlement farms.^® Regional and Washington 
officials carefully checked every resettlement proposal for 
soundness and practicality. The regional office sent out 
agricultural experts to analyze each acre of land anyone
45conkin, Tomorrow A New World. Chapter IX.
^ Madison Journal. February 26, 1937.
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offered the government. Only farm families who had outstand­
ing qualifications could even be considered for membership 
in a resettlement project. The community and social services 
program undertook the tasks of giving low-income farm 
families a practical education in farm and home management. 
Project residents participated in cooperative enterprises, 
but they did so primarily as a means to an end. All but a 
few resettlement families in Region Six were working toward 




PLUM BAYOU AND CREW LAKE: BACK TO THE FAMILY FARM
The Resettlement Administration's program in Region 
Six included almost the full range of possibilities for 
resettlement projects. But since they all shared important 
similarities, it is possible to take a few typical projects 
and generalize about the entire resettlement program. Plum 
Bayou and Crew Lake illustrate two different approaches to 
resettling low-income farmers. Plum Bayou, Arkansas, was a 
community project, the type best adapted to the delta regions 
where large tracts of rich land could be purchased cheaply.
At Plum Bayou, the Resettlement Administration laid out 200 
farm units on contiguous tracts of land and formed a separate 
farm community. This pattern was used at Lake view, a Negro 
project in Arkansas, at Transylvania in Louisiana, at Richton 
in Mississippi, and elsewhere. The Louisiana Farm Tenant 
Security project, better known as Crew Lake, was an infiltra­
tion project, a more versatile type of resettlement (if less 
glamorous) that could be used in both delta and hill country 
where the land was neither rich nor available in large units. 
The Crew Lake tract itself was located in the Mississippi 
River delta, but the Resettlement Administration infiltrated
203
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or scattered half of the project's units all across the 
northern Louisiana hills. Arkansas and Mississippi repeated 
this pattern with their own farm tenant security projects 7 
in addition, Campbell Farms, Arkansas Valley Farms, Western 
Arkansas Valley Farms, Crowley's Ridge Farms, and Northwest 
Arkansas Farms were similarly organized.
Plum Bayou and Crew Lake also offer excellent examples 
of the resettlement program's stress on the family farm, in 
contrast to cooperative farming. Plum Bayou was a community 
project, but community did not mean collective. On both 
projects, settlers farmed their own units individually and 
looked forward to eventually owning them free and clear.
Plum Bayou and Crew Lake were not among the most successful 
projects financially in Region Six, but they did enable many 
clients to get their feet permanently back on the soil.
Neither project became the subject of controversy, at least 
none that made the papers. Plumb Bayou was not in the head­
lines as much as, for example, Lake Dick, a more exciting 
cooperative project in the same county? and Crew Lake was far 
quieter than Terrebonne, a controversial Louisiana cooperative.
•*TJ. S. Department of Agriculture, Farm Security Admin­
istration, "Resettlement Projects, Land and Source of 
Acquisition, Also Status of Unit Development, Vendor, Acre­
age and Number of units Developed or undeveloped, Region Six," 
January 1, 1941, mimeographed, Record Group 96, Records of 
the Farmers Home Administration, National Archives (to be 
cited hereafter as R. G. 96, National Archives); Resettlement 
Administration, "Project Description Book," March-December, 
1936, mimeographed, ibid.
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In sum, Plum Bayou and Crew Lake merely illustrate typical 
Resettlement Administration projects in Region Six.
I
The Resettlement Administration launched Plum Bayou 
at a time of growing unrest among sharecroppers and tenants 
in eastern Arkansas and of growing desire among Arkansans to 
see something done about tenancy. For Arkansas, in fact,
1936 was the year of the sharecropper. In January, the 
Southern Tenant Farmers' Union set up a tent colony near 
Parkin to give shelter to a group of tenant families (about 
100 people), all recently evicted from a Cross County planta­
tion for joining the union. The next month, Governor J. 
Marion Futrell visited Parkin, heard complaints of harasss- 
ment, and declared it ’’much ado about a very little.1'̂  In 
May and June, the STFU called a general strike, and 5,000 
croppers left the fields in eastern Arkansas. When land­
lords fought back with a reign of terror, the nation more 
than ever became aware of conditions among Arkansas tenants, 
but so did Arkansans themselves. "The latest trouble," the 
Pine Bluff Daily Graphic commented of the STFU strike,
"should be a lesson to the leaders of this state that unless 
they . . . take some remedial steps, a dangerous situation may 
a r i s e . E q u a l l y  distasteful was the bad publicity Arkansas
^Arkansas Gazette (Little Rock), February 29, 1936.
3Pailv Graphic (Pine Bluff), June 11, 1936.
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was getting in national publications.^ So in August,
Governor Futrell appointed a Farm Tenancy Commission to 
investigate all aspects of the tenancy problem. This move 
may have improved Arkansas' image somewhat, but it also 
reflected Futrell's growing concern with the tenancy system 
as a roadblock to economic progress in the South. Headed by 
Charles E. Palmer, a Texarkana newspaper publisher, the com­
mission got down to work in September, held sessions through­
out October and November, and turned out a preliminary report 
in December . 5
The Palmer commission apparently watched with interest 
the Resettlement Administration's work at Plum Bayou. In 
November, Palmer postponed a commission meeting for three 
days so that members could attend the project's dedication . 6  
A  month later, the commission released a summary of its con­
clusions, and they were remarkably similar £o what the RA was 
already doing at Plum Bayou. The Arkansas tenancy commission 
recommended a "new homestead policy" to give sharecroppers 
"the opportunity of f arm-homeeownership." The Federal and 
state government, they suggested, should "collaborate on 
making available to tenants land sufficiently productive to 
permit purchasers to pay for them over a long term at low
4 Ibid., June 18, 1936.
5Arkansas Gazette, August 16, 1936.
6 ibid., November 15, 1936; Daily Graphic. November 8 ,
1936.
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interest rates." Palmer described the report as "sane, com­
prehensive, feasible." If action were taken promptly, he 
predicted, it would "end all danger from socialist and com­
munist activities in rural sections." But without Plum 
Bayou's leadership, it is doubtful that such proposals as 
these would have ever been adopted. ̂
The Resettlement Administration made Plum Bayou its 
first resettlement project in Region Six. By laterl935, the 
Arkansas Rural Rehabilitation Corporation had successfully 
negotiated with the Deming Investment Company of Kansas City, 
Missouri,ffor the purchase of the Wright plantation in 
Jefferson County, Arkansas. Then in March, 1936, the Re­
settlement Administration' s regional office took over the 
corporation's activities and completed the purchase, paying 
$198,000 for 5,643.60 acres of fertile bottom land located 
between Little Rock and Pine Bluff, ten miles from England, 
on the northeast side of the Arkansas River.® According to 
the regional office, the Wright plantation "was the first 
tract of resettlement land in the United States bought and 
paid for by the RA. ” 9  For several years, the Arkansas state 
penitentiary had cultivated about 3,600 acres of the
7Arkansas Gazette. December 13, 1936.
8 Ibid«, February 15, 1936? Daily Graphic, February 15, 
1936, November 21, 1936.
%right Community Resettlement Project, n .d ., mimeo­
graphed, R. G. 96, National Archives; see Albert Maverick,
Jr., to John 0. Walker, October 11, 1937, ibid.
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plantation with convict labor. The rest of the land suffered 
from floods on the Arkansas River, but it was suitable for 
future drainage and development. In May, assistant regional 
director E. B. Whitaker purchased more land in the same 
vicinity with a view to expanding the Wright project. The 
Resettlement Administration acquired the Ferda plantation, 
1,880 acres, for $97,000, and the Morrow plantation, 1,240 
acres, for $54,000 both in Jefferson County . 1 0  In addition, 
Whitaker purchased several scattered tracts in Pulaski and 
Lonoke counties: a 120-acre tract for $5,100, a 260-acre
tract for $10,100, a 320-acre tract for $8,500, and a 390- 
acre tract for $12,800. This made a total of 9,853.60 acres 
purchased at a total cost of $386,000. After being enlarged, 
the Wright Community Resettlement project took the name of a 
lake left by an old channel of the Arkansas River— Plum 
Bayou . 1 1
The regional office began making plans for developing 
the Wright plantation while the Arkansas Rural Rehabilitation 
Corporation still held it under option. As both regional 
resettlement director and head of the Arkansas RR Corpora­
tion, E. B. Whitaker was in a perfect position to coordinate 
the activities of both agencies in launching the Wright
10Farm Security Administration, "Resettlement Pro­
jects#’,’ ibid.; Carl C. Taylor to T. Roy Reid, February 18, 
1936. ibid.
^F.arm Security Administration, "Resettlement Pro­
jects," ibid.
project. Between October, 1935, and January, 1936, Adminis­
trator Rexford G. Tugwell released two allotments totaling 
$205,000 to cover the cost of the land and the preparation 
of project plans. On December 23, 1935, Whitaker's prelimi­
nary plans for the Wright plantation won approval from 
Tugwell; and on February 12, 1936, Tugwell approved the final 
project plan with an estimated cost of $845,750 (however, 
not all anticipated costs were included at this time) , 1 2  
Whitaker proposed to establish 100 farmsteads averaging 
thirty-six acres each at an estimated net unit cost of 
$7,207.50. The regional office was to begin work on the 100 
homesteads without delay and to drain and clear the 2 , 0 0 0  
acres of low, wet land on which about fifty families could 
be resettled at a later date. As for community and coopera­
tive facilities, Whitaker planned a cotton gin, community 
center, cooperative store, and other facilities; but 
assistant administrator Carl C. Taylor recommended further 
study of their operation and justification before granting 
authorization. Since construction was to start that spring, 
there was no chance the project could begin full operations 
during the current (1936) crop year. Rather than let the 
land lie fallow and become infested with weeds or lose the
^Arkansas Gazette. February 15, 1936; Daily Graphic. 
February 15, 1936; Carl C. Taylor, Memorandum to Rexford G. 
Tugwell, February 12, 1936, R. G. 96, National Archives; Carl
C. Taylor to T. Roy Reid, February 18, 1936, ibid. See F. P. 
Bartlett to W. E. Packard, July 3, 1936, ibid.
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plantation's cotton base of 2 , 0 0 0  acres, the regional office 
proposed to operate 3,600 acres with relief labor until 
regular clients could take over in 1937.
By the time regional director T. Roy Reid made his 
first annual report in December, 1936, his organization had 
already put a year's work into Plum Bayou. On December 23, 
1935, the regional Architectural and Engineering staff dis­
patched a field survey party to the project. By May 1, 1936, 
the surveyors finished locating all boundaries, roads, 
bridges, drainage ditches, wells, and septic tanks and 
staking out the final unit subdivisions and all building 
foundations. Working with the Resettlement Division, the 
architects and engineers also drew up both the preliminary 
and final project plan books which Reid sent to Washington; 
in these, the regional office assembled information on the 
surrounding area (average annual rainfall, nearby towns and 
markets, etc.) as well as detailed maps, specifications, 
sketches, and cost estimates of all proposed work.^ During 
the same period, the Management Division made a study of 
social, economic, educational, health, and recreational 
phases of the project, worked out an agreement with local 
school officials for the project's use of their facilities,
13carl C. Taylor to T. Roy Reid, February 18, 1936,
ibid.
l^Report of Architectural and Engineering Staff, 
Region Six, Little Rock, July 1, 1935 to December 31, 1936, 
ibid.
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and formulated criteria for the selection of families. At 
the end of 1936, the family selection unit had investigated 
262 applicants, rejected 136, and approved forty-seven, with 
seventy-nine still p e n d i n g . I n  April, the Construction 
Division moved its crews to the plantation and began actual 
work on the homesteads themselves. According to a report 
made before they started, it would cost an estimated $358,000 
to build 100 units on the Wright plantation, and require 
214,800 man hours of work, and an average monthly employment 
of 215 men . - 1-6
The dedication of Plum Bayou on November 20 gave the 
public its first chance to see what the Resettlement Adminis­
tration had done. It was a big day for Plum Bayou and a 
milestone for the Resettlement Administration, since this 
was the first dedication of a resettlement project in the 
nation. The list of special platform guests left out few 
names of importance in New Deal agricultural programs or in 
Arkansas politics: Henry A. Wallace, Rexford G. Tugwell,
Will W. Alexander, AAA director Howard R. Tolley, BAE chief 
A. G. Black, assistant secretary of agriculture Paul H. 
Appleby, rural resettlement director Walter E. Packard, 
construction division director Prank G. Schmitt, T. Roy Reid,
ISManagement Division, News Letter, Region Six, July
1, 1935 to January 1, 1936. ibid.
-^Employment on Resettlement Administration Projects, 
February 18, 1936, ibid.; Resettlement Administration, Annual 
Report, Region Six, December 31, 1936, ibid.
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E. B. Whitaker, Senators Joe T. Robinson and Hattie W. Caraway, 
Governor J. Marion Futrell, Governor-elect Carl E. Bailey, 
Arkansas Democratic national committeeman Brooks Hays, Con­
gressmen John L. McClellan and D. D. Terry, Arkansas public 
utilities commission chairman P. A. Lasley, state bank com­
missioner Marion Wasson, and others. Plum Bayou's dedication 
was important enough for Little Rock and Memphis newspapers 
as well as the Associated Press and the United Press to send 
reporters. The general public showed genuine interest in 
Plum Bayou by attending in large numbers. Although no one 
made an accurate count of the crowd, its size may be guessed 
from the fact that the England, Arkansas, Kiwanis Club served 
500 dozen doughnuts and 150 pounds of coffee— perhaps enough
for 3,000 to 4,000 people, depending on how hungry they 
17were.x '
After the formal ceremony, chief construction engineer 
George Barton took the visitors on an inspection tour of the 
new farmsteads. "Come over and see the houses we're living 
in," one man gushed proudly. "Come over and see the new 
farm we have." So far, Barton's crews had completed only 
five of the proposed 100 homes. The new farmsteads were wood- 
frame structures emphasizing utility and economy? a newspaper
17Arkansas Gazette. November 21, 1936? Daily Graphic. 
November 21, 1936. For the publicity leading up to November 
20, see Arkansas Gazette. November 8 , 15, and 20? Daily 
Graphic. November 8 , 12, 20.
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reporter described them as "tasteful, simple, and distinc­
tive. They all came equipped with electrical wiring, 
plumbing, running water, and outdoor toilets, at least until 
septic tanks could be installed later. As yet, no grass oar 
shrubbery grew around the houses, although plans called for 
each house to be landscaped with native shrubs and trees.
Each farmstead, Barton told the visitors, would include a 
barn, cotton, poultry, and hog houses together with all 
necessary fencing. For water, Plum Bayou families would rely 
on individual wells equipped with gasoline pumps. In addi­
tion, each farmer would have an orchard and a small pasture 
for his stock. When construction crews finished in early 
1937, there would be thirty-nine four-room, fifty five-room, 
and eleven six-room houses on the former Wright plantation. 
For Plum Bayou, the Resettlement Administration's authorized 
farmstead cost (planning, land acquisition, and construction) 
totaled $739,151 or $7,392 per farmstead unit. Of the total 
authorized cost, construction costs alone amounted to
1 Q$512,842.75, which was an expensive $5,128 for each unit.
"These five homesteads that you see here are not for 
everyone,” Tugwell stressed in his speech. "They are only
^ Arkansas Gazette. November 15, November 21, 1936? 
Daily Graphic. November 21, 1936.
•^•^Wright Community Resettlement Project, n.d., 
mimeographed, R. G. 96, National Archives? Facts About Plum 
Bayou Farms, n.d., ibid.? Resettlement Administration, 
"Project Description Book," ibid.
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for the farm families who have proved their good intentions
20and have shown definite ability to succeed." At Plum 
Bayou, the Resettlement Administration offered opportunities 
specifically to young farm families? the age limit for heads 
of families was thirty-five years old or younger preferably, 
not the standard fifty years of age at most community-type 
projects. To qualify, farmers also had to have a background 
of 4-H Club, Smith-Hughes, or similar training in farm opera­
tion and management. The regional office chose the Plum 
Bayou settlers from families on rural rehabilitation rolls 
all over the state of Arkansas.21
Only three families had moved into their new homes at 
Plum Bayou before the formal dedication, but they were 
typical of the kind of people the Resettlement Administr- 
tion was looking for. At thirty-four, Joe F. Lackey was 
almost too old to qualify for Plum Bayou. But he "just kept 
after the Resettlement folks until they gave [me] a chance," 
he said of himself. During the 1920's he and his family 
spent seven lean years on a farm in Faulkner County, Arkansas, 
before giving up. He then got a job in a rice mill at 
DeWitt and later as a carpenter in Little Rock; but when 
his three children were old enough to help withtthe chores,
^ Arkansas Gazette, November 21, 1936.
^Wright Community Resettlement Project, n.d., mimeo­
graphed, R. G. 96, National Archives?. Daily Graphic. November 
8 , November 21, 1936; Arkansas Gazette, November 8 , 1936.
he turned back to the farm. Prior to coming to Plum Bayou, 
the Lackeys lived on the Case plantation, a RA rural reha­
bilitation project twenty miles south of Little Rock, and 
farmed fifty acres on a share-fcent basis. There they accumu­
lated workstock, livestock, feed to carry them through the 
winter, and 650 cans of fruits and vegetables. La Vaugh 
York, twenty-seven, and his wife, twenty, and their seven- 
month-old daughter, had also served an apprenticeship on the 
Case project where they rented a twenty-four acre tract.
They borrowed $461 to make a crop, paid it back, and raised 
enough food and feedstuff to make next year's crop. As 
rehabilitation clients, they acquired livestock, farm imple­
ments, and canned 175 quarts of fruits and vegetables. Born 
on an Indiana farm, York had struggled to get a high school 
education and One year of technical agricultural training.
Ira W. Counts was twenty-five years of age, his wife twenty- 
two, and Wilber, junior, about three. Counts was born and 
reared on a Lonoke County, Arkansas, farm, but became dis­
couraged and tried a job in a nearby town. In 1930, he 
decided to go back to farming; and with the RA's help, he 
had a better chance to succeed. 2 2
Plum Bayou quickly won the endorsement of the most 
important newspaper in Arkansas. "All who realize the pur­
pose of the Plum Bayou homesteads project, " the Arkansas
22Ibid., November 21, 1936.
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Gazette commented editorially, ”. . .  must hope for its com­
plete success." As the Gazette put it, that purpose was "to 
demonstrate the feasibility of land ownership by young 
farmers and young farm wives. . . ."23 Bu^ was it all too 
good to be true? Each separate farm, the editorial said, 
will make a pretty picture with its modern comfortable house 
and outbuildings,
. . . with its landscaping of native shrubs and trees, 
its orchard, its trim barn and cotton house and hog 
house and poultry house, and its flat fertile crop 
land stretching out beyond. Too pretty to last, 
might be the criticism of conservatives familiar with 
many unfortunately typical sections of rural Arkansas 
and the rural South. Wait, such a pessimist might say, 
until ranging stock has had its way with young shade 
trees and shrubbery, until hogs have rooted in that 
young orchard and insect pests taken their toll, until 
needed repairs to buildings have gone unmade for a year 
or two, and then see how pretty things will look.
The Gazette saw the hope of Plum Bayou in the kind of people
who could meet the RA's membership qualifications. "The RA
is giving its Plum Bayou clients high standards to live up
to," the paper said. “But it is selecting them shrewdly."
These farmers were "the best equipped in character, training,
and outlook. . . . ” What we want for Arkansas, the Gazette
said, was "more small farms whose owners can be proud of the
attractive and comfortable homes those farms support. " 2 4
The editor of the Pine Bluff Daily Graphic was another 
booster for Plum Bayou. "According to our way of thinking,"
2^Ibid., November 20, 1936.
24ibid.
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he wrote, "projects of this kind will do more for the county 
than any other effort put forth by the Roosevelt Administra­
tion." "This is one plan of the New Deal wherein the 
government will get back some of the money it is putting 
out." Such projects, he believed, should be encouraged 
because they will "eventually get us away from so-called 
relief projects.
On a visit to Plum Bayou and a neighboring project,
Lake Dick, in 1939, the Graphic editor talked with Dr. J. D.
Niven, landowner and "one of Jefferson county's best known
citizens^," Dr. Niven took his New Deal laced with Horatio
Alger and a dash of Abraham Lincoln. After listening to
Niven, the editor became even more strongly convinced that
his earlier support of Plum Bayou was corrects
Dr. Niven pointed out that the project [Plum Bayou] 
was yielding an influence for good. He related how 
a little girl came to his store a few weeks ago to 
buy some gOods. She lacked 41 cents having enough 
to pay the bill. He told the child he would credit 
her with the 41 cents but reminded her that her 
father [a resettlement client] owed him a bill of 
several years' standing. A few days later the 
child returned to the store, paid the 41 cents and 
part of the old bill. Since that time the father 
has paid the old account in full.
"That has shown me," Dr. Niven said, "the value 
of these resettlement projects. They are making men 
feel different. They are giving them renewed ambi­
tions, creating a desire to deal honestly with their 
fellow men and pointing a way to success and pros­
perity."
The editor put in the last words "If the government through 
these resettlement projects will . . . inculcate in the minds
25paily Graphic/ November 12, 1936.
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of the residents the principles of the Golden Rule in busi­
ness and in life as illustrated by Dr. Niven[,] the effort 
will stand for years to come as a memorial to the present 
administration.
With full operations beginning in the spring of 1937, 
the Resettlement Administration's next step was the develop­
ment of legal organization. Plum Bayou had two cooperative 
associations, not one as did most later community projects.27 
On March 2, 1937, the regional office incorporated the Plum 
Bayou Cooperative Association under the laws of Arkansas for 
a period of fifty years. According to its articles of 
incorporation, the Plum Bayou Cooperative Association could 
issue up to $500 worth of capital stock with a par value of 
one dollar per share. The stockholders consisted of indi­
vidual family heads at Plum Bayou, each buying five shares 
of stock but having only one vote. No stockholder was 
allowed to own more than five per cent of the capital stock 
of the association. The president of the first board of 
directors was Stanley W. Rhodes, newly appointed community 
manager at Plum Bayou. With one of its own employees as 
president, the Resettlement Administration could more easily
2 ®Ibid., February 22, 1939.
^Acting Regional Cooperative Specialist [?] to 
Assistant Regional Director [E. B. Whitaker], n.d., R. G. 96, 
National Archives; T. Roy Reid to Rexford G. Tugwell, n.d., 
ibid.; Edward Stone to J.O. Walker, May 27, 1937, ibid.; 
Plum Bayou Cooperative Association, Economic Justification, 
n.d., ibid.
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influence the board's decisions as well as guarantee the 
experience necessary for successful operation.28 on April 
9, 1937, regional officials set up a second cooperative 
association, the Plum Bayou Homestead Association, this one 
for a period of perpetual existence. The Plum Bayou Home­
stead Association was organized as a benevolent corporation 
rather than a business corporation as in the case of Plum 
Bayou Cooperative Association. Under this form of organiza­
tion, it could operate without issuing capital stock or
OQpaying dividends.
If Plum Bayou had followed the Resettlement Adminis­
tration's standard practice, the function of the Homestead 
Association would have been to borrow funds for development 
work, construct the individual farm units and all coopera­
tive facilities, lease the land and the improvements, then 
manage the project, while the Cooperative Association 
operated the necessary community and cooperative services. 
Plum Bayou, however, deviated from this pattern in small 
details. Since the Construction Division erected the home­
steads, the Plum Bayou Homestead Association had no loan, no
28By-Laws of the Plum Bayou Cooperative Association, 
n.d., ibid.; Audit Report, Plum Bayou Cooperative Associa­
tion, near England, Arkansas, For the Period March 2, 1937 
to June 30, 1938, ibid.; Articles of Incorporation of the 
Plum Bayou Cooperative Association, March 2, 1937, ibid.
2®Audit Report, Plum Bayou Homestead Association, 
Wright, Jefferson County, Arkansas, For the Period April 9, 
1937 to June 30, 1939, ibid.? Petition for the Incorporation 
of the Plum Bayou Homestead Association, April 16, 1937, ibid.
lease, and no part in the development of the Wright planta­
tion. Instead, the Resettlement Administration simply trans­
ferred the completed units to the Homestead Association, 
which became the "landlord organization" for the entire 
project. For example, the association's board of directors 
assumed responsibility for paying taxes, insurance premiums, 
repair and maintenance bills, and repaying all obligations 
due the Resettlement Administration and the Farm Security 
Administration. Eventually, Plum Bayou Homestead Association 
was to take over the government's title to the Plum Bayou
project.30
In addition, the Plum Bayou Homestead Association had 
the task of day-to-day management of the entire project, with 
the advice of the community manager. The association leased 
the farm units to individual clients, collected their rent, 
and passed it on to the Resettlement Administration. At 
Plum Bayou, each family paid rent on a share-crop basis: 
one-third of the corn and feed crops and one-fourth of the 
cotton and cotton seed, under the terms of the RA's flexible 
lease agreement, the actual payment would be lower in case of 
a poor crop year due to adverse weather or other unavoidable 
causes. After a five-year trial period, farmers who had 
proved their mettle became eligible to enter into a lease- 
and-purchase contract. Then they had forty years in which
3®see Ghhpter V.
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to pay the association for their farms. The association 
also appointed a manager who supervised farm operations.
Plum Bayou's farm management plan called for each farmer to 
plant thirteen acres of cotton, ten acres of corn, three 
acres of alfalfa, with five acres devoted to the farmstead 
itself, five acres to pasture, and the remaining acreage to 
truck and minor crops. As on all projects, the farm plan 
had its complement in the home management plan, a "live-at- 
home" program designed to cut expenses to the bone and insure 
that each farmer could meet his obligations. Plum Bayou 
subjected clients to close supervision? but most important, 
each Plum Bayou farmer worked a plot of land which he had 
hope of one day owning.3^
The two associations played separate but complemen­
tary roles in providing cooperative services for Plum Bayou 
farmers. On June 21, 1937, the Resettlement Administration 
made a $65,966.05 loan to the Plum Bayou Homestead Associa­
tion and a $32,095.00 loan to the Plum Bayou Cooperative 
Association . 3 2  The Homestead Association's loan went for 
construction of a store, warehouse, gin and cottonseed house, 
personnel house, feed and grist mills, repair shop, and
3 ^E. B. Whitaker to C. B. Baldwin, August 7, 1940,
R. G. 96, National Archives.
32Acting Regional Cooperative Specialist [?] to 
Assistant Regional Director [E. B. Whitaker], n.d., ibid.?
T. Roy Reid to Rexford G. Tugwell, n.d., ibid.; Edward Stone 
to J. 0. Walker, May 27, 1937, ibid.
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breeding barns. Then the association leased these facilities 
from the government and in turn subleased them to the Plum 
Bayou Cooperative Association. The Cooperative Association 
used its loan to operate these facilities. In reality, this 
association used the store, equipment, and other buildings 
for two years without signing a lease or without paying any 
rent for their use. At Plum Bayou, suchlleases were some­
times rather informal; apparently,, the Resettlement Adminis­
tration held the Homestead Association so tightly in its 
grip that at first an unwritten understanding was satisfac­
tory. But sooner or later, a formal arrangement had to 
supersede the informal one. On April 1, 1939, the Coopera­
tive Association signed a five-year lease with an option to
purchase.3^
The community and cooperative services existed for 
obvious purposes: to furnish members with facilities which
they could not own individually and to provide the benefits 
of bulk purchasing of certain items. Only in this way could 
the farm and home management programs actually succeed in 
making Plum Bayou self-sufficient. The Plum Bayou farmers 
ginned their cotton in their own gin and bought farm supplies 
at a store in which they owned an interest— all at cheaper 
prices than they could get if they had acted individually.
33pium Bayou Economic Justification, n.d., ibid.;
Audit Report, Plum Bayou Homestead Association, Wright, 
Jefferson County, Arkansas, For the Period April 9, 1937 to 
June 30, 1939, ibid.
223
They also had hope of a partial return on the money they 
spent in the form of patronage dividends. Rather than 
depend on outsiders, as members of the association they 
operated for themselves such cooperative enterprises as a 
livestock improvement service, feed and grist mills, and a 
syrup mill? and they cooperatively marketed all farm produce, 
from cotton to livestock. Eventually, the Cooperative 
Association added a meat curing plant and a potato curing 
house. An established farm community would already have 
such facilities; but in the work of community building, there 
was no time to wait on natural growth.^4
Plum Bayou farmers had one of the most elaborate com­
munity centers in Region Six, second only perhaps to the 
center at Dyess. Costing $85,000, the community center com­
plex included an eighty-by-one-hundred-foot gymnasium which 
doubled as an auditorium, a three-room home economics build­
ing, and a school building with seven twenty-two by thirty- 
foot rooms. The latter contained a library, conference 
rooms, and a vocational shpp. After construction was com­
plete, the Plum Bayou Homestead Association turned the school 
over to the Plum Bayou School District Number Sixteen. The 
school served all white children from the fourth to twelfth 
grades in the district, whether or not their parents lived
^^Plum Bayou Economic Justification, n.d., ibid.? 
Audit Report, Plum Bayou Homestead Association, Wright, 
Jefferson County, Arkansas, For the Period April 9, 1937 to 
June 30, 1939, ibid.
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on the project. The first three grades attended another 
school nearby.35
In 1938, the Farm Security Administration expanded 
Plum Bayou with the development of the so-called "Ferda 
Addition." The Resettlement Administration had acquired the 
Ferda and Morrow plantations and several small tracts in 1936 
at a total cost of $171,947.00.3® Once part of Arkansas 
Delta Farms, the Ferda addition consisted of 3,700 acres of 
river bottom land with about 2,920 acres in cultivation, all 
located within a few miles of the Plum Bayou project. In 
addition to the land, the original investment included a 
store building, an old cotton gin, livestock barn, a resi­
dence, and several other usable buildings, although the 
tenant houses were valuable chiefly as salvage material.
When Plum Bayou took over, FSA rural rehabilitation clients 
were farming the land under temporary arrangements until 
definite plans could be implemented. 3 7
At Ferda, the Farm Security Administration followed 
the pattern the Resettlement Administration had perfected 
for developing community projects. With $256,272 borrowed
^Resettlement Administration, "Resettlement Projects," 
ibid.; Arkansas Gazette. January 16, 22, 1938; Daily Graphic, 
January 16, 22, 1938.
3^Arkansas Gazette, January 22, 1938; Daily Graphic. 
January 16, January 22, 1938.
3 7 J. 0. Walker, Memorandum to Milo Perkins, June 29, 
1938, R. G. 96, National Archives; Proposal for Development 
of Ferda Addition to Plum Bayou Project, n.d., ibid.
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from the FSA, the Plum Bayou Homestead Association erected 
the necessary housing units, improved the land, constructed 
or repaired the necessary cooperative facilities, and leased 
the Ferda property from the government. Finally, the Home­
stead Association subleased certain land, buildings, and 
equipment to the Plum Bayou Cooperative Association and the 
individual farm units to the clients. The latter association 
borrowed an additional $10,436 from the government in order 
to operate a store, repair shop, livestock improvement 
service, syrup mill, heavy equipment cooperative, and other 
cooperative facilities on the Ferda addition. As construction 
started, project manager Stanley Rhodes supervised the task 
of subdividing 3,111 acres into sixty-six units averaging 
47.1 acres each. This left 589 acres, part of which 
afforded a community pasture and woodland and part of which 
was scheduled for later development. Rhodes had all of these 
units filled in time for the 1939 crop season. With the 
Ferda and Morrow units, Plum Bayou had room for resettling 
180 families with twenty units undeveloped . 3 8
Plum Bayou left a record of overall financial success; 
but as the history of both cooperative associations show, it 
was an uneven record. The Plum Bayou Homestead Association 
lost money from the start and never broke out of the red . ® 9
3 8 Ibid.
39Plum Bayou Homestead Association, Annual Financial 
Report, For the Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 1943, ibid.
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Since it had no income from sales or patronage as did its 
sister association, the Homestead Association's income con­
sisted solely of rental payments, and the rents it collected 
were not enough to cover the cost of maintaining and managing 
the project.40 The Homestead Association leased a considers 
able portion of its assets to the Plum Bayou Cooperative 
Association but failed to collect any rent on this property 
until 1939.41 Even afterward, there was little financial 
improvement. After making arrangements to liquidate its 
assets, the Plum Bayou Homestead Association ceased opera­
tions on December 31, 1943.42
On the other hand, the Plum Bayou Cooperative Asso­
ciation built a reputation for profitable operation. At the 
end of 1939, for example, the board of directors disbursed a 
patronage dividend totaling $4,445.00, and there were other 
dividend payments' to follow.43 From 1937 to 1944, the
4^t . Roy Reid to W. W. Alexander, May 9, 1939, ibid.
4lAudit Report, Plum Bayou Homestead Association, 
Wright, Jefferson County, Arkansas, For the Period April 9, 
1937 to June 30, 1939, ibid.
42pium Bayou Homestead Association, Wright, Arkansas, 
Annual Financial Report, For the Fiscal Period-Ended March 
20, 1945, ibid.
43t . Roy Reid to the Board of Directors, Plum Bayou 
Cooperative Association, November 9, 1939, ibid.; J. T. 
Holliday to Ben Ash, November 10, 1939, ibid.; Claude Woolsey 
to Stanley W. Rhodes, November 10, 1939, ibid.;W.W. 
Alexander to T . Roy Reid, September 21, 1949, ibid. See 
Stanley W. Rhodes to A. M. Rogers, December 4, 1942, ibid.; 
Claude Woolsey, Memorandum to E. B. Whitaker, March 16,
1942, ibid.
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Cooperative Association made a profit every year except one 
(1940) due to crop failure. In 1939, the board of directors 
increased its authorized capital from $500 to $1,000 so that 
clients on the Ferda and Morrow tracts could become mem­
bers.^ On December 15, 1944, the Cooperative Association 
actually made the final payment on its FSA loan, a milestone 
that not many associations in Region Six reached.45 gut 
already, certain weaknesses had begun to catch up with the 
association. For one, some of the association1s enterprises 
had long been merely dead weight. By 1943, the syrup mill, 
livestock improvement, repair shop, feed and seed mill, 
heavy equipment, sweet potato plant were operating in the 
red, while only the store and cotton gin turned a profit.
As a result, the association liquidated most of these acti­
vities in 1944, retaining only three "departments"— store, 
gin, and repair s h o p . ^ 6  The move strengthened the associa­
tion financially but did not solve its basic problem: not all
members were using the facilities to the fullest extent
^Audit Report, Plum Bayou Cooperative Association, 
Wright, Jefferson County, Arkansas, For the Six Months Ended 
December 31, 1938 and the Calendar Year 1939, ibid.
45pium Bayou Cooperative Association, Annual Financial 
Report, For the Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 1944, ibid.
See Financial Condition of Plum Bayou Cooperative Association, 
Inc., As of November 30, 1944. ibid.
4(5stanley W. Rhodes Claude Woolsey, July 6 , 1942, 
ibid.; Audit Report, Plum Bayou Cooperative Association, 
Wright, Jefferson County, Arkansas, For the Period January 1, 
1940 to December 31, 1943, ibid.
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possible. In 1942, for example, eight tenants did not gin 
any of their cotton at the cooperative gin. The Board of 
directors took a firm stand and refused to renew their 
l e a s e s . S o o n  the store, too, was in trouble. Rhodes had 
difficulty finding and keeping an experienced manager; in 
one year (1943) the store had three different managers, and 
profits sagged. The store was also hurting because two- 
fifths of the membership of the association lived over five 
miles from its location, and almost half of the members lived 
nearer outside stores (and cotton gins) and patronized them 
to save time.48 without one hundred perccent participation, 
the savings the association could provide were reduced for 
everyone, good customers and bad.
In August, 1945, the board of directors went ahead 
with a move they had been contemplating for the past year.
For $27,000 they purchased from the government the coopera­
tive facilities they held under lease— store, gin, feed mill, 
shop, and several dwellings— and the land on which these were
A Qlocated. To make a $6,600 cash down payment, the associa­
tion amended its by-laws to provude for a capitalization of
^7 Ibid.; Plum Bayou Cooperative Association, Annual 
Financial Report, For the Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 1943, 
ibid.; Plum Bayou Cooperative Association, Annual Financial 
Report, For the Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 1942, ibid.
^8Plum Bayou Cooperative Association, Annual Financial 
Report, For the Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 1944, ibid.
49Minutes of the Special Meeting of the Board of 
Directors of Plum Bayou Cooperative Association, Inc.,
Wright, Arkansas, held August 9, 1944, ibid.
$50,000 (1,000 shares of common stock at one dollar each, 
and 4,900 shares of preferred stock at ten dollars e a c h ) . 5 °  
Hopefully, the members would be willing to invest more money 
in the association in order to take care of their new 
obligations. In fact, they proved to be quite unwilling.
The board made the down payment, but could not meet its 
first yearly payment due the FSA, on December 31, 1945.^
What was wrong? First, the purchase was a sound investment 
but it was ill-timed. When World War II ended in August, 
the demand for cotton plummeted— just before harvest.
Taking a heavy loss, the cooperative ginned only 426 bales 
of cotton instead of the 1,500 or more common in past years. 
More than fifty per cent of the cotton raised on the project 
and in the vicinity of it was still in the fields by the end 
of the year, and there was no prospect for picking it. ̂ 2  
Second, the members of the association were no longer behind 
their cooperative; ". . . lack of membership participation,” 
explained regional cooperative specialist Claude Woolsey, "is 
the contributing factor to the unsuccessful operations in
CO1845." By early 1946, the Plum Bayou Cooperative
50j. v. Highful, Memorandum to Elstner D. Beall,
July 27, 1945, ibid.
Slpium Bayou Cooperative Association, Wright, Arkansas, 
Annual Financial Report, For the Fiscal Year Ended December 
31, 1945, ibid.
52ibid.
S^Ibid.; j. v. Highful, Memorandum to Elstner D.
Beall, February 19, 1946, ibid.
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Association's financial condition had reached "an alarming 
stage . " 5 4  It was unable to carry on operations for another 
year.
In 1942, the Farm Security Administration began plan­
ning the sale of individual units and community facilities 
at Plum Bayou . 5 5  By 1943, regional director A. D. Stewart
had transferred all community buildings and facilities to
<
the Plum Bayou Cooperative Association, replacing the lease 
with a sales contract. He completed the sale of units to 
individual farmers in 1945. At Plum Bayou, the resettlement 
agencies had poured $385,000.00 into land and $1,203,893.44 
into homestead development, while the cost of community 
facilities came to $373,919.49. Each homestead represented 
an average investment of $8,052.80, the highest unit cost in 
Region Six by $2,000. Plum Bayou, in fact, was the second 
most expensive resettlement project in the region. By June, 
1945, Stewart had sold 141 out of 151 reorganized units for 
a total of $636,333.00. To that point, Plum Bayou had lost 
$495,541.94 in the final sale of units; it had already fallen 
behind $135,957.74 in operating expenses. Its total deficit 
came to $631,499.58. Plum Bayou finished with the highest 
losses of any resettlement project in Region Six. No other 
project, either community or infiltration type, came within
5 4 Ibid.
5 5 A. D. Stewart to C. B. Baldwin, October 1, 1942,
ibid.
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$300,000 of Plum Bayou's sorry record.5®
Wien liquidating a resettlement project, the Farm
Security Administration had each unit appraised separately
by an impartial committee which based its recommendations on
the fair market value of the land and of the buildings on
the land. The results of this final appraisal explain a large
part of Plum Bayou's deficit. Although the PSA had invested
an average of $8,052.80 in each unit, Plum Bayou settlers
paid an average price of only $4,214.12 per unit, according
to the’appraised market value. Thus the difference between
57unit investment and appraisal value was $3,838.68. At 
Plum Bayou, regional officials fell into perhaps the dead­
liest trap of the resettlement program: over-capitalizing
the project families. Since it was the first project in the 
region, they ambitiously invested more money in the Plum 
Bayou farmsteads than the clients; could ever hope to repay, 
raising the cost of the units far beyond their true value.
The regional office soon acquired enough experience in com­
munity building to avoid this mistake— or at least a mistake 
of this size.
5®House Agricultural Subcommittee of the Committee on 
Appropriations, Hearings on the Agricultural Department ( 





In Louisiana, the Crew Lake project was the earliest 
New Deal experiment in creating a new community of family­
sized farms. Located in the flat cotton fields of the delta, 
the Crew Lake community was part of a larger multiparish 
undertaking known as the Louisiana Farm Tenant Security pro­
ject. In February, 1936, E. B. Whitaker, assistant director 
of Region Six, announced that the Resettlement Administration 
wanted to buy land to convert into ’'resettlement projects in 
which clients will be placed on small farms of from 20 to 40 
acres." While he showed particular interest in large tracts 
of 2,000 acres or more, Whitaker was seeking land units of 
all sizes.
About the same time, Lee 0. Sumrall, as manager of 
the Farm Tenant Security project, began getting in touch with 
landowners in northern Louisiana who had improved farm land 
for sale. "These farms," he said, "must be well located as 
regards to school facilities, mail routes, churches, and 
gravel or hard-surface roads. The Resettlement Administra­
tion demanded the land meet certain standards of soil fer­
tility, market value, and price. Sumnail examined offers of 
several hundredstracts of land of all sizes from small
58Madison Journal (Tallulah), February 14, 1936; T. 
Roy Reid to W. W. Alexander, February 2, 1937, R. G. 96, 
National Archives.
S^Richland Beacon-News (Rayville), March 7, 1936.
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individual farms to at least one delta plantation, but found 
only tfaenty-three good enough to submit to the regional 
office at Little Rock, Arkansas.®® The Millsaps plantation, 
purchased in 1937 for $103,000, was the largest land deal on 
the Farm Tenant Security project. In all, the Resettlement 
Administration paid $223,540.67 for 7,165 acres of rich 
alluvial farm land in Caldwell, Richland, St. Landry, Natchi­
toches, Morehouse, Tensas, and Bossier parishes.®^
As a scattered farm or "infiltration" type of resettle­
ment, the Farm Tenant Security project fit easily into the 
existing pattern of small family farms in the Louisiana hill 
country. From his headquarters at Columbia in Caldwell 
Parish, Sumrall supervised 110 family farm units that were 
widely scattered through eight parishes. Some of them were 
single, isolated farms; but others, like those at Crew Lake, 
were clustered together on contiguous tracts of land.®2 ^
SOMadison Journal. July 3, 1936; Weekly News (Marks- 
ville), July 18, 1936; see Madison Journal. December 4, 1936; 
Caldwell Watchman (Colombia), Septembers, 1937, January 8 , 
1937.
®̂ -Richland Beacon-News. April 3, 1937; Farm Security 
Administration, "Resettlement Projects," R. G. 96, National 
Archives; Lewis E. Long to E. R. Henson, September 22, 1936, 
ibid.
®^With forty units, Crew Lake was the largest center 
of activity on the Farm Tenant Security project, but there 
were also nineteen units in a tract at Indian Village, thir­
teen units in a tract in St. Landry Parish, and thirty-eight 
scattered units, including one eight-unit tract, two tracts 
with six units each, one five-unit tract, two tracts with 
three units each, one tract with two units, and seven iso­
lated units. Farm Security Administration, "Resettlement 
Projects," ibid.
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E. C. Mclnnis, RA director in Louisiana, explained? "We've 
kept away from any idea of setting up 'colonies, ' apart from 
other farmers. The farms are individual ones, located near 
others and among others. These families won't feel them­
selves in any special class, but farmers like the others."6*̂ 
The acquisition of the 3,000-acre Millsaps plantation made 
possible the resettlement of many families at one location 
to form a new community. The plantation was broken up into 
forty adjacent family-sized units; the settlers, though 
grouped together, owned their own farms and operated them 
individually like all other farmers on the Farm Tenant 
Security project. Crew Lake was an experiment which com­
bined cooperative effort with the goals of farm ownership 
and rural rehabilitation.
At Crew Lake, the Resettlement Administration stressed 
cooperative enterprises, not because of any philosophical 
distaste for competition or individualism, but to help groups 
of small farmers operate with the efficiency of large com­
mercial farms. The Crew Lake Cooperative Association, incor­
porated on September 22, 1937, was a self-governing body 
operating under a president and board.of directors elected 
by project families, who made up its membership . 6 4  The
6^Morning Tribune (New Orleans), May 30, 1937.
64"certification of Incorporation of the Crew Lake 
Cooperative Association, Inc.," Secretary of State's Office, 
State Capital, Baton Rouge, Louisiana. Crew Lake families 
also formed a. cooperative medical association which functioned
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member families attended the association's meetings where 
they each had one vote and participated in minor decision­
making, although the community manager maintained actual 
control of Crew Lake activities. With headquarters at 
Rayville, the Crew Lake Association operated cooperatives 
for purchasing registered livestock and heavy farm equipment. 
Through community cooperation, the project families had the 
advantage of using costly farm machinery for their heavy work 
that none of them alone could have afforded. The association 
cooperatively ginned and marketed cotton grown at Crew Lake. 
The Crew Lake Association was incorporated for a term of 
fifty years and is still in legal existence.
In July, 1937, Sumrall began breaking up the Millsaps 
plantation into individual farm units, tearing down tenant 
shacks, and building each family a new h o m e s t e a d . The 
Resettlement Administration's Construction Division erected 
a complete village of farm homes, styled after modest sub­
urban dwellings, along the banks of Crew Lake. Costing about 
$1,650 each, the new'homes were wood-frame structures with 
one or two bedrooms, living room, kitchen, dining room, and
as a kind of health insurance. Lewis E. Long to John J. 
Riggle, July 26, 1938, R. G. 96, National Archives.
^ Monroe Morning World. May 6 , 1938. For descriptions 
Of the homesteads, see also Morning Tribune. May 30, 1937; 
Richland Beacon-News. April 3, 1937; The Progress (Hammond), 
June 2, 1939; for the building program in Region Six, see 
"FHA [FBA] Helps Construction," Construction News. V 
(September 28, 1938), 5, 6 .
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screened front porch. In addition to the dwelling, each 
homestead included a barn, poultry house, smoke house, and 
outhouse. The homes were all painted white, the barns and 
other structures dark red. The Crew Lake homestead units 
varied from forty to 1 0 0  acres? the average was fifty-two 
acres. Sumrall provided each family with about seven acres 
of pasture, laid out roads through the project, and cleared 
land where necessary. Crew Lake families had access to a 
three-building community center for meetings, lectures, 
movies, dances, and other recreation? they could also take 
advantage of community services such as a cooperative store, 
repair shop, feed mill, and syrup mill.®®
After developing the land, the Farm Security Adminis­
tration resold the Crew Lake homesteads to individual farmers. 
The homesteader entered into a lease-and-purchase contract 
with the government, agreeing to pay for his farm over a 
forty-year period at three per cent interest with annual 
payments of about $185. These were low-income families who 
under ordinary circumstances would be unable to obtain credit 
on reasonable terms and who could not put up any security for 
a loan. The FSA used the lease-and-purchase contract as a
®®Farm Security Administration, "Resettlement Pro­
jects, " R. G. 96, Natxonal Archives? A. D. Stewart to C. B. 
Baldwin, December 23, 1941, and attached data, ibid.? Walter 
E. Packard to T. Roy Reid, July 13, 1936, ibid.? Select 
Committee of the House Committee on Agriculture, Hearings on 
the Farm Security Administration. 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1943-44, pt. Ill, p. 1062.
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device to protect the government's investment by insuring 
control and technical supervision. In addition, each family 
came on the project for a trial period of five years; and 
during that time they were required to pay back at least 
fifteen per cent of the homestead cost and to demonstrate 
that they had the qualities to achieve success as farm 
owners. To prevent speculation, farmers could not resell 
their land without FSA approval, though this condition was 
never enforced. After the trial period, the FSA established 
a final resale price for the units based on their produc­
tivity; and the contracts were converted into fee simple 
deeds which for practical purposes eliminated government 
control of the project . ® 7
In 1937, the Resettlement Administration began selec­
ting the Crew Lake [families. ® 8  After field workers thoroughly 
investigated each applicant, a family selection board in the 
Little Rock regional office gave final approval to the fam­
ilies that met certain criteria. The screening process was
®7Cloyd 0. Hopkins, project manager at Crew Lake after 
1939, interview with the author, November 1, 1963; Richland 
Beacon-News. April 3, 17, 1937; Monroe Morning World. May 6 , 
1938; Claude Woolsey, head of the Cooperative Section in the 
Little Rock regional office, interview with the author, 
January 19, 1968.
®8Monroe Morning World. May 6 , 1938; Paul K. Conkin, 
Tomorrow a New Worlds The New Deal Community Program 
(Ithaca, N. Y., 1959), 187, 188; see John B. Holt, An Analy­
sis of Methods and Criteria Used in Selecting Families for 
Colonization Proiects. Social Research Report No. 1, u. S. 
Department of Agriculture, Farm Security Administration, and 
Bureau of Agricultural Economics (Washington, 1937), 6-10, 
13-15.
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designed to pick out families most likely to be serious
about putting down permanent roots in a farm. Like all
resettlement communities, Crew Lake was to be a culturally
homogeneous community of people who could cooperate together
and identify with one another's problems. The RA wanted
couples between twenty-five and forty years of age, having
up to five or six children. "They must measure up to several
standards," Mclnnis said.
They must, first of all, undergo a physical examina­
tion and be free from disease and physical handicaps.
. . . They must show us that they have thrift and 
integrity, that they know enough about the job of 
getting along in farming, to warrant this new help.
We have to be sure that they won' t fail through sheer 
lack of knowledge or experience in farm work.°9
In other words, applicants had to be outstanding tenants—  
tenants who were not on relief rolls, who had initiative, 
but who had been too poor to buy their own farms. They 
brought with them their personal property, including furni­
ture, farm implements, and livestock. There was no difficulty 
in finding qualified families to fill the forty units at Crew 
Lake •
The tenant families selected for the Crew Lake project 
had all moved into their new homes by early 1938. The new 
settlers were usually not shifted long distances or moved 
into drastically different environments. Most were already 
residents of the Crew Lake region. One family, after having
^Morning Tribune. May 30, 1937; Madison Journal. 
February 26, 1937.
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been tenants on the Millsaps plantation, were potential 
owners of the same land they had rented for the past eight 
years. Across the highway from their new home stood the 
house they had occupied— a square, unpainted cabin, which 
was later torn down . 7 0  Another family had moved to Crew 
Lake in December, 1936, and farmed the land as clients in 
the RA's rural rehabilitation program.7^ Before time for 
spring planting in 1938, the settlers performed for them­
selves some of the unskilled tasks in developing their home­
steads. They built picket fences around their homes, dug 
irrigation and drainage ditches, and constructed out­
buildings? some built wagonsheds and storehouses.7^ rp̂ e 
Crew Lake settlers had more reason to work with hope and 
self-confidence than in many years; they had a chance at last 
to realize their dream of landownership.
The rural resettlement program went far beyond merely 
setting up a tenant family in the farming business with land,
homestead, and equipment. The RA and FSA supervised the
actual operation of the farm. Working under Douglas Robinson, 
Richland Parish FSA supervisor, experts on both scientific 
farming and Louisiana agriculture consulted with all Crew
70Monroe Morning World, May 6 , 1938.
7^The Progress, June 2, 1939.
7^Lewis E. Long to John J. Riggle, July 26, 1938, R.
G. 96, National Archives ? Monroe Morning World. May 6 , 1938 ? 
Morning Tribune. May 30, 1937.
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Lake settlers and gave them the benefit of the best tech­
nical advice. Together each farmer and his counselor worked 
out a detailed farm plan— what crops to plant, how much 
acreage to devote to each, what livestock to keep, what 
garden crops to raise. The purpose was to provide the farmer 
with a cash income and to enable him to pay off'his loan.
At Crew Lake, the principal cash crop was cotton? at Terre­
bonne it was sugarcane. But without exception, the old 
one-crop system so common in the South was abandoned. Crew 
Lake families, for example, relied on sweet potatoes and 
livestock for additional cash crops? the project's farm plan 
included the soil conservation practices recommended by the 
Louisiana extension service and participation in AAA crop 
reduction programs.
The Crew Lake families followed a ”live-at-home" pro­
gram of home management. Stressing self-sufficient farming, 
the PSA encouraged project residents to supply most of their 
own food, especially milk, poultry, and pork. "That's an 
essential,” Mclnnis contended. "Forty-four per cent of farm 
living expenses come under these three items, and the farmer 
that doesn't provide them for himself is at a terrific dis­
advantage. "74 The farm wife naturally played an important
73Lewis E. Long to John J. Higgle, July 26, 1938,
R. G. 96, National Archives? Monroe Morning World. May 6 , 
1938? Morning Tribune. May 30. 1937.
74ibid.
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role in every resettlement project. Joyce Mullins, Richland 
Parish home demonstration agent, worked with the women in 
planning a budget for household expenses. The key to the 
RA—FSA home management program was the pressure-cooker; the 
women learned how to can the fruits and vegetables they 
raised in their gardens and to provide a balanced diet during 
the winter m o n t h s . T o  a large degree, the resettlement 
communities were adult education courses in scientific farm­
ing, food preservation, nutrition, sewing, health care, 
sanitation, and personal hygiene.
In 1943, the Farm Security Administration began dis­
solving the Louisiana Farm Tenant Security project. This 
meant simply that the FSA phased out its participation in 
the project and transferred title and mortgage to the families 
living on the individual farm units. The object of the 
experiment from the beginning had been to promote independent 
farm ownership. By 1945, the RA. and FSA had spent $233,540.67 
to purchase the land and $379,211.17 to develop 110 individual 
homesteads. The average investment per unit— to develop and 
maintain for five years— was $5,416.94. But Crew Lake and 
Farm Tenant Security settlers paid an average price of 
$4,316^73 per unit according to the appraised market value. 
Thus the difference between unit investment and appraisal
...... 75Joyce Mullins, "Some Facts About Resettlement,"
Caldwell Watchman, May 21, 1937; Richland Beacon-News, Novem 
ber 14, 1936.
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value was $1,100.21. By June, 1945, the FSA. had sold all but 
one unit for a total of $435,990.00, leaving the Farm Tenant 
Security project with a deficit of $110,858.41 in land and 
development costs. This figure, however, does not include 
$60,223.46 invested in community facilities, or an accumu­
lated net loss of $27,202.90 in operating expenses over 
income. Since both items were written off, the project's 
total deficit was $198,284.77.^
Plum Bayou and Crew Lake were typical of most pro­
jects established by the Resettlement and Farm Security 
Administrations in Region Six. They were both experimental 
and unprecedented. But what happened there from day to day 
was undramatic, unromantic, unexciting, and completely un­
newsworthy. They were in fact rather boring projects. Life 
at Plum Bayou and Crew Lake was the same as life anywhere in 
the Southern cotton belt— getting up before daybreak, 
hitching teams, plowing, hoeing, chopping, picking. It was 
the hard life of small farmers living on the edge of want. 
Plum Bayou and Crew Lake did, however, offer renewed hope for 
a few families. This hope was the most important part of 
everyday living and working. Perhaps for the first time, 
these tenant farmers had the hope that all their work was not 
for someone else. It was for themselves. It was for their 
future.
*
7 fiHouse Agricultural Subcommittee of the Committee on 
Appropriations, Hearings on the Agricultural Department Appro 
priation Bill for 1947, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 1946, pp. 1505, 
1413.
CHAPTER VIII
THE TERREBONNE COOPERATIVE FARM
Terrebonne Parish has every characteristic of Southern 
Louisiana. The Creole and Cajun population, the French and 
Spanish names, the old plantation homes, the lazy bayous, 
the live oaks heavy with Spanish moss all suggest strong 
ties with the past, rich traditions, and a certain timeless­
ness. Thirty years ago as today, Houma, the parish seat, 
was famed for shrimp, oysters, and, above all, sugar cane. 
Terrebonne's rich, black soil— the "good earth" for which 
the parish was named— had made it one of the most important 
sugar cane producing parishes of Louisiana. Even in the 
Depression, its citizens liked to think of Terrebonne as a 
"modern garden of Eden."-*- Yet Southern Louisiana was hardly 
a paradise for farmers, especially small owners and tenants. 
In 1935, slightly more than half of all Terrebonne Parish 
farmers did not own their own land . 41 Young families found 
it difficult to get a start in farming. The Depression and
% o u m a  Courier, August 269 1 1938.
2u . S. Bureau of the Census: United States Census of




low sugar cane prices forced many small operators to fall 
back on mere subsistence agriculture, while large numbers of 
farmers completely lost their hold on the land. In Terre­
bonne Parish, the New Deal tried an approach to rural relief 
and rehabilitation that made the old and the new, the tradi­
tional and the experimental, stand out in sharp relief. The 
Farm Security Administration's project near Schriever, three 
miles south of Thibodaux, was an experiment in collective 
farming. No community project in Region Six made a greater 
departure from traditional farm practice.^
The Terrebonne project, along with Lake Dick (Arkansas) 
and Marcella (Mississippi), were the only resettlement pro­
jects in Region Six which ran counter to the traditional 
pattern of individually-owned family farms. The most impor­
tant promoters of such projects were Rexford G. Tugwell,
M. L. Wilson, and others in Washington who considered large- 
scale cooperative farming to be a valuable social and economic 
pattern, one that could become the wave of the future.^ The 
family farm, they believed, could not compete with newer 
larger-scale commercial agriculture. But farms were not
3Unlike Arkansas and Mississippi, Louisiana was the 
only state in the region with previous experience in coopera­
tive farming. The New Llano colony, near Leesville in Vernon 
Parish, operated from 1917 to 1937. See Henry Edward Wilson, 
"The History of the Llano Cooperative Colony" (unpublished 
M.A. Thesis, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, 1951).
^Joseph w. Eaton, Exploring Tomorrow1 s Agriculture 
(New York and London, 1943), 80-85. See Chapter I.
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only getting larger? machinery and hired labor were replacing 
sharecroppers, tenants, and even small owners. Perhaps the 
cooperative farm could help farmers readjust to the agricul­
tural revolution without sacrificing economic democracy. In 
Region Six, however, most resettlement officials were not 
enthusiastic about cooperative farming, since it called for 
fundamental changes in agricultural structure and social 
values. As land grant college graduates or former county 
extension agents, they had always taken for granted the 
traditional values associated with individual land ownership. 
They believed that the family farm had a place even in a 
world of large-scale mechanized agriculture. Regional 
officials went along with such experiments as Terrebonne 
because they had to, but they also twisted the philosophy of 
cooperative farming enough to make it more palatable. Reset­
tlement Division director E. B. Whitaker, for example, saw 
Terrebonne primarily as a training school program for low- 
income farm families who could not as yet measure up to the 
responsibilities of individual ownership or even of tenancy. 
Here, these families could gain practical experience, under 
trained supervision, in running a farm. After a few years, 
they could probably "graduate" to individual farming . 5  
These two points of view were basically incompatible, but in 
the short run they did not conflict.
5E. B. Whitaker, interview with the author, April 19,
1968.
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In June 1937, E. C. Mclnnis, Resettlement Adminis­
trator in Louisiana, announced the purchase of three adjacent 
plantations (Waubun, St. George, and Julia) near Schriever in 
Terrebonne Parish? in August, the RA acquired the Isle of 
Cuba plantation located away from Schriever toward Houma.̂
All together, the Resettlement Administration paid $147,346.60 
for 5,960 acres of gummy sugar cane land . 7 The Farm Security 
Administration inherited the Terrebonne project in September, 
1937, and made plans to put it into operation. George S. 
Harmount, as community manager, built a village of farm 
homes near Schriever, developed the land with new roads, 
fences, and drainage ditches, and organized the project into 
a collective farm large enough to support eighty families.
Terrebonne colony has a history of controversy, dis­
appointment, and delay. The Resettlement Administration 
began planning the project in 1935? but Terrebonne did not 
officially open as a Farm Security Administration project
^Times-Picavune (New Orleans), June 23, 1937? Morning 
Tribune (New Orleans), August 6 , 1937? see Times-Picavune. 
October 9, 1938? Caldwell Watchman (Columbia), January 29, 
1937? Louis J. Rodriguez, "The Terrebonne Project: Ideolo­
gical Revolution or Economic Expediency," Louisiana Studies, 
VI (Fall, 1967), 267-77.
'U. S. Department of Agriculture, Farm Security 
Administration, "Resettlement Projects, Land and Source of 
Acquisition, Also Status of unit Development, Vendor, Acre­
age and Number of Units Developed or Undeveloped, Region 
Six," January 1, 1941, mimeographed, Record Group 96, Records 
of the Farmers Home Administration, National Archives (to be 
cited hereafter as R. G. 96, National Archives).
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Quntil 1939. During part of the interim period, the FSA 
leased its land in Terrebonne Parish to the Louisiana Rural 
Rehabilitation Corporation, an organization formed by the 
Emergency Relief Administration in Louisiana to carry on its 
rehabilitation program for low-income farmers. Using relief 
labor, the Louisiana Rural Rehabilitation Corporation operated 
Terrebonne as a sugar cane plantation for the next two years. 
After a freeze destroyed the project's cane crop in 1937, 
the Louisiana corporation was unable to meet the terms of 
its lease; by the end of 1938, its losses amounted to 
$24,276. On January 1, 1939, the FSA took over the operation 
of Terrebonne . 9
The work of the Louisiana Rural Rehabilitation Cor­
poration kept alive interest in a resettlement project at 
Schriever, but local community and civic leaders from Terre­
bonne and Lafourche parishes were anxious to see it developed 
on a permanent basis. For months the Schriever project, 
according to the Houma Courier, was "a hot and cold proposi­
tion . " ^ 9  In November 1937, the presence of a FSA engineering 
crew at Schriever raised the hopes of the Thibodaux Rotary 
Club, which made inquiries about the project's future.^
^Resettlement Administration, "Project Description 
Book," March-December, 1936, mimeographed, ibid.
9Henry A. Wallace to Allen J. Ellender, February 1, 
1940, Record Group 16, Records of the Office of the Secretary 
of Agriculture, National Archives.
l°Houma Courier, April 5, 1938.
lllbid., November 19, 1937.
But at that time no further work was done. The following 
spring, the Farm Security Administration began preliminary 
work on Terrebonne. In April, 1938, George Harmount announced 
a meeting in Thibodaux for anyone interested in the Schriever 
resettlement project .-*-2 Before launching any resettlement 
community, the RA and FSA always secured not only the backing 
of local leaders but even that of property-owners whose land 
was adjacent to the project. Those who met in Thibodaux 
were supporters of the project, but were probably primarily 
concerned with having Federal money spent in their parish.
At the meeting, T. Roy Reid, Farm Security Adminis­
tration director of Region Six, explained why the Schriever 
project had been delayed. The time required to investigate 
the titles to the land purchased for the project, Reid said, 
had thrown Terrebonne far behind schedule. When the land 
was finally transferred to the government, the end of the 
fiscal year (July 1, 1937) had arrived, and the funds appro­
priated for developing the project had to be returned to the 
United States Treasury. Consequently, no improvements could 
be made. This was the practice, he said, at the end of each 
fiscal year with money appropriated but notvyet used for any 
project. But now, according to Reid, money was again avail­
able, and the project was going to be carried out as planned.-*-3
3-2Ibid., April 8, 1938.
13Ibid.
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What Reid did not discuss was the indecision within
V
the Farm Security Administration itself during 1937 and 
1938 over how to organize Terrebonne. "The Terrebonne pro­
ject," wrote J. 0. Walker, Director of the Resettlement 
Division, "has been the subject of considerable difference 
of o p i n i o n . T h e  central issue was whether the ultimate 
aim should be to operate Terrebonne as a cooperative farm or
"to have each homesteader own and operate a family size 
1 ̂farm." Reid's Little Rock office was apparently not 
anxious to have a project that critics could compare to a 
Soviet collective farm.^ But as they knew, cane production 
was a type of agriculture requiring a large outlay for heavy 
power equipment and as a general rule had been carried on 
more successfully by large-scale operators than by family­
sized farmers.
About the same time the decision was made in favor of 
cooperative farming, the Farm Security Administration assigned 
George Harmount to Terrebonne as project manager. He had 
been FSA parish supervisor before his promotion and was
•^J. 0. Walker, Memo to Edwin G. Arnold, March 30, 
1938, R. G. 96, National Archives; see E. B. Whitaker to 
C. B. Baldwin, August 1, 1941, ibid.
^5Mastin G. White, Memorandum for W. W. Alexander, 
March 26ija 1938, ibid.
l^Whitaker, interview with the author^ April 19, 1968; 
Horace E. Thompson, Community manager at the Lake Dick pro­
ject, Arkansas, interview with the author, January 19, 1963; 
Little Rock Arkansas Gazette. January 3, 1939.
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identified with the diversified farming movement in Terre­
bonne Parish. Although a graduate of Yale, Harmouht had no 
formal agricultural training.17 Since most FSA personnel in 
Louisiana backed individual farm ownership, Harmount's 
enthusiasm for trying a cooperative farm in the state more 
than qualified him for his job as Terrebonne project manager. 
He was the man most responsible for developing the Terre­
bonne colony.
Claude Woolsey, as chief of the FSA's Cooperative 
Section in Region Six, formed the project into a cooperative 
association known as Terrebonne Association, Inc., filing 
its papers with the Secretary of State's office on November 
8 , 1 9 3 8 . Conrad M. LeBlanc, Sr., one of the project
■̂ Times-Picayune. April 9, 1939.
■^"Articles of Association of Terrebonne Association, 
Inc.," Secretary of State's Office, State Capital, Baton 
Rouge, Louisiana; Claude Woolsey, interview with the author, 
January 19, 1968. Since Louisiana laws did not authorize 
cooperative associations to engage in agricultural production, 
Terrebonne had originally been incorporated under a 1922 law 
regulating business corporations. Organized on May 10, 1938, 
Terrebonne Farm, Inc., issued eighty shares of capital stock 
worth fifty dollars each; the corporation1s membership con­
sisted of owners of one share of stock. If families selected 
for the project could not afford to buy their own share, the 
FSA loaned them fifty dollars to meet this initial expense.
On June 13, the Louisiana Legislature approved Act No. 40 of 
the 1938 session permitting the organization of cooperative 
associations without capital stock but with all the powers 
possessed by Terrebonne Farm, Inc. as well as substantial tax 
advantages. As a result, Terrebonne Farm was reorganized as 
Terrebonne Association. T. Roy Reid to W. W. Alexander,
April 13, 1938, R. G. 96, National Archives; Mastin G. White 
to W. W. Alexander, March 26, 1938, ibid.; Mastin G. White, 
Memo for W. W. Alexander, September 26, 1938, ibid.; Louisi­
ana Revised Statutes of 1950. Vol. 1, Title 3, Chapter 2, 
pp. 42-62.
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members, served as president, and Harmount himself was a 
member of the four-man board of directors. Every Terrebonne 
family was a member of the association and had one vote in 
its business meetings. The Farm Security Administration 
gave the Terrebonne Association a ninety-nine year lease on 
all project land and financed its activities with an initial 
loan of $415,619. Of this sum, the association used $280,659 
in constructing the individual farm homes, barns, poultfcy 
houses, fences, roads, and renovating the community center. 
The balance, $134,980, was invested in farm implements, 
mules, and equipment used in the production of sugar cane. 
Under its lease with the government, the Terrebonne Associa­
tion's annual rent for the use of FSA land was a fifth share 
of the sugar cane and a fourth share of all other crops. The 
Terrebonne project relied upon subsidiary cooperatives to 
carry on special tasks such as marketing produce and pur­
chasing heavy machinery and equipment. The association
became part owner of the Magnolia Sugar Refinery for use by
1 Qthe colonists. ^
To qualify for membership in the Terrebonne colony 
was somewhat different from most community projects. At 
Terrebonne, special preference was given to young married 
couples with reasonable education who had reached adulthood
19Economic Justifications Proposal for Development 
of Terrebonne Project, n.d., R. G. 96, National Archives; 
Times-Picayune. October 9, 1938; New Orleans Item-Tribune, 
June 25, 1939.
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since the beginning of the Depression, although heads of 
families between twenty-one and fifty years of age could 
qualify.20 a. D. Roberts, family selection specialist, 
stressed that applicants should be enthusiastic about the 
cooperative idea, because a person with strong individual­
istic tendencies would not fit into the program. Even in 
the face of a shortage of project families, Roberts' office
refused some applicants because they showed signs of being
21"rugged individualists." "The plan for the development of 
this project," a news release said, "is something new and it 
will be up to those families who first enter [Terrebonne] to 
make it a success; therefore, it is necessary that families 
be capable of understanding and adapting to these new con-
p pditions." The family selection staff was looking for 
families in good financial condition, with reputations for 
sobriety, honesty, and diligence, and who were well recom­
mended by the business and professional men in their home 
communities. Experience with sugar cane production was 
eddential; finally, no family was considered unless they were 
engaged in farming at the time of selection . 2 3
20Times-Picavune, October 9, 1938; Item-Tribune. 
January 25, 1939; Houma Courier, August 5, 1938.
2 ^Times-Picavune. April 9, 1939; Item-Tribune. 
January 25, 1939.
22Houma Courier, August 19, 1938.
22Ibid., August 5, 1938; August 19, 1938.
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When the selection process was begun in April, 1938, 
Harmount planned to settle eighty families, the optimum 
number Terrebonne's size could support with a satisfactory 
standard of living.2^ Paul N. Mayeau, FSA supervisor in 
Terrebonne Parish, advised those interested in getting on 
the project to make application at his office in Houma . 2 6  
On April 8 , Mayeau organized a meeting to discuss the pro­
ject with interested families in Houma and a second one in 
Thibodaux the following day . 2 6  He scheduled trips to the 
project site at Schriever for those wanting to go. Soon he 
had about 300 family applicants on file; yet he was never 
able to get enough qualified families to fill all the pro­
ject units. 2  ̂ By August 5, 1938, the Houma Courier 
announced that the "final selection" of all tenant families 
for the project was underway. But on August 19 the Courier 
reported that "additional applications" were being sought.
On September 9, "complete final arrangements" were again 
being made at Schriever, but more families for the project 
were needed.2® After a year's operation, in July 1940, only
24Resettlement Administration, "Project Description 
Book," R. G. 96. National Archives; Houma Courier. August 
19, 1938, September 6 , 1938.
25||guma Courier. August 5, 1938, July 22, 1938.
26lbid., April 8 , 1938.
2 7 Times-Picavune. April 9, 1939.
28Houma Courier. August 5, 1938, August 19, 1938, 
September 9, 1938.
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sixty families were living on the project— twenty short of 
what had been planned for; and since only seventy-two units 
were built, twelve new houses, having never been occupied, 
were still standing empty.^
On Saturday, January 13, 1939, Mrs. Allen J. Ellender, 
wife of the Louisiana Senator, came to Schriever to attend 
the ceremony officially opening the Terrebonne project. The 
general public was invited; and scores of interested spec­
tators , including many of the families already selected to 
become colonists, flocked to the community center. Acting 
as master of ceremonies, George Harmount presided over a 
series of nine speeches given both by PSA officials and 
civic leaders from Houma and Thibodaux. E. C. Mclnnis, PSA 
director in Louisiana, outlined the organization and opera­
tion of the Schriever project, recounted its history and 
gave details of other FSA activities in Louisiana. E. B. 
Whitaker, representing the PSA's regional office at Little 
Rock, stated that the success of the Schriever experiment 
would lead to the application of private capital to similar 
projects. That the project had much local support seems 
evident. Among other speakers, for example, Colonel Julius 
Dupont, president of the Houma-Terrebonne Chamber of Com­
merce, discussed the educational benefits of the project; 
and R. L. Caldwell, president of the Lafourche Parish police 
jury, said, "The people of Lafourche parish are behind the
29 . .Times-P icavune. July 15, 1940.
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project 1 0 0  per cent and expect to do everything in their 
power to assist." After the speeches, Mrs. Ellender turned 
over the first shovelful of earth to begin construction work 
at Terrebonne. 3 0
Once underway the development of Terrebonne was rapid. 
In September, 1938, the Farm Security Administration had 
asked for bids on the construction of seventy-three home­
stead units (219 separate structures)! in January 1939, the
31contractor with the lowest bid began work. The homes were 
light frame structures built according to FSA specifications. 
They had two to three bedrooms, living room, kitchen, dining 
room, and screened side porch. The house plans did not 
include indoor plumbing, but they contained a storeroom which 
could be converted into a bathroom later. Although erecting 
the structures on a mass production basis, the FSA sought to 
avoid a monotonous "tenement" atmosphere by Building several 
liferent types of houses ranging in cost from $1,495 to 
$1,732. Including house, barn, poultry house, water cistern, 
two mules, two cows, corn crib, tool shed, and fencing, the
cost of each homestead averaged about $2,600. By July, 1939,
32work had been completed on the project.
3 0 Ibid.. January 15, 1939; Houma Courier. January 17,
1939.
^Houma Courier. September 6 , 1938, September 27, 1938, 
January 13, 1939; for additional delay in accepting awarding 
bids, see ibid., October 25, 1938, October 28, 1938, November
4, 1938; J. 0. Walker, Memorandum to Edwin G. Arnold, Decem­
ber 12, 1938, R. G. 96, National Archives.
3 ^Item-Tribune, June 25, 1939; Houma Courier.
September 6 , 1938.
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Even before construction crews left, Terrebonne Asso­
ciation began cooperative operations on 3,140 acres of crop 
land and 640 acres of pasture land leased from the govern­
ment. In other words, the client families farmed the land 
as one big farm and shared in the profits as members of the 
association. The Terrebonne cooperative association entered 
into "Work and Occupancy Agreements" with its members, fur­
nishing them rent free two acres of land, house, barn, 
poultry house, toilet, water cistern, and livestock. In 
return the head of each family worked on the cooperative 
acreage as a day labourer. The PSA anticipated that work 
would be available at Terrebonne during most of the year for 
about eighty men. At harvest time, the association employed 
additional laborers from outside sources. During the 
development stage at Terrebonne clients who had already been 
chosen were employed on construction work as much as pos­
sible. ̂
Under PSA supervision, the association's president 
and board of directors laid out a farm program for each year 
and appointed a foreman to take charge of farming operations. 
He in turn assigned the men work for which they were best 
suited. Some worked as tractor drivers, others as plow 
hands, still others took care of the stock. The association 
paid each family head for his work at the same rates he could
33]2conomic Justifications Proposal for Development 
of Terrebonne Project, n.d., R. G. 96, National Archives.
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get from private sugar cane planters. In 1939, for example, 
the current rate for cultivating cane was $1 . 2 0  a day and 
$1.50 a day for harvesting, plus overtime. At the end of 
the year, the association paid its expenses— overhead costs, 
installment on FSA loan, lease payment, and reserve fund—  
and divided the balance, if any, among the members according 
to the number of hours of work each had put in during the 
year. The project families, therefore, had two main sources 
of incomes their daily wage, which should have covered day- 
to-day living expenses, and a dividend paid at the end of 
the year out of profits on the cane and other cash crops.
In reality, however, the Terrebonne Association was never 
successful enough to pay a dividdndd.. Project families had 
to depend on their income as day laborers on the project 
rather than on dividends as part-owners in the cooperative 
association.
Harmount subdivided 480 acres of project land into 
eighty homestead units of six acres each, two acres of which 
served as the homestead site, while the other four were 
devoted to garden vegetables, poultry, and livestock. 
Although project members occupied their individual homestead 
units rent free, each family paid thirty dollars a year rent 
on the four-acre tract? they could either keep its produce 
for their own use or sell it and keep the profit as
■̂^Item-Tribune. June 25, 1939; Houma Courier. Septem­
ber 13, 1938.
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supplemental income. Terrebonne's remaining 2,148 acres 
included space for roads, ditches, community center, com-
O Cmunity pasture, and uncleared land.
Since the Terrebonne project was located in the heart 
of the sugar bowl of southern Louisiana, the major portion 
of its arable acreage was planted in sugar cane. I. C. 
Borland, as farm management supervisor, designed the pro­
ject's farm program to comply with recommendations made by 
the Louisiana Experiment Station; thus besides cane, the FSA 
program included corn, soy beans, Irish potatoes, truck 
crops, and livestock . ^ 6
At Terrebonne, the Resettlement Administration had 
originally planned to imitate the so-called European village 
style of agriculture. The homesteads were to be grouped 
together to form a village in the center of the project, 
while the fields would stretch out all around in the dis­
tance. But when developing the project, the Farm Security 
Administration scattered the homesteads and despite plans 
for communal farming, broke up the cultivatable land into 
seventy-two units of forty acres each. The most important 
reason for this change was the fear, on the part of Little 
Rock officials, that plans for operating Terrebonne as a
•^Economic Justifications Proposal for Development 
of Terrebonne Project, n.d., R. G. 96, National Archives; 
Item-Tribune, June 25, 1939.
36ibid., Times-Picayune. April 9, 1939.
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collective farm would not be practical. Whitaker, for 
example, wanted to be prepared to split the community into 
individual family units if collective operations should 
fail . 3 7  Thus the Schriever land was divided into forty-acre 
units which at first seemed to serve no real purpose. At 
the same time the FSA found it expedient to group together 
dwellings in two' s and three1 s so that more than one family 
could use the same well, thus cutting costs and encouraging 
informal cooperation. 3 8
The communal organization at Terrebonne was the main 
source of controversy. One outspoken local critic was Edward 
A. Ford, Presbyterian minister at Thibodaux. Addressing the 
Houma Rotary Club on September 20, 1939, Ford offered several 
objections to the project's operation. As planned by the 
FSA, he asserted, Terrebonne was in grave danger of failing. 
The spirit of the resettlement program was to permit people 
to own land of their own. But at Schriever tenants could 
never own the land as individuals. Since ownership was not 
possible, he contended that personal initiative would be 
destroyed and a less desirable type of farmer would be drawn
qqto the pro3 ect. ^
The following week, George Harmount and John Lynch,
3 7 Whitaker, interview with the author, April 19, 1968.
3 8 Eaton, Exploring Tomorrow* s Agriculture. 79.
O QHouma Courier. September 23, 1938.
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one of his colleagues, appeared before the Rotary Club to 
answer Ford's criticisms. Did the project fail to provide 
incentive for families since it did not anticipate eventual 
ownership? The answer, Harmount explained, was not as clear 
as Ford believed. Harmount contended that it was difficult 
to find people who were capable of operating their own farms, 
and that the cooperative plantation provided a means of dis­
covering people with the qualities for gaining farm ownership 
He explained that if a man had to buy livestock, equipment, 
and other needs for a modern farm, it would require several 
thousand dollars, while at Terrebonne a man can get started 
for fifty dollars. The fact that the land had been divided 
into forty-acre tracts indicated, Harmount suggested, that 
the FSA may have in mind actual tenant ownership at a future 
date. Lynch argued that from a practical standpoint sugar 
cane lent itself better to large-scale cooperative farming 
than to small family farms.f^
On an earlier occasion, Harmount made an interesting 
defense of the operation of the Schriever project. The 
farmers there were not merely clients on another government 
project; they were, he said, stockholders in a business 
proposition. What of the charges of radicalism that were 
sometimes made? "Socialized farming? Communistic? Radical?
^ I b i d .. September 30, 1938. Fifty dollars was the 
price of one share of stock in Terrebonne Farm, Inc. See 
Footnote No. 48.
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mused Harmount. "I don't like those words. They do not 
apply here. We are operating a business. Strictly busi­
ness . " ^ 1  In Louisiana and other Southern states, the FSA 
could also present its cooperative plantation projects like 
Terrebonne as a continuation of the.Sofcth's large plantation
A Osystem. But most FSA personnel in Region Six viewed 
Terrebonne as a place where inexperienced tenant families 
could receive practical training in farm and home manage­
ment .
Community facilities were part of every resettlement 
project, whether based on individual ownership or coopera­
tive ownership. At Schriever, Harmount converted the old 
Waubun plantation mansion into a community center contain­
ing his office and space for group meetings, social and 
educational activities; an athletic field was laid out near 
the building. In addition, the FSA built a school on the 
project and turned it over to the Terrebonne Parish school 
board. Local physicians and the parish health unit worked 
through the association's medical cooperative to provide 
medical attention and health education for project resi­
dents . 4 3
41t jmes-Picavune. April 9, 1939.
42ibid.. October 9, 1938; Conkin, Tomorrow a New 
World. 210.
43Houma Courier. September 20, 1938, see Richard 
Heilman, "The Farmers Try Group Medicine, " Harper' s Magazine. 
CLXXXII (December, 1940), 72-80.
One of the idealistic arguments for Terrebonne was 
that it would afford farm families a full community life. 
Living and working together as members of the community, the 
Terrebonne settlers and their families would derive special 
benefit from their cooperative effort toward social and 
economic security— benefit they would miss if it were every 
man for himself in competition as individual farmers. Such 
community fellowship would supposedly appeal to young farm 
families and keep them from drifting into the cities.£4 
While the FSA encouraged project residents to be "coopera­
tively minded," most were unable to readjust their values 
and work together as a team.45 Many settlers were anxious 
to work their own plots on good days, but ready to work the 
association's land only on rainy or otherwise bad days.46 
While the cooperative system did not suffer from a complete 
breakdown, it was not the success that Harmount expected. 
Most Terrebonne farmers were probably still not convinced 
that community property rather than private ownership was 
the answer to their problems. "I guess every man would like 
to own land," one farmer observed. "But it's pretty hard to 
raise a family and acquire land as a farm worker or tenant.
44Houma Courier, September 20, 1938.
45item-Tribune. June 25, 1939.
46p. l . Spencer, farm management supervisor in Region 
Six and project manager at Mounds, interview with the 
author, December 2, 1963.
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I think this project gives my family more security. I know 
we'll eat better."47 Like most others, his attitude was 
based on economic expediency; he stayed because Terrebonne 
meant steady work, temporary security, and perhaps a chance 
to save up enough money to buy a farm of his own.
The Farm Security Administration wanted every reset­
tlement project to stand up on its own feet financially and 
repay the government1 s investment. Few communities were 
immediately successful in a business way, however, and the 
FSA found itself having to carry projects operating in the 
red. Terrebonne was one of the FSA's most unsuccessful 
cooperative plantations. In 1940, the project suffered a 
net loss of $42,684. In 1941, Harmount cut the loss to 
$16,582— a clear indication of financial improvement. Terre­
bonne's total income for 1942 was about $15,000 more than in 
1941, but it was still $24,700 short of the project budget. 
Brice M. Mace, Jr., chief of the FSA's Farm Management 
Division, estimated that Terrebonne could "operate at a 
profit" by 1944; even then, it would still be a year behind 
any other cooperative farm project. Mace would not venture 
a guess as to when Terrebonne would be able to wipe out its 
deficit. The future of Terrebonne, Mace said, was "highly
47Item-Tribune. June 25, 1939.
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problematic."4Q
In 1943, C. Stott Noble, assistant Farm Security 
Administrator in Washington, took charge of liquidating the 
Schriever project.49 He first canceled the Terrebonne Asso­
ciation's ninety-nine year lease by mutual agreement with its 
membership. Under incessant Congressional prodding, Noble 
quickly made plans to sell the land. Making use of the fact 
that Terrebonne was already broken up into individual farms, 
Noble offered project residents a chance to buy the units 
they occupied; he was also willing to sell units to eligible 
farm families who were not Terrebonne residents. By June, 
1945, he had sold fifty-two qf the fifty-five operating 
units at an average price of $4,312 each; this included all 
but 214 acres of the project's land. The FSA recovered 
$224,200.00 through sales of individual units, while it had 
invested $300,389.67 to purchase the land and develop the 
homesteads. In land and development costs, the Terrebonne 
project closed with a deficit of $59,804.78. In addition, 
Terrebonne had invested $205,270.25 in community facilities; 
and after five years Its accumulated operating expenses were
48Eaton. Exploring Tomorrow's Agriculture. 163, 154;
U. S. Senate, Agricultural Subcommittee of the Committee on 
Appropriations, Hearings on the Agricultural Department 
Appropriation Bill for 1943. 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 1942, 
pp. 656-59.
49senate Agricultural Subcommittee of the committee 
on Appropriations, Hearings on the Agricultural Department 
Appropriation Bill for 1946. 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 1945, 
p. 287.
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$47,769.47 more than its income. Since neither amount was 
recoverable, the total deficit was $307,871.50.^°
Terrebonne1s losses were due in part to handicaps 
over which it had little control. At first, Terrebonne was 
crippled by restrictions on the amount of cane and other 
crops that could be produced under AAA regulations. Harmount 
had originally intended to divide his cultivatable land into 
700 acres of cane, 1,000 of corn, 100 of potatoes and vege­
tables, and 640 of pasture land for livestock. But AAA 
quotas limited Terrebonne to 398 acres of sugar cane, ninety 
of potatoes, and sixty acres of "truck" garden vegetables— a 
total of 548, or about nine acres for each of the sixty 
families living on the p r o j e c t . T h e  AAA had initially 
based Terrebonne's sugar cane allotment on the fact that the 
project was operated as a single plantation; to have the 
acreage increased, the FSA asked for cane quotas for seventy- 
two individual family farm units rather than for one large 
plantation operated by a number of day laborers. As a result, 
Terrebonne received permission to cultivate a maximum of ten 
acres of cane per family, thus increasing the entire cane
^House Agricultural Subcommittee of the Committee on 
Appropriations, Hearings on the Agricultural Department 
Appropriation Bill for 1947, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 1946, pp. 
1393, 1413; see A. D. Stewart, Memo to Frank Hancock,
October 27, 1944, R. G. 96, National Archives. The Terre­
bonne Association discontinued operations as of December 31,
1943. A. D. Stewart, Memo to Frank Hancock, January 14,
1944, ibid.
5-j-Times-Picayune. July 15, 1940.
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acreage possibly to 710 acres. The AAA did not revise its 
allotments for other crops at Terrebonne until wartime needs 
caused allqquota restrictions to be dropped.53 if Terre­
bonne had been allowed to cultivate half of its arable acre­
age (about 2,700 acres), as Harmount wished to do, that 
would still have been only 22.5 acres per family . 5 3
Harmount offered a steady stream of apologies for
Terrebonne's record in his "Annual Financial Reports."
Despite growing losses, he never waivered from his claim
that project operations showed consistent improvement.
After Terrebonne was ordered to liquidate, he wrote:
[In 1939] The Association took over this property,
which was then made up of four old run down plan­
tations, [with] poor drainage, insufficient cane, 
potato or vegetable quotas . . . , and for the
last five years, at great sacrifice to themselves,
fought their way upward, overcoming handicaps of 
floods, freezes, droughts, crop diseases, failures 
and faulty farm planning forced upon them. 54
In 1943, Harmount claimed, the members of the association
"felt they were achieving their goals and could see success
in the future . " 3 5  Claude Woolsey, regional chief of the
52John j. Riggie, Memorandum for Brice Mace, Jr., 
April 15, 1940, R. G. 96, National Archives; see E. B. 
Whitaker to W. W. Alexander, June 24, 1939, ibid.; C. B. 
Baldwin to Joshua Bernhardt, May 28, 1940, ibid.; T. Roy 
Reid to W. W. Alexander, April 6 , 1940, ibid.; J. 0. Walker 
to T. Roy Reid, May 6 , 1940. ibid.
5 3 Times-Picavune. July 15, 1940.
5^Annual Financial Report, Terrebonne Association, 




Cooperative Division# believed Harmount was over optimistic. 
He blamed weak management for Terrebonne' s failure to work 
out its problems.56
During the Depression, the rural resettlement program 
sought to stabilize tenancy by taking low-income farmers off 
poor land and helping them get a new start as independent 
farmers with better land. On all except three projects in 
Region Six, the Resettlement Administration and the Farm 
Security Administration stressed the family-size farm of 
forty to sixty acres, enough land to keep one farmer and his 
family busy and give them a good living. The home manage­
ment program encouraged each family to strive for economic 
self-sufficiency. Most resettlement projects centered around 
a cooperative association which subleased land to its members 
in family-size units for individual operation. The Farm 
Security Administration, in contrast, converted Terrebonne 
into a collective farm. In making a wide departure from 
traditional farm practice, Terrebonne illustrates the radical 
side of the rural resettlement program. Bad weather, faulty 
planning, and mismanagement doomed Terrebonne to failure, 
despite the optimism of Harmount and some of the project 
members. "I think we are going to put it over," said one 
settler soon after the project opened. "I think everybody
5®Annual Financial Report, Terrebonne Association, 
Inc., for the Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 1942, ibid.
will get together and work hard and put it across."^ But 
everybody would not get together and work hard in a com­
munity effort. Most had still not given up hope of owning 
their own land.
5?Times-Picavune. April 9, 1939.
CHAPTER IX
PUBLIC RELATIONS, POLITICS, AND RESETTLEMENT
The New Deal resettlement agencies were anxious to 
present a favorable image of their activities to the general 
public. The short-lived Division of Subsistence Homesteads 
engaged in public relations work to promote its community 
program, as did the Rural Rehabilitation Division of the 
Federal Emergency Relief Administration. But neither of 
these agencies seemed more conscious of the power of public 
opinion or more determined to gain support for its programs 
than did the Resettlement Administration and its successor, 
the Farm Security Administration. In fact, public relations 
probably consumed more of the regional office's time than 
any other one task outside the immediate supervision of its 
rehabilitation and resettlement programs. Regional offi­
cials probed public opinion, molded it, and occasionally 
yielded to it, but they were always alert to what people 
were thinking and saying about resettlement. No public 
expression of disapproval escaped their notice; when facing 
opposition, they generally tried to clear up misunderstand­
ings, compromise differences, or at least present the 
government's side to the public. Nor did the regional office
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fail to note any expression of favorable opinion, especially 
if uttered by some influential citizen or organization and 
published in a newspaper or periodical. The RA and FSA also 
sought the support of all political leaders in Region Six—  
senators, congressmen, governors, state and local officials—  
but avoided political alliances with any group that would 
cut them off from rival factions.
I
The Resettlement Administration did not operate as if 
it were in a political vacuum, going about nobly uplifting 
the rural poor and blithly ignoring the realities of power. 
From the start, Administrator Rexford G. Tugwell consulted 
with congressional leaders when appointing men to top posi­
tions. In 1935, for example, Tugwell wrote President Roose­
velt that T. Roy Reid was "a democrat and acceptable to 
Senator [Joseph T.] Robinson."^ Before A. D. Stewart took 
over the regional directorship in 1941, Farm Security Admin­
istrator C. B. Baldwin cleared the appointment with Senators 
Pat Harrison and Theodore G. Bilbo of Stewart's home state.
As majority leader in the Senate and Senator from Arkansas,
•^Rexford G. Tugwell to the President, July 10, 1935, . 
Record Group 96, Records of the Farmers' Home Administration, 
National Archives (to be cited hereafter as R. G. 96, National 
Archives).
^C. B. Baldwin to R. W. Hudgens (telegram), February 
7, 1941, ibid.
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Robinson could presumably have exercised a powerful veto over 
resettlement activities in his home state if he had wished; 
but he apparently approved of the RA and FSA's programs, 
although perhaps reluctantly. After a conference with 
Robinson in 1936, Reid reported that he held a favorable 
attitude toward resettlement work; "he seems," Reid wrote,
"to be pleased that he helped push the passage of the Bank­
head-Jones Bill through the S e n a t e . B u t  the RA and FSA 
also had the support of other members of the congressional 
delegations of the three states. In 1936, Senator Harrison 
wrote Tugwell that he had "followed the Resettlement Adminis­
tration one hundred percent."^ Arkansas congressman Wilbur 
Mills, wrote Baldwin in 1939, "is very much infeferesfceddin our 
program, and was to a large extent responsible for the fact 
that our part of the program did not strike any snags in
5[the House Banking and Currency Committee]." The same year, 
A. Leonard Allen, congressman from Louisiana, told a constitu­
ent: "I think I have often said that I was as much interested,
or perhaps more, in the work this department [FSA] is doing, 
than any other agency created by the Roosevelt Administra­
tion. . . . This is one New Deal Agency that I would like to
3t. Roy Reid to W. W. Alexander, December 23, 1936,
ibid.
^senator Pat Harrison to R. G. Tugwell, July 16, 1936,
ibid.
5C . B. Baldwin to T. Roy Reid, August 25, 1939, ibid.
272
see continued and I have no hesitancy in voting funds for 
it."6
Reid wanted to build up support among state political 
leaders, but he met widely different attitudes toward the 
plight of farm tenants and sharecroppers. In 1936, with the 
Southern Tenant Farmer1s Union nipping at his heels, Governor 
J. M. Futrell appointed a farm tenancy commission to study 
tenant problems in the state and to recommend a program of 
reform. He apparently recognized the seriousness of the 
South's sharecropping system? "the evils arising from it 
have become so serious," he said, "that the problem must be 
met if Arkansas is to have peace among its citizenship and 
if agriculture is to continue to hold its rightful place as 
the state's chief resource . " 7 Futrell hoped other states in 
the South would set up their own commissions to examine 
tenant problems. Governor Richard Leche of Louisiana com­
mented that "it never hurts to discuss a situation." Governor 
Hugh White declared "we have no sharecropping problem in 
Mississippi that I know anything about."® Neither Louisiana 
nor Mississippi ever showed as much official concern for 
croppers and tenants as did Arkansas. Assuming that Governors
&A./Leonard- Allen to Colonel A. L. Smith, May 13, 
1939, ibid. Reid often met with congressional delegations
from Region Six. See T. Roy Reid to W. W. Alexander, March 
14, 1939, ibid.
7Arkansas Gazette (Little Rock), August 16, 1936.
^Ibid.
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Futrell, Leche, and White accurately reflected public opinion 
in their respective states, one would not be surprised to 
find Arkansas more receptive to the New Deal resettlement 
program. Indeed, this may in part explain why the Resettle­
ment Administration started eleven projects in Arkansas, four 
in Louisiana, and three in Mississippi.
Of all the political problems the RA and FSA had to 
face in Region Six, perhaps none was more difficult than 
Senator Huey P. Long and his political machine in Louisiana. 
Huey Long was a charter member of the FRBC group ("For Roose­
velt Before Chicago”), but he broke with Roosevelt during 
the first Hundred Days. In the summer of 1935, while Long 
was voicing his determination to control all Federal relief 
spending in Louisiana, Tugwell established the offices of 
the Louisiana and Mississippi directors in Little Rock 
rather than in their own states . 9 It was a blow aimed 
directly at Long. RA leaders also worried about how to set 
up a resettlement and rehabilitation organization in Louisi­
ana, an organization that would have to go down into every 
rural parish in the state with hundreds of Federal jobs to 
fill.
After touring Louisiana, Robert W. Hudgens and George 
M. Reynolds, trouble shooters for the Washington office, sub­
mitted a report to Tugwell outlining three possible options
^Arkansas Gazette. July 22, 1935. See ibid., July 20,
1935; and Chapter II.
for organizing the RA in Huey Long's state . - 1-0 First, they 
said, the Louisiana organization could be made in cooperation 
with the Long machine, an unthinkable choice since Long 
opposed New Deal programs at practically every turn. Second, 
it could be set up in alliance with the anti-Long forces in 
Louisiana. This was what the Louisiana Emergency Relief 
Administration had done, reported Hudgens and Reynolds, and 
it had cost the ERA much in independence and efficiency, 
besides diverting it from its relief work. The Resettlement 
Administration should not, they advised, allow itself to be 
used as part of an anti-Long machine, especially if this 
would defeat the purpose for which the RA was set up. Third, 
the RA could form a non-political organization, keeping it 
independent of any political faction. The latter was the 
best, most practical course, they argued; this approach was 
not expected to incur the wrath of the Long machine (Reynolds 
and Hudgens believed that the most Long hoped for was to 
neutralize the political effect of Federal spending in Louisi­
ana, not actually control it) . But they anticipated opposi­
tion from the anti-Long faction since the latter believed 
the RA's purpose was to help them build up an anti-Long 
machine. Ironically, the report ended: "to follow the third
course and do an excellent piece of work is . . . in the long 
run the most effective opposition to Senator Long." Long's
•^Robert W. Hudgens and George M. Reynolds, Memorandum 
to R. G. Tugwell, July 15, 1935, R. G. 96, National Archives.
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death in September relieved the RA of its dilemma. In May, 
1936, Reynolds wrote: "The Long faction has made peace in
Washington— they evidently are taking the attitude they will 
vote in accordance with the wishes of FDR on any measure."
He further reported that Governor Leche was favorably in­
clined toward the RA, as was Mrs. Huey P. Long.-*--1- In 1936, 
Reid moved the Louisiana director's staff to New Orleans and 
the Mississippi office to Jackson.
II
The Information Division of the regional office served 
as Reid's liaison staff between the operating divisions (like 
Resettlement or Rehabilitation) and the general public.
0. E. Jones was the first Information advisor, followed by 
George Wolf and J. Lewis Henderson; all were professional 
newspapermen. The Information Advisor became in effect the 
press secretary for the regional office. The most important 
service he performed was to establish and maintain cordial 
relations with the public in Region Six. To do this, he had 
at his command an organization that included radio, photo­
graphic, correspondence, and editorial sections. ^  The 
Information Division found the best and friendliest medium 
for conveying information to the public to be daily and
  H - G e o r g e  M. Reynolds to W. W. Alexander, May 22, 1936,
ibid.
l^see John Fischer, Memorandum for 0. ,A. Simmes,
July 19, 1941, ibid.
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weekly newspapers. Its staff wrote everything from simple 
press releases to feature stories for metropolitan Sunday 
magazine sections, distributing them through a network of 
450 newspapers on a regular mailing list. They supplied the 
public with pamphlets on resettlement in Region Six, worked 
up exhibits for county and state fairs, and handled arrange­
ments for dedicatory ceremonies at resettlement projects 
Where possible, the Division worked through civic clubs, 
churches, fraternal groups, chambers of commerce, labor 
unions, farm organizations, schools and colleges.^ From 
January to August, 1939, for example, Wolf estimated that 
local personnel had given 884 luncheon dlub talks, regional 
and state personnel 150 talks.^
As long as depression hung over the countryside, the 
resettlement agencies enjoyed their greatest public support 
in Region Six. In December, 1936, according to a Gallup 
poll, public opinion in the South strongly favored government 
help for low-income farmers. Gallup's question was, "Would 
you favor government loans, on a long-time and easy basis, 
to enable farm tenants to buy the farms they now rent?" In 
Arkansas, eighty-nine per cent of those polled answered yes, 
as did eighty-eight per cent in Mississippi, and eighty-four
l^Report of Activities of Information Division from 
July 1, 1935 to December 31, 1936, ibid.
1-4J o h n  Fischer, Memorandum to all Information Advisors, 
December 10, 1940, ibid.
l5George Wolf to John Fischer, August 16, 1939, ibid.
per cent in Lotiisiana.1® But whether these majorities 
favored the resettlement program specifically is another 
question. In his first annual report (1936), Reid stressed 
the good public relations enjoyed between the Resettlement 
Administration and the general public in Region Six. "The 
press," he wrote, "has been favorable and generally anxious 
to carry information about Resettlement." Such local groups 
as civic clubs, farmers organizations, and home demonstration 
councils were giving their support. "There have been no 
opposing organizations, and the public, generally, seems to 
be very favorable to the work which Resettlement is doing. 
There is, occasionally," he admitted, "criticism of pro­
cedures or of delays in activities, but the general objec­
tives of the work seems to be meeting with strong public 
favor . " 1 7  Almost a year later, John Fischer, national 
information director, reported! "Newspapers continue to be 
extremely friendly both to work undertaken by RA and the new 
work of FSA. The opening of projects in Arkansas and the com­
pleted projects in Mississippi received wide and laudatory 
comment."1® Not all favorable comments went as far as that
ISBirminqham News (Alabama), December 13, 1936; 
Arkansas Gazette. December 12, 1936.
17Annual Report, Resettlement Administration, Region 
VI, As of December 31, 1936, R. G. 96, National Archives.
18John Fischer, Memorandum for W. W. Alexander, 
November 20, 1937, ibid.
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of a farm wife in West Carroll Parish, Louisiana, who told a 
home demonstration supervisor: "The RA was thought of by
God Himself . " 1 9
Occasionally, regional officials had to deal with 
situations that might have caused an unfavorable influence 
on public opinion. Reid wanted to make sure good news got 
spread around, but he was equally determined to keep the lid 
on bad news. On June 9, 1939, the Lake Providence, Louisiana,
Banner Democrat carried a brief story on the front page of an
/
automobile accident near Tallulah in which two men and a girl 
were killed and another girl was hurt. No names and few 
details were given. George Wolf, regional information 
advisor, had persuaded the Banner editor to make no mention 
of the fact that the two men were FSA personnel assigned to 
the nearby Transylvania project— plus the fact that they were 
both drunk at the time of the accident. "We have had so much 
trouble down there," Wolf wrote, "I was afraid the crowning 
touch would be the project getting the reputation of hiring 
a bunch of drunks . " 2 0  His attempt to cover up the facts 
almost worked, as it doubtless did in other cases, but the 
Banner editor apparently forgot to tell the society page 
editor about his agreement with the FSA. There it was, 
printed on an inside page of the same issue, the story Wolf
19Martha D. Dinwiddle to R. G. Tugwell, July 23, 1936,
ibid.
20George Wolf to Jack [John Fischer], June 27, 1939,
ibid.
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wanted suppressed, and written with a strong dose of moral 
disapproval. This version of the accident told what the men 
did for a living, their names, Leroy Haggerty and J. G. 
Enright, but not the names of the girls (they were from up­
standing local families presumably), and called attention to 
the fact that both men were forty years of age, the girls 
twenty or less, and that one man was married. The accident 
took place, the society editor further revealed, at four 
o'clock in the morning after the couples had just left the 
"Cat Head" club at Tallulah. The men "had no less than ten 
drinks each," but the girls, she assured the readers, had 
not been drinking at all.
One of the most dangerous public relation problems 
in Region Six was race. "At the risk of its political life, " 
writes William E. Leuchtenburg, "the PSA was scrupulously 
fair in its treatment of Negroes."2^ The Division of 
Subsistence Homesteads had plans for a Negro project at 
Camden, Arkansas; 2 2  but it was the Resettlement Administration 
that built the first community projects for Negroes in Region 
Six: the Lakeview community in Phillips County, Arkansas;
the Townes project near Earle in Crittenden County; and the 
Mounds community in East Carroll Parish, Louisiana. For a
^William E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and 
the New Deal. 1932-1940 (New York, 1963), 141.
22See Glenn E. Riddell to Bruce L. Melvin, March 1, 
1934, March 4, 1934, R. G. 96, National Archives.
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time, the FSA supervised farm operations at Mound Bayou, 
Mississippi, an all-Negro rural community of long standing.
In addition, Negroes became members of predominantly white 
projects throughout the region. By 1941, the FSA had 
developed 791 units for Negro farmers in the Region Six 
resettlement program, or about thirty-two per cent of the 
total units . 3 3
The Farm Security Administration's policy of fair 
treatment for Negroes meant public relations trouble— trouble 
from blacks as well as whites, with the regional office 
caught in the middle. Some Negroes were quick to protest 
what they believed to be racial discrimination in the reset­
tlement program. Region Six officials, for example, ran into 
Negro protests over its handling of the Transylvania project 
in East Carroll Parish, Louisiana. When the RA made the 
Transylvania purchase, about 250 Negro families were farming 
the land under private ownership. But the FSA developed 
Transylvania as a white project, meaning that all 250 Negro 
families moved off and white families took their places. The 
American Negro Press, a wire service for such papers as the 
Pittsburgh Courier, the Kansas City Call, and the Louisiana 
Weekly (New Orleans), challenged this action on the ground
3 3 U. s. Department of Agriculture, Farm Security Administration, "Resettlement Projects, Land and Source of 
Acquisition, Also Status of Unit Development, Vendor, Acre- 
ate and Number of Units Developed or Undeveloped, Region 
Six," January 1, 1941, mimeographed, ibid.
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of racial discrimination.24 in response, Region Six offi­
cials appeared anxious to keep the confidence of the Negro■ 
press. In early February, 1939, E. B. Whitaker (assistant 
regional director), E. C. Mclnnis (Louisiana director), and 
0. E. Jones (regional information advisor), and others spent 
two hours in New Orleans with Leon Lewis, Pittsburgh Courier 
reporter.25 Specifically, Whitaker and Mclnnis presented a 
plan to ensure fair treatment for Negro farmers. The Mounds 
project, Lewis learned, would take care of qualified Negro 
families displaced at Transylvania. Lewis "was not only 
satisfied— he was enthusiastic,” according to Jones' report 
of the meeting? his personal investigation convinced him 
that his race "was, if anything, getting the best of the 
bargain there."26 jn reality, Lewis was still skeptical. 
There was no discrimination in the incident, he reported to 
his paper. "The same thing that is being done to Negroes is 
being done to whites, and they are complaining as much."2 ? 
The Information Division afterward made a conscious effort 
to keep the ANP informed of progress at Mounds. When the
2%fathan W. Robertson, Memorandum for W. W. Alexander, 
n.d., ibid.; George Fischer, Memorandum to C. B. Baldwin, 
n.d., ibid.
25o. E. Jones to Nathan Robertson, February 8 , 1939,
ibid.
26ibid.
27Leon Lewis to Claude Barnett, February 4, 1939,
ibid.
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construction contract was awarded, Jones wired them full 
details of building plans. As a result, the ANP let up on 
its criticism.^®
At the same time, the Farm Security Administration 
was sensitive to the danger of alienating whites in the 
region. Regional officials always sought the support of the 
white majority before going ahead with proposals for Negro 
resettlement. On the Louisiana Farm Tenant Security project, 
for example, community manager Lee 0. Sumrall not only 
sounded out local opinion on plans for resettling Negroes on 
some of the units, but asked reputable citizens and land­
owners to write letters expressing their approval of the 
29idea. This request was standard procedurey without their 
support, no Negroes would have been placed on the project. 
Despite all precautions, however, white racism was a problem 
in Region Six. Concerning Negro participation in FSA pro­
grams, a Mississippi woman wrote: "I know that the aim of
this Administration is to force racial equality on us here 
in the South, and the farm program is the biggest weapon they 
have. Government lending without security and wastefulness 
in general," she said, "is killing what little thrift and
^Division of Information, Farm Security Administra­
tion, to Associated Negro Press (telegram), February 7, 1939, 
ibid.
29Lee o. sumrall to E. B. Whitaker, August 31, 1936, 
ibid.; T. Roy Reid to W. W. -Alexander, December 11, 1937, 
ibid.
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initiative our Negroes had to start with . " - * 0
Perhaps more important, the PSA in Region Six en­
countered the race issue in its personnel policies. Negroes 
were employed at lower levels of the regional organization. 
Most Negro employees were women serving as home management 
supervisors on Negro projects, with a few in charge of home 
management work for an entire project. A  few Negro men 
worked as farm management advisors and as field representa­
tives in the rural rehabilitation or tenant purchase pro­
grams. 3^ in 1939, the PSA had eleven Negro workers in 
Arkansas, seven in Louisiana, and fourteen in Mississippi.3^ 
Despite this meager number, a group of Adams County, Missis­
sippi, citizens decided in October that the FSA had gone too 
far. They drew up a resolution protesting the employment of 
a Negro in the FSA office at Natchez. 3 3  (He was serving as 
assistant rural rehabilitation supervisor for Adams County.) 
They called attention to the fact that the FSA office was in 
the courthouse, that "young white ladies" were employed in 
the office and came into contact with the Negro employee.
30Ruby Pugh (Mrs. J. J. Pugh) to George Mitchell, 
September 9, 1941, ibid.
31william F. Littlejohn, Memorandum for George S. 
Mitchell, November 14, 1940, ibid.
32gee T. Roy Reid to W. W. Alexander, April 26, 1940, 
ibid.; Roy Hendrickson, Memorandum for George Mitchell,
May 24, 1940, ibid.
3^Dan R. McGehee to C. B. Baldwin, October 31, 1938,
ibid.
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Senator Theodore G. Bilbo also strongly protested this "out­
rage." "You,” he wrote Mississippi director M. T. Aldrich,
"as a good Mississippian, should clean out this situation at 
once.” ''Mississippi is still a white man's country," he said, 
"and we do not want Negroes bumping up against our white 
girls in the official life of the state."34
The FSA quickly yielded to prejudice. There were 133 
Negro clients in Adams County, Reid explained; "it is neces­
sary for someone to contact them and go into homes and work 
intimately with them in the home and farm planning opera­
tions." The Negro employee "does not have an office with 
white people . . . ," Reid added, "it is not the desire of 
this office to place a Negro worker where it is objectionable 
to the p e o p l e . "35 FSA Assistant Administrator Milo Perkins 
thought the FSA had acted in accordance with a "well estab­
lished principle throughout the South"— that of letting 
Negroes work with Negroes. In addition, Perkins noted, the 
Adams County assistant supervisor "was to operate entirely 
under the immediate supervision of the white rural rehabili­
tation supervisor and was to spend all his time in the field. 
Consequently, he would have had no occasion to enter into 
office relationships with the other employees of the county
34rpheodore Gm Bilbo to M. T. Aldrich, October 29, 
1938, ibid.
35t . Roy Reid to Theodore G. Bilbo, November 4, 1938,
ibid.
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unit."3® The unfortunate man was transferred out of Adams 
COunty, presumably to a more congenial location. Later, 
regional director A. D. Stewart expressed a desire "to employ 
Negro personnel when it can be done without creating a situ­
ation that would injure rather than improve the advancement 
of the colored people . ” 3 7  In truth, the PSA had all the 
problems it could handle without getting involved with a 
crusade for racial justice.
Ill
Prom the beginning, the Resettlement Administration 
encountered skeptics and critics in Region Six. Free-lance 
writer Oren Stephens once told the story of a sociologist 
visiting Pine Bluff, Arkansas. He stopped a native Pine 
Bluffian on a street corner and asked him what he thought of 
the Farm Security Administration. "Well, it's this way,” 
said the native:
The government spends a million dollars or so to buy 
a forty-acre farm for a down-and-out sharecropper.
They give him a mule, a bathtub, and an electric 
shoelacer. They lay a railroad track to his house to 
carry the tons of forms he has to fill in. A  bunch 
of experts figure his milking I.Q. Lo and behold, 
they teach his wife how to hook rugs and can beef and 
spinach, and they show the feller how to plant soybeans 
and prune an orchard— and by darn, Luke, them govern­
ment people can actually do it! After we poke fun at
3®Milo Perkins to Pat Harrison,, November 18, 1938,
ibid.
  37A. D. Stewart to C. B. Baldwin, December 10, 1941,
ibid.
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their red tape for a year or two, they ups and 
proves their experiment is self-liquidatin'—  
that the feller is makin' his payments and 
raisin' a family, too. And I don't know who's 
more surprised, me or the 'cropper.38
The native correctly stated the pro and con arguments over 
the resettlement (cost, frills, red tape), but not all critics 
were so open-minded. When Lakeview, a Negro project in 
Phillips County, Arkansas, was announced, the Helena World 
was openly skeptical; "We want to see how many families will 
succeed in becoming independent when the means to do so come 
handed out on a platter from a bountiful government . " 3 9  In 
1937, an El Dorado, Arkansas, man complained that government 
assistance to low-income farmers was an unfair advantage to 
hard-working citizens, presumably like himself. "I believe 
we have too many farmers already . . . ," he told Secretary 
of Agriculture Wallace. "You or our National Government want 
to buy land and place more farmers to farm against each 
other." "The old pioneer citizen and taxpayer of the country 
[is] trying to live, and pulling himself up by his boot 
straps, while his neighbor [is] supported by the Govern­
ment . " ^ 0 Two years later, several members (not a majority) 
of the Arkansas General Assembly signed a statement protesting
3 8 0ren Stephens, “PSA Fights for Its Life." Harper's 
Magazine, CLXXXVI (April, 1943), 479.
3Helena World (Arkansas), November 11, 1935.
40b . Justiss to Henry Wallace, December 26, 1937,
R. G. 96, National Archives.
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the FSA's policy of operating farms in "direct competition 
with private farmers."41 Much of the early criticism was 
sporadic, unorganized, and without any real consequence; but 
by the late thirties, FSA policies had antagonized certain 
interest groups, and opposition increased.
In a 1939 meeting at Biloxi, the Mississippi Bankers 
Association passed a resolution condemning FSA credit poli­
cies. 42 ijjhe bankers' association was critical of government 
lending agencies for making loans in competition with private 
bankers. The FSA responded by sounding out the extent and 
nature of opposition among Mississippi bankers and by 
attempting to clear up any misunderstanding about FSA programs. 
Mississippi state director Marvin T. Aldrich contacted 
several bankers; and with some, he ran up against solid oppo­
sition. Frank Allen of Canton, one of the leaders behind 
the resolution, "was not in favor of any of the New Deal 
governmental agencies," an FSA official reported. "In his 
opinion the Farm Security Administration was not making any 
loans that the bank [sic] cared to make but [it] interfered 
with the banks' loans to the landlords, who were to furnish 
the tenants."43 But Aldrich found the banking community
41John E. Miller to Franklin D. Roosevelt, February 
3, 1939, Official File 1568, Box 4, Franklin D. Roosevelt 
Library, Hyde P ark, New York.
4 2t. Roy Reid to W. W. Alexander, May 18, 1939, R. G.
96, National Archives.
43Sidney J. Johnson to Marvin T. Aldrich, June 17,
1939, ibid.
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badly split over the resolution, with some of its members 
anxious to make excuses for their association. A. L. Rogers, 
president of the bankers' association, had not been behind 
the move to name the FSA specifically in the resolution. The 
bankers, Rogers told Aldrich, had directed their resolution 
primarily at such agencies as the Home Owners Loan Corpora­
tion, the Federal Housing Administration, the Farm Credit 
Administration, and the Farm Labor Board. They had included 
the FSA because of the fear on the part of some bankers that 
it might later encroach on the loaning functions of private 
bankers, not because of any of its current activities.44 
Information advisor George Wolf also found that the resolu­
tion did not represent the feelings of rural bankers in 
Mississippi; he reported "a sharp division— the city bankers 
voting for the resolution and the country and small-town 
bankers voting against it."45 R. L. Goodwin, vice-president 
of the Farmers and Merchants Bank of Forest, wrote that the 
FSA in his county handled a large volume of loan and long­
term credit "which was not available for any local bank."
"You have helped a great many farmers who could not have 
received this kind of help from any other source," he wrote 
Alexander. "I consider the Farm Security Administration the
44m . T. . Aldrich to T. Roy Reid, May 31, 1939, ibid.; 
Reid to W. W. Alexander, June 7, 1939, ibid.
4 5George Wolf to John Fischer, May 27, 1939, ibid.
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4*6finest New Deal project established by President Roosevelt." 
With opinion divided, the FSA could count on support from at 
least some Mississippi bankers for its credit programs.
In 1942, the Farm Security Administration became 
involved in a different kind of controversy at Transylvania.
On February 11, the Police Jury of East Carroll Parish, 
Louisiana, issued a statement sharply critical of the FSA as 
a whole and the Transylvania project in particular. With the 
nation at war, every unnecessary expenditure must be cur­
tailed, they asserted, but the FSA was spending money at 
Transylvania that would never be returned to the government. 
Under FSA management, moreover, Transylvania's cotton yield 
per acre had dropped far below what the same land had pro­
duced under private ownership, and the land had suffered a 
reduction in its cotton acreage allotment simply because the 
land was not kept in cultivation. They backed this charge 
with a display of research done at the local AAA office. If 
Transylvania was operated so inefficiently, they asked, how 
could the government' s investment be repaid? The Police Jury 
was even more disturbed over the fear, based on newspaper 
reports of congressional hearings on the FSA, that Adminis­
trator Baldwin "might favor" the exercise of eminent domain 
or of expropriation against absentee owners in order to break 
up large southern land holdings." *̂ We are also advised," the
  46r . l . Goodwin to Will W. Alexander, May 12, 1939,
ibid.
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statement read, "that they . . . plan to dispossess absentee 
owners of their holdings that they consider large enough to 
use for F. S. A. projects." This plan was "State Socialism," 
they asserted.47
The FSA faced the charges head-on, did some research 
of its own, the prepared a defense of Transylvania's opera­
tions. Regional resettlement director E. B. Whitaker went to 
Lake Providence and found that the statement was not an 
official statement of the Police Jury, although it did 
reflect the thinking of some of its members. "It was drawn 
up by several landowners," regional director Stewart reported 
to Baldwin, "and circulated over the state in such a manner 
as to make it appear as though it were a statement from the 
Police Jury."4® Transylvania's Board of Directors answered 
the charges in the Lake Providence Banner Democrat.49 True, 
cotton production was down at Transylvania. Under private 
ownership, about 250 Negro families had occupied the Transyl­
vania land, each farming about twenty-three acres devoted 
exclusively to cotton. But the FSA reduced the number of
47a  Statement by the Police Jury of East Carroll 
Parish, Louisiana, Regarding the Policies and Administration 
of the F. S. A., attached to Newton V. Mills to C. B. Baldwin, 
February 23, 1942, ibid.? Police Jury of East Carroll Parish, 
Louisiana, to Claude Wickard, February 23, 1942, ibid.
4®a. D. Stewart to C. B . Baldwin, May 6 , 1942, ibid.
49Lake Providence Banner Democrat. March 20, 1942.
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families to about 150, gave each family about fifty acres, 
and developed a diversified farm management program. Rather 
than have the settlers entirely dependent on a single cash 
crop, the board of directors explained, Transylvania stressed 
food and feed crops, pasture, garden vegetables, poultry, 
milk cows, cattle, and hogs. Transylvania settlers produced 
cotton as their major cash crop, but they had a higher 
standard of living and more security regardless of the price 
of cotton.
At least two local citizens, a landowner and a Police 
Jury member, supported the FSA's explanation. Norris C. 
Williamson, whose property was next to Transylvania, saw part 
of the project almost every day, he said, and the FSA was 
doing a good job operating the l a n d . But since many of 
the settlers were used to the light sandy soil of the 
Louisiana hills, they had to learn how to farm the richer 
delta soil and how to combat the obnoxious grasses of that 
area. In addition, the project had suffered from heavy 
rains during recent planting seasons; but despite its dis­
advantages, he pointed out, Transylvania's cotton yield per 
acre came up to about the parish average every year with one
5°see also R. W. Hudgens, Memorandum to EmeryyE.
Jacobs, September 4, 1942, R. G. 96, National Archives? A. D. 
Stewart to C. B. Baldwin, November 7, 1942, ibid.
^Norris C. Williamson to E. B. Whitaker, February 
15, 1942, ibid.
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exception. P. W. Holt, a member of the Police Jury of East 
Carroll Parish who was convalescing from an accident when 
the statement was issued, wrote that he "did not agree with 
his colleagues on the Police Jury or [with] those sponsoring 
these charges of communism, socialism, or any other kind of 
ism. . . ." Transylvania settlers operated cooperatives for 
their mutual benefit; but socialism, he contended, was a 
bogus issue since each farmer worked his own land and was 
striving toward individual farm o w n e r s h i p . ^
■ t
IV
The New Deal resettlement agencies ran into their 
most serious opposition, both political and ideological, 
from farm organizations in Region Six. All major organized 
farm groups operated in one or more of the three states.^3 
In Arkansas, the Southern Tenant Farmers1 Union, Farm Bureau, 
and Farmers Union were active, as was the National Grange to 
a lesser degree. Louisiana farmers had to choose either the 
Farm Bureau or the Farmers Union, while Mississippians had 
only the Farm Bureau. Since both the STFU and the Farmers 
Union were dealing with basically the same class of people, 
they reached an agreement in 1941: neither would set up an 
organization in territory where the other was already
52f . vt. Holt to H. B. Staples, March 10, 194-2, ibid. 
53T . Roy Reid to W. W. Alexander, May 7, 1940, ibid.
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organized.5^ por Region Six, this meant that the STFU would 
continue unchallenged in most of eastern Arkansas but left 
the rest of the state and all of Louisiana to the Farmers 
Union. Since the STFU tended to expand toward the newer
cotton regions of the southwest rather than to the older
)
lands of the east, the union never attempted to organize in 
Mississippi . 5 5  The Farmers Union limited its efforts to 
Arkansas and Louisiana. Thus the Farm Bureau was the only 
farm organization which functioned in all three states of 
Region Six.
Regional officials tried to work with all national 
farm groups operating in the three states. They encouraged 
membership in farm organizations without becoming active 
partisans for any one group. Nor did they attempt to hinder 
the development, of any organization . 5 5  Many resettlement 
projects had their own "farm bureaus," and STFU membership 
was not uncommon among resettlement clients in eastern 
Arkansas. In 1940, for example, the STFU set up a local at 
Dyess. The FSA firmly refused to recognize it as a bargain­
ing agent but allowed the union members themselves to remain
5 ^h. L. Mitchell to James G. Patton, September 11, 
1941, ibid.. see also H. L. Mitchell to George S. Mitchell, 
September 2, 1941, ibid.
5 5 H. L. Mitchell, Columbia Oral History Project inter­
view, mimeographed copy, Southern Tenant Farmers' Union 
Papers, Box 80, Folder 1465, university of North Carolina 
Library, Chapel Hill, North Carolina.
5 5 T. Roy Reid to C. B. Baldwin, October 25, 1940, R.
G. 96, National Archives.
on the project.5  ̂ jjo further attempts were made to unionize 
resettlement projects in the region. Yet a policy of 
neutrality did not guarantee the cooperation of all farm 
groups. In Region Six, opposition from farm groups came from 
both sides of the political spectrum, the Southern Tenant 
Farmers' Union on the left and the Farm Bureau on the right.
The newest farm organization in the region, the 
Southern Tenant Farmers' Union, originated in. protest against 
AAA policies which favored landlords over tenants and share­
croppers.^® The STFU sought to awaken the nation's con­
science to the evils of the Southern farm tenancy system 
through strikes, marches, and protest demonstrations. As a 
result, union leaders interpreted the appointment of the 
President's Special Committee on Farm Tenancy and the 
Arkansas Farm Tenancy Commission as union victories; more 
important, they claimed credit for New Deal programs which 
assisted low-income farmers . ^ 9 In 1941, STFU secretary and 
former president H. L. Mitchell told a Congressional committee 
"That a government program to aid tenant farmers, share­
croppers and other low income farmers was initiated is due in 
part to the work of the Southern Tenant Farmers Union . . .
®7W. W. Alexander to T. Roy Reid, March 4, 1940, ibid.; 
see E. B. Whitaker to H. E. Trulock, April 4, 1940, ibid.
®®See David Eugene Conrad, The Forgotten F_armers:
The Story of Sharecroppers in the New Deal (Urbana, 111.,
1965), 83-88.
®9Mitchell, Columbia Oral History interview.
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succeeded in making America conscious of its most pressing 
problems . 1 , 6 0
But from the start, STFU leaders found themselves in 
disagreement with the New Deal's basic approach to farm 
tenancy. When the President's Committee on Farm Tenancy 
recommended privately owned family farms as the best means 
for eliminating tenancy, the union's representative on the 
committee, W. L. Blackstone, dissented in a minority report. 
A program to encourage small homesteads, he said, was "an 
economic anachronism, foredoomed to f a i l u r e . instead, he 
urged the establishment of cooperative farm projects? no 
doubt Blackstone had in mind Delta and Providence Farms, two 
private resettlement projects being operated by Sherwood 
Eddy in Bolivar and Holmes, counties, M i s s i s s i p p i . ^  For the 
same reason, STFU was cold to the Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant 
bill. Although gratified that farm tenancy was receiving 
some attention from the Federal government, the union charged 
in 1935 that the bill pointed backward and not forward. "It 
was really thought of 70 years ago when men were talking of 
'Forty acres and a mule.'" The Bankhead-Jones bill would
6 ° S t a t e m e n t  Q f h. L. Mitchell to the Committee Inves­
tigating the Farm Security Administration, dated May 26, 1943, 
R. G. 96, National Archives.
^National Resources Board, Farm Tenancy: Report of
the President's Committee (Washington, 1937), 22.
6 ^see Delta and Providence Farms Papers, University 
of North Carolina Library, Chapel Hill, North Carolina.
possibly, union leaders feared, lead to "a subsidized 
peasantry in America.” While mentioning cooperative farming, 
the bill did "not lay sufficient stress upon this type of 
farming which many far seeing Americans regard as the only 
practical solution to our rural problems." "Through co­
operative farming, " they asserted, "a new and altogether high 
type of rural life may be developed in the South. By drawing 
groups of farmers together into a co-operative community they 
may have at their disposal all of the resources of modern 
civilization."^3
In reality, however, STFU leaders thought the New 
Deal was good as far as it went; the problem was that it did 
not go far enough. The union was not opposed to a policy 
favoring small farms, Mitchell later claimed, but he ques­
tioned whether many tenants and croppers were qualified for 
small farm ownership, since they had always been accustomed 
to s u p e r v i s i o n . to Mitchell, the ideal solution would
have been for a group of farmers to rent a plantation, 
divide half of the proceeds from the sale of the crops among 
the tenant families, and, since the other half did not have 
to go to a private owner, put it into a pool to pay the rent,
6 ^A statement Concerning Farm Tenancy Submitted to 
the Governor's Commission on Farm Tenancy by the Executive 
Council, Southern Tenant Farmers' Uhion [c. 1936], Socialist 
Party of America Papers, Duke university Library, Durham, 
North Carolina.
^Mitchell, Columbia Oral History interview.
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buy needed farm equipment and supplies, and eventually pur­
chase the plantation outright. The tenants themselves would 
select a manager to supervise farm operations. "We wanted 
. . . a  village economy where the workers lived in a village 
and worked out on the farms with a certain small acreage of 
land where each man could have his own garden and raise his 
own food," Mitchell explained. "We visualized something 
similar to what they have in Europe where the workers all 
live in one central village."65
In addition to ideological differences, the STFU was 
critical of the local administration of the resettlement and 
rural rehabilitation programs. In a 1936 statement, union 
leaders complained that the Resettlement Administration's 
decentralized organization kept it from fulfilling its 
obligations. Too much authority had been given to local and 
state committees, committees that helped decide who received 
loans and other assistance. "If the Resettlement Administra­
tion is to adequately serve the people who need its services, 
political and anti-social officials should be removed and 
replaced by men who have a broad knowledge of the problems 
involved and sympathy and interest in the people . ” 6 6  in 
Arkansas, the Southern Farm Leader charged, STFU,members had 
been thrown off RA programs after they protested graft.
6 5 Ibid.
66A Statement Concerning Farm Tenancy Submitted to 
the Governor's Commission on Farm Tenancy.
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According to the STFU paper, the Resettlement Administration
had made loans in Louisiana
. . .  to people who do not need them and denied them 
to needy croppers and tenants. Croppers and tenants 
who do get loans are told what and where to buy and 
very seldom see the cash. Not one Resettlement farmer 
we know of has a copy of the Resettlement contract.
The field agents act as complete dictators.67
In 1940, the union's sixth annual convention adopted 
a series of resolutions which summed up their criticisms of 
the resettlement agencies. The FDA's "greatest drawback," 
the delegates said, was "faulty local administration.” The 
convention went on record recommending (1 ) that "dirt 
farmers" be put on local administrating committees; (2 ) that 
Congress appropriate larger sums of money to make the program 
more effective; (3) that more large cooperative projects be 
set up; (4) that special projects be set up to care for 
migrant farm workers in Southern cotton regions; (5) that 
the FSA be created as a permanent agency independent of the 
Department of Agriculture. The Farm Security Administration, 
they were saying, was not doing enough, was doing some things 
wrong, and could do everything better . ® 8
In 1940, the STFU and the FSA began to move closer 
together, and before long they found much common ground.
®^Southern Farm Leader. May. 1936, copy in Southern 
Tenant Farmers' Union Papers, university of North Carolina, 
Chapel Hill, North Carolina.
6 8 "proceedings of the Sixth Annual Convention,
Southern Tenant Farmers' Union," Socialist Party of America 
Papers, Duke university Library, Durham, North Carolina.
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Charles M. Measles, Labor Relations director for Region Six, 
sought to improve relations between the two organizations by 
talcing part in the STFU's 1940 annual convention. Speaking 
to the delegates, Measles expressed pleasure that the STFU 
favored larger appropriations for resettlement work and 
promised the union sympathy and cooperation from his office. 
"X believe that you are fighting for the same things we are," 
he told the delegates, "and I pledge you our full coopera­
tion. All we need is more money and a chance to help . " ® 9  
In a question and answer session, some delegates still showed 
suspicion, but Measles was not easily ruffled. What should 
we do when local officials of the FSA fail to cooperate? 
someone asked him. Surprisingly, Measles admitted that some 
project managers and other officials should be c h a n g e d . 7°
During the coming months, STFU-FSA relations con­
tinued to improve. Secretary of Agriculture Claude Wickard, 
in a memorandum dated March 21, 1941, stated that the STFU 
was a "group to be considered as a worthy effort to improve 
the position of low income farm people and one . . . which 
it would be entirely proper for your field people to have a 
cordial relationship with."7-1- About the same time, Reid 
wrote that the FSA was already doing everything the STFU was
6 9 Ibid. 70ibid.
7^Quoted in C. B. Baldwin to Ernest S. Morgan, July 2, 
1941, Box 36, Folder 662, Southern Tenant Farmers' Union 
Papers, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, North 
Carolina.
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currently proposing . 7 3  Perhaps projects like Terrebonne and 
Lake Dick were concessions in part to STFU demands for experi' 
mentation with cooperative farming. But Reid's statement was 
made possible because the union itself seemed to be moderat­
ing its demands somewhat. In their eighth annual convention 
(1942), the union delegates passed a resolution 'tthat the 
STFU seek to preserve the family type farm a way of life, to 
help provide cooperative services for purchasing goods, 
marketing and preserving farm products, and to fully support 
all programs designed to reestablish farm people on the 
land . " 7 3  What brought the STFU and Region Six officials even 
closer together, however, was the Farm Bureau's campaign 
against the FSA.7^
V-
The Farm Bureau was just as devoted as the Southern 
Tenant Farmers' Union to promoting the interests of farmers—  
but not the same farmers. While some critics have charged 
that the Farm Bureau did not represent farmers at all, its
7 3 T. Roy Reid, Memorandum to C. B. Baldwin, October 4, 
1941, R. G. 96, National Archives.
7 3 H. L. Mitchell to C. B. Baldwin, January 16, 1942,
ibid.
7 ^See, for example, "Farm Bureau Advocates Abolition 
of Tenant Program," Tenant Farmer, I (July 15, 1941), 1; 
Leonard G. Herron, "How Farm Security Administration Is 
Helping Tenant Farmers, Sharecroppers, Farm Laborers,"
Tenant Farmer, I (August 15, 1941), 2.
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membership consisted mainly of large-scale, commercial 
farmers, the kind of farmers who would benefit most by the 
Bureau' s concern with commodity prices and its unconcern with 
rural welfare programs . ^ 5 in the 1930's, the American Farm 
Bureau Federation was a powerful conservative farm organiza­
tion. After the Depression struck, Farm Bureau leaders were 
quick to define agricultural problems in terms of national 
responsibility and to look to Washington for action. "Unless 
something is done for the American farmer, " warned AFBF 
president Edward A. O'Neal in January, 1933, "we will have a 
revolution in the country-side in twelve months."^
Not surprisingly, the Farm Bureau rode an insidetrack 
in the early New Deal. Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. 
Wallace consulted with all farm organizations during the 
Hundred Days, but the Farm Bureau played a crucial role in 
early New Deal agricultural policy by uniting farmers in 
both the Midwest and the South behind the Agricultural Adjust­
ment Act. While Farm Bureau leaders deserved little credit 
for helping to formulate agricultural policy, the AAA did 
favor the interests of landlords and large farmers, which 
exactly fit the Farm Bureau idea of whose interests national
^ C h r i s t i a n a  McFadyen Campbell, The Farm Bureau and 
the New Deal; A Study of the Making of National Farm Policy. 
1933-40 (Urbana. 111.. 1962), 22-29.
^®Senate Agricultural and Forestry Committee, Hear­
ings, on the Agricultural Adjustment Relief Plan, 72th Cong.,
2d Sess., 1933, p. 15.
farm policy should favor. But as the New Deal began respond­
ing to the needs of farm tenants and small farm owners, the 
Farm Bureau found less and less to be happy about. When 
President Roosevelt created the Resettlement Administration 
in 1935? Farm Bureau leaders at first adopted an indifferent 
attitude; they were equally unenthusiastic about the Bankhead 
Jones bill of 1937.77 They offered neither active opposition 
nor active support. In Region Six, all farm organizations, 
Reid wrote in 1940, had given support to the Farm Security 
Administration. ’"The Farm Bureau has probably been less 
active in its support of the activities of the Administration 
than any of the other organizations . ” 7 8  Within a matter of 
weeks, the Farm Bureau launched a vicious attack against the 
Farm Security Administration on both the national and local 
level.
The Farm Bureau-Farm Security Administration conflict 
was only part of a larger power struggle between the Farm 
Bureau and the United States Department of Agriculture. 
Essentially, the Department of Agriculture wanted to free 
itself of dependence on the Extension Service for the local 
administration of its action programs and to rely on an 
independent, centralized system of administration. In other
77Grant McConnell, The Decline of Agrarian Democracy 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1959), 97-101.
7 8 T. Roy Reid to W. W. Alexander, May 7, 1940, R. G. 
96, National Archives.
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words, agencies like the Farm Security Administration and the 
Soil Conservation Service could take federal action programs 
directly to individual farmers, short-circuiting all inter­
mediaries. The Farm Bureau, on the other hand, fought to 
have the Extension Service administer practically everything. 
O'Neal, for example, favored giving the FSA's farm and home 
management programs to the Extension Service and turning over 
its loan activities to the more cautious Farm Credit Adminis­
tration. The Farm Bureau eventually mounted a sweeping 
attack on all FSA programs and the way they were being 
handled; but O'Neal concentrated his heaviest fire on the 
resettlement program, the FSA's most vunerable spot. In 
reality, the Farm Security Administration's greatest crime 
was being outside the Farm Bureau's sphere of influence.
Since Farm Bureau leaders could not control the FSA, they 
determined to kill it.7^
The role of the Agricultural Extension Service and the 
land grant colleges of Region Six injected an element of 
irony into the Farm Bureau-Farm Security Administration fight, 
an irony that was not lost on contemporaries. Watching the 
conflict develop, 0. E. Jones, editor of the Batesville 
(Arkansas) Daily Guard and formerly regional Information 
Advisor, could not hold back his dismay. The Arkansas
7 ^Campbell, The Farm Bureau and the New Deal. 156-178; 
J. C. Futrall to Raymond A. Pearson, April 2, 1938, R. G. 96, 
National Archives.
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Extension Service, he noted, was dominated by the American 
Farm Bureau Federation? Extension agents in Arkansas were 
actively soliciting Farm Bureau memberships "to swell the 
coffers of a private lobbying organization." "The Farm 
Bureau, on the one hand, is waging a fight to the death in 
an effort to kill the Farm Security Administration, a branch 
of the Department of Agriculture, with a campaign of vilifi­
cation and misrepresentation; and the Extension Service, a 
branch of the Department of Agriculture, is actively engaged 
at the same time in trying to build the agency [the Farm 
Bureau] that is slashing a dagger at the back of its sister 
agency." "I am loath," Jones added, "to sit idly by and see 
the Farm Bureau blitzkrieg the Farm Security Administration 
out of existence . 1 , 8 0 In Region Six, perhaps the groundwork 
for this conflict had been prepared in the early days of the 
Resettlement Administration.
Since many RA programs overlapped agricultural exten­
sion and home demonstration work, Reid sought the cooperation 
of the region's Extension Services and land grant colleges, 
which operated the Extension programs.8^ At first, there was 
a natural alliance between the Resettlement Administration 
and the region's farm leaders— an alliance that was
8 0 O.,E. Jones to M. L. Wilson, March 26, 1942, ibid.
. 8^Raymond A. Pearson to Dan T. Gray, April 1, 1936,
ibid.
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especially close in Arkansas. In 1935 and 1936, the regional 
office was largely staffed with men on leave from the College 
of Agriculture at the University of Arkansas or from the 
state's Extension Service. Reid himself had served twelve 
years as assistant director of the Extension Service in 
Arkansas. Indeed, a large proportion of personnel at every 
level had some connection with either Fayetteville or Exten­
sion work, or bothy many project managers, for example, were 
former county agents with agricultural-college degrees. To 
bring the region's agricultural leadership into general 
policy planning, Reid in early 1936 set up three state land 
committees whose memberships included (among others) the dean 
of the college of agriculture! and director of extension in 
each state . 8 2  The committee's function was to approve reset­
tlement areas and make general recommendations in regard to 
the resettlement program, but it was also a way of securing 
the endorsement of agricultural leaders on resettlement pro­
jects. As regional director, Reid no doubt hoped to make 
use of his ties with the Extension Service, but he ran into 
trouble where he probably least expected it— in Arkansas.
The Resettlement Administration got off to a bad 
start with Dan T. Gray, Dean of the College of Agriculture 
and Director of the Extension Service, when it established 
the regional headquarters at.Little Rock rather than at
8 2 T. Roy Reid to R. G. Tugwell, February 11, 1936, 
ibid.; see Dan T. Gray to W. W. Alexander, June 10, 1937, 
ibid.
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Fayetteville. In the spring of 1936, still feeling resent­
ful and suspicious, Gray complained that "RA authorities 
never did consult with authorities of the College of Agricul­
ture before their policies were announced. . . . "  "The RA," 
he continued, "has simply announced what is to be done in 
Arkansas and then come around in a very friendly way and 
asked cooperation of those associated with the College of 
Agriculture." "The two organizations— ours and theirs— are, 
as a matter of fact, just moving along side by side, without 
any serious attempt at fundamental cooperation.
Specifically, Gray disagreed with the RA's selection 
of resettlement areas. Concentrate the resettlement program 
in the hill country of northern Arkansas, he advised, thin 
out farmers on poor lands, increase the size of farms, and 
stress, livestock production. Disagreeing, Reid argued that 
northern Arkansas was too thickly settled, good farm land 
was scarce and high priced, and much of the l^nd was sub­
marginal. He favored buying up submarginal land, moving 
people off (not keeping them on it), and resettling them on 
alluvial land in the river b o t t o m s . » i  do not 'think that 
he is critical of our particular purchases," Reid wrote of 
Gray, "but that he is critical of the fact that we are 
attempting to resettle farmers on family-size farms rather
8®Dan T. Gray to Raymond A. Pearson, April 20, 1936,
ibid.
®4t . Roy Reid to W. W. Alexander, May 15, 1937, ibid.
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than on larger commercial farms."82* But in 1937 and 1938, 
the College of Agriculture became perhaps more unsympathetic 
with resettlement activities, feeling that the program in 
Arkansas was being carried on with a "lack of capable plan­
ning and failure to utilize proven knowledge and experience." 
They naturally felt they could provide the proper advice . 8 8
The Farm Bureau began its attack against the FSA in
1940. After publishing an article critical of the Lake Dick
project, the Memphis Commercial Appeal8 7 received a large
number of letters from Arkansas and Mississippi citizens
requesting that its reporters make surveys of other projects
and FSA programs in certain counties. Regional director
A. D. Stewart watched and waited; then in early 1941, he
summed up what was happening in his regions
I am afraid that these letters and requested studies 
are inspired by ".a certain organized” group that is 
using this method of attack to offset an inspired 
public confidence in connection with the Farm 
Security Administration program in its extension of 
help to low-income families. The most dangerous 
attack that could be made would be to have presumably 
disinterested citizens pick the weak spots in our 
program and magnify them. We shall then watch every 
step taken in this direction carefully and prepare to 
meet the situation when it arises . 8 8
85t. Roy Reid to W. W. Alexander, June 11, 1937, ibid.; 
Will W. Alexander to Reid, May 6 , 1937, ibid.
8 6 c. D. Kinsman to M. L. Wilson, July 20, 1937, ibid.
87commercial Appeal (Memphis, Tennessee), July 5, 1940.
8 8 a. D. Stewart, Quarterly Report, January-March,
1941, R. G. 96, National Archives.
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Soon the Farm Bureau launched a barrage of criticism 
in newspapers, through the mail, and in special meetings.
By early 1942, Stewart wrote that the Farm Bureau attack had 
become his 11 foremost" problem . 8 9  Farm Bureau opposition, as 
Stewart saw it, came principally from state Farm Bureau 
officials, with very little criticism from county officials. 
He reported receiving resolutions and letters from Farm 
Bureau members in many counties indicating that they did not 
concur in the FSA fight. "It is quite evident," he wrote, 
"that state farm bureau [sic] leaders did not consult county 
bureau units before launching the attack on our program.
There is abundant evidence to show that farm bureau ranks 
have broken at many points and that there is clearly much 
resentment among bureau members over the position some of 
their leaders have taken . " 9 0  But in this struggle, the FSA 
could take little comfort in the knowledge that its opposi­
tion was divided.
The Farm Bureau conducted its campaign against the FSA 
on more than one level. In the newspapers of the region, the 
Farm Bureau's most common charges were excessive administra­
tive costs, misuse of funds, and poor management. Perhaps a 
typical exchange took place in Jackson, Mississippi, papers 
in 1942. On March 26, Mississippi director Dallas C.




Vandevere reported that 25,397 families in the state with 
PSA loans had increased their net income from $328 before 
becoming clients to $571 at the end of 1941— an increase of 
seventy-four per cent. During the same period, they raised 
their net worth (all assets from furniture and clothes to
q*ifarm equipment) from $443 to $567. Vandevere's report drew
immediate fire from the Farm Bureau. His figures were 
accurate, a Farm Bureau news release admitted, but misleading. 
The net income increase for FSA families was indeed seventy- 
four per cent, but all farm income in Mississippi had 
increased eighty per cent during the same period. "Being an 
FSA client kept 25,000 farmers from getting 6% additional 
increase in farm income," the Farm Bureau charged. Vande- 
vere's claim of a gain in new worth was equally misleading, 
since the FSA had made an average loan of $942 t<5 each 
client) "it took $942 of FSA money to increase the net worth 
of clients by $124." For good measure, the Farm Bureau also 
criticized the high number of employees in Mississippi, 
excessive administrative costs, the misuse of grants, collec­
tive farming projects, and government policies to acquire
go"as much land as possible.
It was Vandevere's turn again, and he replied promptly. 
The Mississippi Farm Bureau was out "to discredit the work 
being done by low income farmers under FSA guidance,"
91jackson Daily News. March 26, 1942. 
92jackson Daily News, March 30, 1942.
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Vandevere said. "Like all of the accusations made by the 
Farm Bureau, the recent outburst is another exhibition of 
statistical gymnastics and comparison of unrelated facts and 
figures." When discussing income, he contended, the FSA. 
referred to net increases in income, while the Farm Bureau 
used gross increases. Actually, he said, the increase in 
gross cash income was six per cent, not eighty per cent.
What about charges of over-staffing and excessive adminis­
trative costs? Consider Coahoma County, Mississippi, for 
example, Vandevere said. There, the FSA had three field 
workers, two clerks, and one person on temporary assignment, 
a force of six which supervised 128 borrowers. In Missis­
sippi, Vandevere said, it cost taxpayers seventy-two dollars 
a year per family to administer the FSA programs including 
all losses and expenses.
On its lowest level, the Farm Bureau attack was 
unequaled for bitterness and vvituperation. In July, 1942, 
for example, the Tate County Farm Bureau, at Senatobia, 
Mississippi, adopted a series of resolutions critical of 
"civilian agencies of alphabetical fame, now being maintained 
at the expense of the American taxpayer. . . ." According 
to the resolution, such alphabetical agencies "sponsor and 
support many practices, projects and programs which are 
economically unsound, socialistic and communistic in their 
tendency, wholly un-American and contrary to the principles
93jackson Clarion-Ledcrer, April 3, 1942.
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of our form of government, which must be discontinued and 
the agencies abolished." The Farm Security Administration, 
"with the cooperation of their socialistic friends," was 
attempting to overthrow the legitimate American farmer and 
was using "approximately forty per cent of their appropria­
tions for administrative c o s t s . T h e  next month, at a 
Farm Bureau meeting at Greenville, Mississippi, a speaker 
insinuated that the FSA was opposed to private ownership of 
land and advocated Government ownership of all land, if 
this was what we were fighting World War II for, the speaker 
was saying, there was no point in the United States winning 
the war. This kind of attack was more difficult to deal with 
because of its unthinking and unreasoning quality.9^ More 
suggestive and spectacular, it dealt less with hard facts 
and figures and, in its most extreme form, was more common 
in private meetings than in the public press.
Farm Bureau speakers swarmed all over the states of 
Region Six criticizing the FSA in meetings for local Farm 
Bureau personnel and county agents. On May 8 , 1942, Milton 
Tainter, Louisiana Farm Bureau secretary, spoke to a group 
of county agents and Farm Bureau officials at Minden, 
Louisiana. A. E. Robinson, district rural rehabilitation
-------------------------------  t
9 4Theodore G. Bilbo to C. B. Baldwin, July 3, 1942,
R. G. 96, National Archives.
9 5 J. Lewis Henderson to Jack H. Bryan, August 20,
1942, ibid. ? Delta Democrat-Times (Greenville, Mississippi), 
August 2, 1942.
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supervisor in northern Louisiana, attended the meeting to 
gain first-hand information regarding Farm Bureau activi­
ties. His report provides some insight into the nature of 
such meetings and an example of how the FSA. reacted.
Recognizing Robinson as a FSA employee, Tainter 
explained at the outset that he was not directing his remarks 
at "any individual or any agency," and specifically not at 
the Farm Security Administration. Judging from Robinson's 
report, Tainter seemed to make two main points: Government
agencies were helping low-income farmers while neglecting 
large farmers, and the Extension Service should run all 
government farm programs, anyway. He condemned "certain 
governmental agencies" for placing too much emphasis on sub­
sistence farming "to the advantage of the tenant farmers and 
at the expense of the large landowner farmers." Tainter dis­
paraged FSA efforts to aid low-income farm families, a 
category which, he explained was "made up of seventy-five 
per cent negroes [ sic ] and twenty-five per cent fairly low- 
class white people." He objected to "giving such people an 
advantage that was being denied to the average farmer." 
Besides, Tainter added, this time really punching below the 
belt, the Farm Security Administration program was "bringing 
about certain conditions in which iiegroes in Louisiana were 
assuming the attitude that the government was endorsing a 
program whereby they would receive equal rights." Tainter 
went on to attack what he called "bureautocracy." The
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Department of Agriculture, he charged, was dictating all 
agricultural work in Washington and eliminating local con­
trol of agricultural programs. He contended that county and 
home demonstration agents should handle government programs 
at the local level. At one point, the meeting chairman 
recognized a lady— Robinson missed her name— who stated that 
"it was time for us to wake up to the fact that our govern­
ment was turning socialistic." She put it better than he 
could have, Tainter remarked when she sat down. He had 
supported President Roosevelt for three consecutive terms, 
but now, he suggested, the President was too busy with the 
war and leaving domestic affairs to Mrs. Roosevelt.
After the meeting adjourned, Robinson and Tainter met 
for lunch. Robinson tried to clear up certain errors that 
Tainter had made earlier or to set him straight on FSA pro­
grams and policies. But again, Tainter told Robinson "that 
/
he hoped we [FSA officials] would not assume that his remarks 
were addressed specifically toward our organization." The 
purpose of this tactic may have been to throw the opposition 
off guard or simply to remain on good terms with local FSA 
personnel. In March, 1942, speaking to the Lafourche Farm 
Bureau ht Thibodaux, Louisiana, Tainter charged that the Farm 
Security Administration and the Department of Agriculture 
were permeated with men who leaned to the left. With Terre-
96a . E. Robinson to E. C. Mclnnis, May 12, 1941, R. G. 
96, National Archives.
314
bonne project manager George Harmount sitting in the audi­
ence, Tainter explained that he did not mean any FSA men in 
the field; officials in Washington were the ones leaning to 
the left. Nor did he have any criticism, Tainter made clear, 
of the Terrebonne project or the way it was being handled.
"You can take this for what it was worth, " Harmount wrote 
Whitaker, "but I think he did not dare, with me being there,
to try to start anything. . . ."^7
Regional director Stewart managed to find some good 
results coming out of the Farm Bureau controversy. It was 
"gratifying," he wrote in 1942, "to observe that Farm Security 
has many supporters which he did not. know about before? a 
large number of editors, civic clubs, preachers, educators, 
organizations, and individuals have openly expressed their 
support of the Farm Security Administration." Other groups 
had sided with the Farm Bureau against the FSA, he admitted, 
but it was a far smaller number. "On the whole, " Stewart 
added, "the controversy has given us the opportunity to 
acquaint many people with the FSA program who had not under­
stood it before. Hundreds of unsolicited letters have been
received from people in all walks of life, expressing their 
wholehearted support and endorsement of the FSA. Also, when 
the Farm Bureau criticized specific projects, FSA clients 
"have enthusiastically repudiated statements attributed to 
them and conditions reportedly existing." At Biscoe Farms
97q . dx Harmount to E. B. Whitaker, March 21, 1942,
ibid.
in Arkansas, the families themselves issued statements 
answering the attacks. "A strong public reaction has de­
veloped against the Farm Bureau," Stewart asserted, "because 
of its attack on the FSA. This reaction is general, except 
possibly among certain of the large farm operators who depend 
on tenant as day l a b o r . A t  best, however, these were only 
short-term gains for the FSA.
Before World War II, the Resettlement Administration 
and the Farm Security Administration enjoyed a friendly 
environment in Region Six. With a program as controversial 
as rural resettlement, both agencies sought to minimize con­
flict through good public relations. In Louisiana, the 
Resettlement Administration had to play consensus politics, 
seeking friendships with two rival factions but becoming the 
tool of neither. The Information Division sought to win 
support by stressing resettlement's positive side and, if 
necessary, by suppressing the negative. When running into 
opposition, regional officials seemed to play it by ear; 
they answered the Police Jury's charges at Transylvania, 
tried to divide the opposition in the case of the Mississippi 
bankers, or gave ground on the race question. Typically, 
the resettlement agencies were willing to challenge Southern 
traditions on race, but only if no objections were raised.
But by the start of World War II, Farm Bureau opposition and
98a . d . Stewart, Quarterly Report, January-March, 
1942, ibid.
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congressional disapproval had begun eroding PSA support at 
the local level and eventually succeeded in killing the PSA 
in 1946.
The FSA's ultimate fate was not decided in Region Six. 
But the opposition of the two most important farm organiza­
tions in the region does provide insight into the nature of 
the resettlement agencies. The Farm Bureau criticized the 
PSA from a conservative point of view almost diametrically 
opposite to the Southern Tenant Farmers' Union1s socialistic 
viewpoint. To the Farm Bureau, for example, the PSA was 
spending too much money; the STFU argued it was not spending 
enough. The Farm Bureau wanted the Extension Service to 
exercise more influence in FSA programs; the STFU thought 
the large farmer-dominated Extension Service already occu­
pied too many positions of influence. The Farm Bureau 
opposed the FSA's "impractical socialized farming projects," 
perhaps the most notorious of the FSA's crimes; the STFU 
hoped to see more such projects established. In every 
instance, the FSA's position was in the middle of two 
extremes. Regional officials, for example, were never 
enthusiastic about cooperative farming, they had always 
stressed the individualistic family farm, and they had been 
gradually phasing out the cooperative projects. This doubles 
the irony of the Farm Bureau-Farm Security Administration 
struggle. The Farm Bureau attack came when the resettlement 
program was becoming somewhat more conservative than it had 
been a few years before, and the STFU came to the defense of
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an agency that was far less radical than they would have 
preferred. Neither left-wing nor right-wing farm organiza­
tions wholly endorsed what the PSA was doing, and at various 
times both had actively opposed it. Perhaps the opposition 
and dissatisfaction of both liberal and conservative groups 
suggests that the Resettlement and Farm Security programs 
were rather moderate in nature after all.
CONCLUSION
"The fight over the abolition of the Farm Security
)
Administration," writes Paul Conkin, "was one of the most 
bitter domestic issues during World War II . ” 1  It was a fight 
the FSA had little chance of winning. From 1937 on, a con­
gressional coalition of conservative Democrats and Republicans 
engaged in a running battle with the Administration over 
almost all New Deal programs. After Pearl Harbor, President 
Roosevelt was unwilling to take strong stands on domestic 
issues and risk alienating congressional support for vital 
wartime programs. As a result, the conservative bloc seized 
the oppostunity to dismantle as much as possible of the New 
Deal. In addition, the Resettlement Administration and its 
successor, the Farm Security Administration, had antagonized 
a coterie of powerful opponents. Southern landlords and 
large farm corporations relied on the labor of the very 
groups the FSA befriended: tenants, sharecroppers, and
migrant farm workers. As the FSA took them under its wing, 
the large farm interests began to worry about losing their 
cheap labor supply. For similar reasons, private processors
•*-Paul K. Conkin, Tomorrow a New World: The New Deal
Community Program (Ithaca. N. Y., 1959), 220.
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and retailers felt threatened when the FSA made loans to 
farm cooperatives. Unfortunately, the landlords, large farm 
corporations, and middle men had powerful backers in Con­
gress, while the people the FSA helped most usually did not 
even vote. The FSA's most dangerous and determined enemy, 
however, was the American Farm Bureau Federation. With con­
gressional assistance, the Farm Bureau led the attack on the 
FSA that eventually killed it.
The battleground of the struggle was the committee 
hearing rooms on Capitol Hill. At the House Appropriation 
Committee hearings of 1941, the Farm Bureau opened an 
ambitious campaign to remake the entire U. S. Department of 
Agriculture in its own image, but achieved little except to 
force small reductions in appropriations and to keep FSA 
personnel out of Civil Service. Afterward, Farm Bureau 
president Edward A. O'Neal decided to zero in on a more 
vulnerable objectives the Farm Security Administration. In 
early 1942, he appeared before the Byrd Committee— officially 
known as the Joint Committee on Reduction of Nonessential 
Federal Expenditures. Senator Harry F. Byrd of Virginia and 
other anti-New Deal congressmen were raising the cry of 
economy as an excuse for demolishing New Deal agencies; and 
the Farm Security Administration was one of their main 
targets. A  shrewd showman, O'Neal began his testimony with 
the revelation that FSA supervisors regarded the poll tax as 
a proper expense in an individual client's farm and home
management plans. Having gained the committee's full atten­
tion, O'Neal outlined the Farm Bureau case against the FSA. 
Most Farm Security programs were no longer necessary, he 
claimed, and the rest should be turned over to other agencies. 
He went on to make a series of sweeping charges: the FSA
established quotas of clients in order to spend all funds 
appropriated and to maintain full personnel employment, 
"solicited" clients to meet quotas, burdened clients with
L
more loans than they could repay, established "socialistic 
and impractical farming projects,” made emergency grants to 
enable repayment of loans and conceal the record of failure, 
used renewal notes and variable payment plans to disguise 
low payment on loans, employed pressure groups to maintain 
congressional appropriations, wasted funds in excessively 
high administrative costs, and exercised rigid control of 
business and farm plans of clients. After the Byrd Committee 
hearings, Congress cut off all funds fpr collective farms 
like Lake Dick and Terrebonne and requested the rapid liqui­
dation of all resettlement projects. Later in 1942 and in 
1943, the Farm Bureau repeated substantially the same 
charges before the House and Senate committees on appropria­
tions . 2
— See ibid., 223, 224? Grant McConnell, The Decline of 
Agrarian Democracy (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1959), 97-111; 
Sidney Baldwin. Poverty and Politics; The Rise and Decline 
of the Farm Security Administration (Chapel Hill, 1968), 
342-52.
The Farm Security Administration fought its Armageddon 
in 1943 and 1944 at the Cooley Committee hearings. For two 
years, Representative Harold D. Cooley, Democrat of North 
Carolina, had sought a resolution calling for an investiga­
tion of FSA activities; the House finally passed it in March, 
1943, setting up a Select Committee of the House Committee^ 
on Agriculture. The Cooley Committee offered an open forum 
for criticism of FSA programs; and after taking testimony 
for more than a year, it published two fat volumes (four 
parts) of Hearing's on the Farm Security Administration.̂
The Farm Bureau again marched out its familiar repertoire of 
accusations, but this time gave them a new emphasis. From 
past experience, Farm Bureau leaders had learned what issue 
would have maximum effects the community program. The 
resettlement projects were costly, unsuccessful, and worst 
of all, similar to the collective farms of Soviet Russia.
To the Farm Bureau, the resettlement program was the best 
proof that the FSA was a socialistic effort to destroy tradi­
tional land policy in the United States. The FSA had leased 
a few projects (Terrebonne, for example) to cooperative 
associations on ninety-nine year leases, and these leases 
were supposedly evidence of the FSA's rejection of fee simple 
ownership. The rural poverty programs, Farm Bureau leaders
^Select Committee of the House Committee on Agricul­
ture, Hearings on the Farm Security Administration. 78th 
Cong., 1st Sess., 1943-1944.
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urged, should be placed in a new agency in order to "save 
the low income farmer from political exploitation and save 
American agriculture from collectivism and Government land­
lordism."^ In defending itself, PSA officials often came 
close to disavowing the entire resettlement program with the 
explanation that it was only managing projects initiated by 
other agencies.
The resettlement projects proved to be the FSA's 
greatest embarrassment, despite the fact that they were a 
very small part of the total work of the agency, unfortu­
nately, the resettlement program, never a congressional 
favorite, lacked definite legislative authority for its 
existence. The Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act of 1937 had 
given the FSA authority to complete existing projects, but 
it could not start new ones. The FSA, in fact, did not have 
authority to purchase land under the Bankhead-Jones Act. As 
early as 1938, Congress limited the use of funds in the 
resettlement program to "liquidation and management.”
Relying on executive orders, however, the Farm Security 
Administration continued to expand some of the projects, but 
did not begin liquidating the program.^ In 1939, Congress 
refused to allot any more funds for the completion of com­
munity projects. Until this time, Region Six director T.
4 Ibid., 802.
^Conkin, Tomorrow a New World, 220.
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Roy Reid was still looking for land to purchase for reset­
tlement purposes. "Though the large number of resettlement 
projects have been now largely completed and are now offering 
challenging problems of management," wrote Reid in early 
1940, "the development work still continues on some projects 
and new land is yet being added to develop other projects. 
After 1940, the FSA could not make loans to new cooperative 
associations, an essential step in the development of almost 
every resettlement community. When America entered the war,
the regional office began acquiring still more land in a new
housing program for defense workers.
In May, 1944, the Cooley Committee found the FSA 
guilty of ignoring the Bankhead-Jones Act and defying the 
will of Congress. The FSA, the committee further charged, 
was
. . . financing communistic resettlement projects, 
where the families could never own homes, or be 
paid for all that they made or for all the time 
they worked, and was supervising its borrowers to 
the extent of telling the borrower how to raise
his children, how to plan his home life and, it is
strongly suspected in some cases, how to vote.7
As a result of the Cooley Committee's findings, Congress
reduced the Farm Security Administration to a powerless
organization without funds. Although the FSA lived on for
6 t. Roy Reid, Annual Report, Region VI, December 31, 
1940, Record Group 96, Records of the Farmers Home Adminis­
tration, National Archives.
. 7 j .  s . .  House of Representatives, Activitieis of the 
Farm Security Administration. Report No. 1430, 78th Cong.,
2d Sess., 1944, pp. 1, 2.
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two more years, its primary task was the liquidation of the 
resettlement projects. In 1946, Congress created a new 
agency, the Farmers Home Administration, which absorbed both 
the FSA and the Farm Credit Administration. The Farmers 
Home Administration carried on the rural rehabilitation and 
tenant purchase programs but rushed the liquidation of any 
resettlement units the FSA had not already sold.®
The controversies of World War II should not obscure 
the real nature of the New Deal resettlement program. The 
Resettlement Administration and the Farm Security Administra­
tion were never as radical as the Farm Bureau and other 
critics pictured them. Yet New Deal agricultural policy did 
break sharply with the past. Before the 1930's, federal aid 
to agriculture had consisted mainly of grants-in-aid for 
agricultural education and long-term credits. But the New 
Deal set up action programs which carried the influence of 
the Federal government down into every rural county in the 
nation. Rexford G. Tugwell hoped to devote the Resettlement 
Administration to the broad problems of rural poverty and, 
most important, land reform. Never before had the Federal 
government bought up submarginal land, converted it to other 
uses than crop production, and resettled the families living 
there on better land. Although Tugwell soon left government 
service, the Farm Security Administration went on to experi­
ment with cooperative farms, long-term leases (as opposed to
8 Conkin, Tomorrow a New World. 227, 229.
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fee simple ownership), medical care cooperatives, and migrant 
labor camps. Even the Agricultural Adjustment Administra­
tion plunged into the unchartedecseasis of crop destruction 
and acreage allotment— expedients which old agrarians accepted 
with reluctance. But if New Deal methods were new, what about 
New Deal objectives?
The Farm Security Administration, the most important 
and longest lived of the New Deal resettlement agencies, 
represented a conservative attempt to deal with the problems 
of farm tenancy. The FSA based its overall program squarely 
on the traditional agrarian principle of owner-operated 
family-size farms. The ideological heritage of the FSA,
Sidney Baldwin has recently written, gave it "a sense of dis­
advantage, an optimistic reformist zeal, a nostalgic yearning 
for restoration of traditional institutions, such as sub­
sistence agriculture and the family farm.”® Above all,
Region Six officials were not revolutionaries, and the reforms 
they pushed did not amount to a revolution. They believed 
the FSA program was fully in accord with American rural 
traditions. Given the background of the regional leadership 
(Southern birth, agricultural education, and Extension 
Service experience), it is hard to imagine them caught up in 
a vision of a "new world" that would eliminate the family 
farm. "The funds available to the RA, " wrote regional 
director Reid, for example, in 1936, "are sufficient only to
^Baldwin, Poverty and Politics, 268.
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provide a demonstration of the possibilities of rural reset­
tlement. But there is no reason why its methods should not 
be embodied in a permanent, family-sized owner-operated farm 
program of the government." "I know of no better means of 
reconstructing our agriculture on a thoroughly sound and 
permanently desireable basis," he added, "than to make as 
its foundation the family-size owner-operated farm."-*-® The 
people who became clients of the resettlement program could 
not have agreed more. On the whole, the resettlement program 
was designed for people who had always made their own way and 
who would not need help except for the Depression. They were 
the kind of people who would be most concerned with owning 
their own little plots and homes.
Thus the central purpose of the New Deal community 
program in Region Six was farm ownership for tenants, share­
croppers, and submarginal farmers who had no other chance to 
escape the plight of Depression. Whether started under the 
Subsistence Homesteads Division, the FERA, or the RA, almost 
all resettlement projects in the region operated on a family- 
farm basis. The family-farm projects were not only more 
numerous, but they cost more money and helped more tenant 
families than the region's three cooperative farms. For
inDaily Graphic (Pine Bluff), August 30, 1936. The 
last sentence is identical to one Secretary of Agriculture 
Henry A. Wallace wrote in 1935, but it still expressed what 
Reid felt about the family farm. See Wallace, "Wallace 
Points to the Danger of Tenancy.1 New York Times Magazine. 
LXXXIV (March 31, 1935), 21.
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example, the Resettlement Administration and the Farm 
Security Administration invested $2,629,567.82 in Terrebonne, 
Lake Dick, and Marcella, the only cooperative farming com­
munities in the region, but poured $13,719,818.70 into 
twenty-three family farm projects. The regional office 
resettled about 2,602 families on the individual farm pro­
jects, while the cooperatives involved only about 207 fami­
lies. Beyond the community projects, the FSA's tenant 
purchase and rural rehabilitation programs, which were also 
aimed at individual farm ownership, expended an additional 
$120,000,000 in Region Six.1^ The cooperative plantation 
proj ects like Terrebonne were new and startling. But what 
seems more important about the New Deal community projects 
as a whole is that the Federal government for the first time 
was operating a program to give direct aid to tenant farmers 
and sharecroppers. This fact also represented a break from 
tradition. The community program was a radical means to 
achieve a conservative and traditional goal.
If the New Deal resettlement agencies sought to
■^Computed from House Agricultural Subcommittee of 
the Committee on Appropriations, Hearings on the Agricultural 
Department Appropriation Bill for 1947. 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 
1946, 1405, 1411-1413. These figures do not include funds 
spent for Dyess Colony or the Mississippi subsistence home­
steads, all of which should be added to the $13,000,000.00
•*-2U. S. Department of Agriculture,. Farmers Home 
Administration.. Report of the. Administrator of the Farmers 
Home Administration. 1946-1947 (Washington, 1947), Appendix 
Tables II, IV.
restore the family farm, how well did they do it? More 
important, how successfully did they alleviate the suffering 
of tenants and croppers? Obviously, the New Deal did not 
spark a revival of family-size farms. Tugwell was correct 
when he pointed out the anachronism of the family farm in an 
age of technology and large-scale, commercial agriculture. 
Nothing could have brought back the family farm. In this 
sense, the resettlement program was not merely conservative; 
it was a bit reactionary. As for farm tenancy, the number of 
Southern tenant farmers dropped dramatically during World 
War II and afterward. In Region Six, the average rate of 
tenancy fell from a high of 67.2 per cent in 1930 to 59.6 in 
1940, 51.0 in 1945, and 42.9 in 1950, and 26.4 in 1959.13 
But most of the families who left tenancy became farm 
laborers, an even lower status than tenancy, not farm owners? 
or they left the land entirely during the war and went into 
the cities and towns. Even so, the New Deal could take 
credit for only a small part of what actual improvement did 
take place. The resettlement projects, tenant purchase, and 
rural rehabilitation programs were simply not large enough 
in themselves to produce a change of great magnitude. In 
Region Six, the resettlement program involved only about 
2,800 families in all three states, although more
s. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of 
the United States, 1942 (Washington.- 1952), 709; Statistical 
Abstract of the United States. 1952 (Washington, 1952), 582? 
Statistical Abstract of the United States. 1962 (Washington,
1962), 619.
329
participated in the tenant purchase and rural rehabilitation 
programs. The RA and FSA did not measure up to the problem 
of farm tenancy, much less to the broader problem of rural 
poverty. Yet neither agency ever intended to do more than 
assist a relatively small number of the beqt qualified 
tenant families.
Today, few people remember the excitement of Dyess 
Colony in 1934, or the optimism of Plum Bayou in 1936, or 
even the radical spirit of Terrebonne in 1939. But at a 
crucial time in American history, such resettlement projects 
brought hope into the lives of a few members of an unfor­
tunate class of people. Perhaps the New Deal did not do 
enough to combat rural poverty, but it did more than had 
ever been done before. At least, the New Deal tried to help.
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY
No adequate study of the New Deal resettlement program 
could be written without the records in the National Archives. 
The most important collection of correspondence, memoranda, 
and reports is Record Group 96, Records of the Farmers Home 
Administration, which contains 2,443 cubic feet of material 
on the Division of Subsistence Homesteads, the Federal 
Emergency Relief Administration, the Resettlement Administra­
tion, and the Farm Security Administration. Stanley W.
Brown and Virgil E . Baugh (comps.) , Preliminary Inventory of 
the Records of the Farmers Home Administration, National 
Archives and Records Service, General Services Administration, 
Publication No. 118 (Washington, 1959) is the best available 
guide to this all-important record group. Unfortunately, 
Region Six is the only one of the twelve regions with no 
records for either the regional director's office or the 
Resettlement Division. Despite this disappointment, National 
Archives records relating to Region Six are still so vast 
that one person could literally spend weeks looking through 
them all. What was lost in the destruction of these records, 
however, can be glimpsed in Works Projects Administration, 
Survey of Federal Archives, Inventory of Federal Archives in 
the States, Series IX, The Department of Agriculture, No. 4,
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Arkansas (New Orleans, 1938-1939).
Four other record groups in the National Archives con­
tain indispensable, but relatively small quantities of, 
records on Region Six activities. Since the Resettlement 
Administration became part of the Department of Agriculture 
in 1937, Record Group 16, Records of the Office of the Secre­
tary of Agriculture, contains material relating to the Region 
Six resettlement program. Record Group 48, Records of the 
Office of the Secretary of the Interior, is disappointing on 
the early subsistence homesteads program in Mississippi. 
Record Group 69, Records of the Work Projects Administration, 
includes the records of the Works Progress Administration, 
the Civil Works Administration, and the Federal Emergency 
Relief Administration. The WPA records are an important 
source of material on W. R. Dyess and the >;ural rehabilita­
tion program in Arkansas. Record Group 207, Records of the 
Housing and Home Finance Agency, contains material concerning 
the last years of the Mississippi subsistence homesteads and 
their liquidation.
In addition, the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library at 
Hyde Park, New York, contains much correspondence relating 
to the Region Six resettlement program in the President's 
official File and the Harry L. Hopkins Papers. The Southern 
Tenant Farmers1 Union Papers in the Southern Historical Col­
lection, university of North Carolina Library, Chapel Hill, 
includes several folders of material relating to Dyess Colony 
and other resettlement activities. The Socialist Party of
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America Papers in the Duke University Library at Durham,
North Carolina, contain correspondence concerning Norman 
Thomas' interest in Arkansas sharecroppers and STFU activi­
ties in Arkansas.
Government documents provide a convenient source of 
descriptive and statistical information on the resettlement 
program. The Resettlement Administration, Interim Report 
(Washington, 1936) is a polished piece of work covering the 
agency's earliest activities. Equally well done, the RA's 
First Annual Report (Washington, 1936) is valuable for its 
comprehensive summary of every aspect of resettlement work, 
showing what has been done to date in elaborate statistical 
tables. The Farm Security Administration's Annual Reports 
(Washington, 1937-1946) never measured up to the RA's high 
standards. Descriptive material is sketchy and sometimes 
statistical data are non-existent. The annual reports of 
the Farmers Home Administration contain the ultimate repay­
ment figures in FSA loan programs, but they are largely 
silent on the liquidation of the resettlement projects. Of 
some value for the final disposition of the projects are the 
annual reports of the United States National Housing Agency 
(1945-1947) and its successor, the United States Housing and 
Home Finance Agency (1947-1953).
The Division of Subsistence Homesteads, the Resettle­
ment Administration, and the Farm Security Administration 
all published hundreds of booklets, pamphlets, reports, bulle­
tins, and circulars for the use of local supervisors, client
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families, and the general public. This material often pre­
sents a romanticized view of resettlement projects, but it 
does convey the mood that permeated the program's early 
years. There are several bibliographies covering most such 
material. The most useful one in Saul M. Katz and Joseph W. 
Eaton, Research Guide on Cooperative Group Farming (New York,
1942). The editors' use of the libraries of Columbia Uni­
versity, the University of Chicago, the Rural Settlement 
Institute of Chicago,aand the New York Public Library, along 
with its relatively late date, make it the most comprehensive 
of all bibliographies published within the FSA's lifetime.
In addition, the listings of government publications,and 
Department of Agriculture and WPA research monographs give 
the Katz and Eaton guide special value. Two other biblio­
graphical aids are Katherine. McNamara, Bibliography of 
Planning, 1928-1935 (Cambridge, Mass., 1936); and Helen E. 
Heunefrund, Part-time Farming in the United States. U. S. 
Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Agriculture Economics, 
Agricultural Economics Bibliography No. 77 (Washington,
1939). The bibliographies 1 in National Resource Board, Farm 
Tenancy: Report of the President1s Committee (Washington,
1937); and U. S. Department of Agriculture, Farmers in a 
Changing World: The Yearbook of Agriculture, 1940 (Washing­
ton, 1940) include selected government publications and 
contemporary magazine articles.
The many congressional committee hearings, reports, 
and documents supply much cold, hard factual information on
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the resettlement projects. The Cooley Committee published 
almost 2,000 pages of testimony and statistical data on the 
FSA: Select Committee of the House Committee on Agriculture,
Hearings on the Farm Security Administration, 78th Cong., 1st. 
Sess., 1943-1944. Part Three contains a valuable summary of 
the resettlement projects, although omitting most subsistence 
homesteads and FERA communities. The committee summarized 
its findings and recommendations in U. S. House of Repre­
sentatives, Activities of the Farm Security Administration, 
Report No. 1430, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., 1944. The Resettle­
ment Administration prepared an elaborate statistical 
analysis of its programs for Congress while almost all its 
resettlement projects were still in the planning stage: U.
S . Senate, Resettlement Administration Program, Senate Docu­
ment No. 213, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., 1936. The annual hear­
ings of the Senate and House Agricultural Subcommittees of 
the Committees on Apprppriations for 1941 through 1947 
convey the headlong haste with which the FSA resettlement 
program was dismantled. Especially useful for demonstrating 
congressional determination to scrap the resettlement pro­
gram are U. S. Senate, Agricultural Subcommittee of the 
Committee on Appropriations, Hearings on the Agricultural 
Department Appropriation Bill for 1943, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 
1942; and the Senate Agricultural Subcommittee of the 
Committee on Appropriations, Hearings on the Agricultural 
Department Appropriation Bill for 1944, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1943. The Senate Agricultural Subcommittee1 s Hearings on the
Agricultural Department Appropriation Bill for 1946, 79th 
Cong., 1st Sess., 1945, contains a specific attack on the 
Terrebonne project. The House Agricultural Committee of the 
Committee on Appropriations, Hearings on the Agricultural 
Department Appropriation Bill for 1947, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 
1946, contains the last published figures on the liquidation 
of almost all resettlement projects, including their total 
cost, the average unit sales price, operating and maintenance 
expenses, and income. Many contemporary critics accused the 
FSA of juggling figures in order to show resettlement pro­
jects operating at a profit. This is an exaggeration, but 
the tables of FSA figures in appropriations committee hear­
ings are misleading if given only a cursory glance, although 
the information is there. The Congressional Record shows the 
growing displeasure with FSA resettlement activities.
Three other public documents deserve mention. John 
B. Holt, Analysis of Methods and Criteria Used in Selecting 
Families for Colonization Projects, Social Research Report 
No. 1, U. S. Department of Agriculture, Farm Security Admin­
istration, and the Bureau of Agricultural Economics 
(Washington, 1937) is an excellent study of the family 
selection programs of all resettlement agencies, with a 
special look at Dyess Colony. Arkansas Emergency Relief 
Administration, A Review of Work Relief Activities in 
Arkansas. April 1st. 1934. to July 1st. 1935 (Little Rock,
1935) contains minute detail oh the development of Dyess 
Colony. A  similar work but with less detail is Arkansas
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Emergency Relief Administration, Traveling Recovery Road:
The story of Relief, Work-Relief, and Rehabilitation in 
Arkansas. August 30, 1932. to November 15, 1936 (Little Rock,
1936).
An invaluable source of information on the local work 
of the resettlement agencies is the newspapers of the region, 
both small-town weeklies and large-city dailies. Newspapers 
not only reflected local attitudes toward resettlement, but 
they published information about land purchase, family 
selection, project development, and in some cases operation, 
although most papers lost interest in local projects once 
the new wore off and the clients settled down to everyday 
living. Even the most humble weeklies provide indispensable 
information, since such papers often served as a kind of 
"official journal" for the announcements of county and parish 
FSA supervisors. Front-page coverage was the rule. One 
example of unusually close cooperation between local project 
officials and a local paper is the McComb Enterprise (Missis­
sippi) in 1934 and 1935. The editor of the paper, J. 0. 
Emmerich, was also the project manager of McComb Homesteads, 
and he gave the project a big play. Another example is the 
Houma Courier (Louisiana), which followed every move made at 
the Terrebonne projects from 1937 to 1940. The Richland 
Beacon-News (Rayville, Louisiana) showed interest in FSA 
activities all over the state, but especially at nearby Crew 
Lake. The Lake Providence Banner Democrat and the Madison 
Journal (Tallulah) were strong boosters of both the
337
Transylvania and Mounds projects in northeast Louisiana.
The Caldwell Watchman (Columbia) ran a series of short 
articles written by Joyce Mullins, Caldwell Parish home 
management supervisor, under the general heading "A Few Facts 
About Resettlement." Both the Osceola Times and the Blythe- 
ville Courier News, the two leading newspapers of Mississippi 
County, Arkansas, gave excellent coverage on the development 
of Dyess Colony, but they both seemed to ignore the colony' s 
troubles after 1938.
The Arkansas Gazette (Little Rock) is the most 
valuable single papef for news about resettlement in Region 
Six. It was located in the same city as the regional head­
quarters and always carried any news release concerning 
Arkansas resettlement activities or any release of region- 
wide importance. The Gazette. like other large-city dailies 
of the region, offers special advantages not available in 
the rural weeklies. Its reporters visited resettlement pro­
jects and interviewed officials and clients, and the numerous 
feature articles they wrote are an important source of 
detailed first-hand information on such projects as Dyess 
Colony, Lake Dick, Plum Bayou, and Lakeview. Resettlement 
projects were news, at least when they were new or when 
troubled with any suggestion of discontent or scandal. They 
were also the source of much human interest material. The 
New Orleans Times-Picavune published several long stories on 
the Terrebonne project, as did the Item-Tribune. The Monroe 
Mornincr News gave the Crew Lake project favorable treatment.
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The Pine Bluff Daily Graphic, unofficial spokesman of south­
east Arkansas, was in an excellent position to cover reset­
tlement activities, since two large projects, Plum Bayou and 
Lake Dick, were located just across the Arkansas River. The 
Jackson Clarion-Ledger and the Daily News (Mississippi) are 
important papers, but they had less resettlement activity to 
cover. The Memphis Commerical Appeal and especially the 
Press-Scimitar (Tennessee), both of which circulated widely 
in eastern Arkansas, reported news from Dyess, Plum Bayou, 
and elsewhere, and generally favored resettlement as a means 
of helping farm tenants.
In the past decade, students of the New Deal have 
begun to give the resettlement program the attention it 
deserves. Most recently, Sidney Baldwin, in Poverty and 
Politics; The Rise and Decline of the Farm Security Adminis­
tration (Chapel Hill, 1968), has written an excellent 
administrative history of the FSA and its predecessors. A 
political scientist, Baldwin is preoccupied with institutional 
survival, goal formation, goal succession, and other such 
concepts, but he has contributed insights that historians 
might have overlooked. The most valuable book on the reset­
tlement program itself remains Paul K. Conkin, Tomorrow ja 
New World; The New Deal Community Program (Ithaca, N. Y.,
1959). Conkin traces the origins of the back-to-the-land 
movement of the Depression, discusses the subsistence home­
steads program, the FERA communities, and the RA and FSA
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projects, giving five communities separate treatment. He 
stresses the discontinuity of the resettlement program from 
previous experience. What he has to say about Region Six 
projects, of course, is meager. An early but still valuable 
study is Joseph W. Eaton, Exploring1 Tomorrow1 s Agriculture 
(New York, 1943). Written under the auspices of the Rural 
Settlement Institute, Eaton had access to certain FSA files 
in Washington, interviewed FSA officials, and visited several 
projects in early 1941. He attempted specifically to explain 
the theory and practice of what he called the "cooperative 
group farms" (like Terrebonne and Lake Dick), which he 
believed to be the wave of the future; but much of what he 
says about project development, organization, and operation 
applies to all FSA communities.
The scope of other secondary works on the community 
program is more limited. Casa Grande Valley Farms, an 
Arizona cooperative farming projects, is the subject of 
Edward Banfield, Government Project (Glencoe, 111., 1951). 
Russell Lord and Paul H. Johnstone (eds.), A Place on Earths . 
A Critical Appraisal of Subsistence Homesteads. Bureau of 
Agricultural Economics (Washington, 1942) contains soci­
ological case studies on thirteen individual subsistence 
homestead communities. Paul W. Wager, One Foot on the Soils 
A Study of Subsistence Homesteads in Alabama (University,
Ala., 1945) is limited to five communities in the Birmingham 
area. Despite the title, Wager deals with FSA projects.
How Greenbelt, Maryland, one of the famous Tugwelltowns,
340
appeared to an early settler is told in George A. Warner, 
Greenbelt: The Cooperative Community (New York, 1954). A
similar work is Raymond P. Duggan, A Federal Resettlement 
Project— Granger Homesteads, School of Social Work, Mono- 
graphy No. 1, Catholic University of America (Washington, 
1937). Paul K. Conkin, "It all Happened in Pine Mountain 
Valley," Georgia Historical Quarterly. XLVII (March, 1963), 
1-42, deals with an FERA community.
A number of new studies provide help in evaluating 
the community program in relation to overall New Deal agricul­
tural policies. Christiana MacFadyen Campbell, The Farm 
Bureau and the New Deal: A  Study of the Making of National
Farm Policy, 1933-1940 (Urbana, 111., 1962) follows the 
rising conflict between New Deal agencies and the American 
Farm Bureau Federation but stops before the latter's assault 
on the FSA. A book that focuses on Arkansas farm tenancy 
troubles is David Eugene Conrad, The Forgotten Farmers; The 
Story of Sharecroppers in the New Deal (Urbana, 111., 1965). 
Conrad does not go into the New Deal resettlement program. 
Richard s . Kirkendall, Social Scientists and Farm Politics 
in the Age of Roosevelt (Columbia, Mo., 1966) discusses 
important farm leaders and thinkers in the New Deal including 
M. L. Wilson and Rexford G. Tugwell. Another significant 
study is Dean Albertson, Roosevelt1 s Farmer: Claude R.
Wickard in the New Deal (New York, 1961). Edward L. and 
Frederick H. Schapsmeier, Henry A. Wallace: The Agrarian
Years, 1910-1940 (Ames, Iowa, 1969), focuses largely on the
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New Deal years. Russell Lord, The Wallaces of Iowa (Boston, 
1947) is an older work that tries to put the community pro­
gram in perspective. The struggle over the FSA in World War 
II is recotinted in Grant McConnell, The Decline of Agrarian 
Democracy (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1953). Alfred W. 
Griswold, Farming and Democracy (New Haven, 1952) traces the 
history of the agrarian myth that the back-to-the-landers 
held. See also Wilma Dykeman and James Stokely, Seeds of 
Southern Changes The Life of Will Alexander (Chicago, 1962); 
and Bernard Sternsher, Rexford G. Tugwell and the New Deal 
(New Brunswick, N. J., 1964).
As a rule, general works on the New Deal treat the 
Resettlement and Farm Security Administrations in cursory 
fashion. But Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Roose­
velt. Vol. II: The Coming of the New Deal (Boston, 1958),
includes an exceptionally full account of the early subsis­
tence homesteads program and the Resettlement Administration's 
activities. Schlesinger's fourth volume, if it appears, 
should devote additional attention to the Farm Security 
Administration. Paul Conkin, The New Deal (New York, 1967) 
works a few comments on the community program into his New 
Left critique. William E. Leuchtenburg. Franklin D. Roose­
velt and the New Deal (New York, 1963) gives the resettle­
ment program its due. Frank Freidel's Franklin D. Roosevelt; 
The Triumph (Boston, 1956) discusses Roosevelt's speeches on 
agriculture during the 1932 campaign. Georgg B. Tindall's 
magnum opus, The Emergence of the New South. 1913-1945 (Baton
342
Rouge, 1967) contains a good summary of Arkansas tenant 
troubles and the New Deal's response.
Among the collections of primary sources in print, 
most supply only incidental material on the resettlement 
program. Samuel I. Rosenman (ed.), The Public Papers and 
Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt (13 vols.; New York, 1938- 
1950) contains executive orders, speeches, and other offi­
cial material relating to the resettlement agencies. Edgar
B. Nixon (comp.), Franklin D . Roosevelt and Conservation 
(2 vols.; Hyde Park, 1957) does not provide much help on the 
New Deal's resettlement work. The published memoirs of New 
Deal insiders also gives minimal help. Harold L. Ickes, The 
Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes (3 vols.; New York, 1953- 
1954) makes clear what he thought about the subsistence home­
steads program on a trip through Tupelo, Mississippi. Rexford 
G. Tugwell. The Democratic Roosevelt (Garden City, N. Y.,
1957) gives insight into the development of the entire 
Resettlement Administration program. Raymond Mo ley, After 
Seven Years (New York, 1939); and Eleanor Roosevelt, This I 
Remember (New York, 1940) are of little value so far as the 
RA and FSA are concerned.
The periodical literature on the New Deal is volumi­
nous. Of the literally hundreds of contemporary articles on 
the community program, few deal specifically with Region Six 
activities. The most helpful, however, are Will W. Alexander, 
"Rural Resettlement." Southern Review. I (Winter, 1936), 
528-39; Oscar Ameringer, "No Thoroughfare to Utopia,"
Reader's Dicrest, XXXVII (July, 1940), 13-16; Mordecai 
Ezekiel, "Schisms in Agricultural Policy," Journal of Farm 
Economics, XXIV (May, 1942), 4-63-76; "FHA [FSA] Helps Con­
struction," Construction News, V (September 28, 1938), 5, 6; 
Richard Heilman, "The Farmers Try Group Medicine, " Harper1 s 
Magazine. CLXXXII (December, 1940), 72-80; Charles P . Loomis 
and Dwight Davidson, Jr., "Sociometrics and the Study of New 
Rural Communities," Sociometrv. II (January, 1939), 56-76; 
Rena B. Maycock, "Home Economic Work in the Resettlement 
Administration," Journal of Home Economics. XXVIII (October,
1936), 560-62; Horace G. Porter, "New Farms in the Missis­
sippi Delta," Louisiana Rural Economist, II (April, 1940), 
5-7; "Rural Industrial Community Projects: Woodlake, Texas,
Osceola, Arkansas, and Red House, West Virginia," Architec­
tural Record, LXXVI I (January, 1935), 14-16; Oren Stephens, 
"FSA Fights for Its Life," Harper1s Magazine. ELXXXVI (April, 
1943), 479-87; Oren Stephens, "Revolt on the Delta: What
Happened to the Sharecroppers' Union," Harper's Magazine, 
CLXXXIII (November, 1941), 656-64; Rexford G. Tugwell, "Co­
operation and Resettlement," Current History, XLV (February,
1937), 71-76; George S. Wehrwein, "An Appraisal of Resettle­
ment," Journal of Farm Economics, XIX (February, 1937), 190- 
202; Lawrence Westbrook, "The Pr&gram of the Rural Rehabili­
tation Division of the FERA," Journal of Farm Economics.
XVII (February, 1935), 98-100; Clarence A. Wiley, "Settlement 
and Unsettlement in the Resettlement Administration, " Law 
and Contemporary Problems. IV (October, 1937), 456-72;
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M. L. Wilson, "The Place of Subsistence Homesteads in Our 
National Economy," Journal of Farm Economics," XVI (January, 
1934), 73-84.
The most useful bibliographical guide to more recent 
articles is William J. Stewart (comp.), The Era of Franklin
D . Roosevelt: A Selected Bibliography of Periodical and
Dissertation Literature. 1945-1966 (Hyde Park. N. Y., 1967). 
Again, Region Six is a research vacuum. The most obvious 
exception is Louis J. Rodriguez, "The Terrebonne Project: 
Ideological Revolution or Economic Expediency?" Louisiana 
Studies, VI (Fall, 1967), 267-77. M. S. Vankataramani,
"Norman Thomas, Arkansas Sharecroppers, and the Roosevelt 
Agriculture Policies, 1933-1937," Mississippi Valley His­
torical Review, XLVII (September, 1960), 225-46, is excellent? 
but Conrad, in The Forgotten Farmers. has treated the subjects— , 
far more thoroughly. See also Jerold Auerbach, "Southern 
Tenant Farmers: Socialist Critics of the New Deal," Labor
History. VII (Winter, 1966), 3-18. A recent article of 
interest in Louis Cantor, "A Prologue to the Protest Move­
ment: The Missouri Sharecropper Roadside Demonstration of
1939." Journal of American History. LV (March, 1969), 804-22.
See also Rexford G. Tugwell, "The Resettlement Idea, " Agri­
cultural History. XXXIII (October, 1959), 159-64.
The South's farm tenancy system has long been a popular 
subject with farm economists, sociologists, and historians, 
but never more so than during the 1930's. A basic study of 
the problem is Rupert Vance, Human Factors in Cotton Culture
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(Chapel Hill, 1929). Charles S. Johnson, Edwin R. Embree, 
and Will Alexander, The Collapse of Cotton Tenancy (Chapel 
Hill, 1935) dramatically called attention to the problem 
while taking some shots at the AAA's effects on tenants. 
Charles S. Johnson goes into more detail in The Shadow of 
the Plantation (Chicago, 1934). W. A. Turner, A  Graphic 
Survey of Farm Tenure,.U. S. Department of Agriculture, Misc. 
Publ. No. 261 (Washington, 1936) is valuable for its statis­
tical data. Another government-sponsored summary is National 
Resources Board, Farm Tenancy: Report of the President1s
Committee (Washington, 1937). Neither Carl C. Taylor, Helen 
W. Wheeler, and E. L. Kirkpatrick, Disadvantaged Classes in 
American Agriculture, U. S. Department of Agriculture, Bureau 
of Agricultural Economics, Social Service Report No. 8 
(Washington, 1938); nor T. J. Woof ter, Jr., et al., Landlord 
and Tenant on the Cotton Plantation. WPA Research Monography,
V (Washington, 1936) should be overlooked. Several small 
studies focus on the states of Region Six: Donald C.
Alexander, The Arkansas Plantation. 1920-1942 (New Haven,
1943); Arkansas State Policy Committee, Agricultural Labor 
Problems in Arkansas. Published Paper No. 1 (n.p., October 31,
1936); H. W. Blalock, "Plantation Operations of Landlords and 
Tenants in Arkansas," University of Arkansas, College of Agri­
culture, Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletin No. 339 
(Fayetteville, 1938); J. G. McNeely, Glen T. Barton, and 
Trimble R. Hedges, "Land Tenure in Arkansas," University of, 
Arkansas, College’ of Agriculture, Agricultural Experiment'.
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Station Bulletin Nol 438 (Fayetteville, 1934); Ralph J.
Ramsey and Harold Hoffsomer, Farm Tenancy in Louisiana. U. S. 
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